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 11 Summary
Summary
High-tech development—which lies at the very heart of the processes of economic 
growth—has been recognised by many developed and developing countries as a strategic 
instrument to enhance and sustain their competitiveness in the global economic network. 
Although the concept of high-tech development differs between countries, many share 
the underlying assumption that the core of high-tech development is to create a sound 
environment where innovation thrives. This ideology implies a definite spatial dimension. 
As a result, various spatial strategies have been formulated and implemented to support 
high-tech development. This has had intentional and unintentional effects on the 
economy, society and space.
Numerous studies have been devoted to exploring, analysing and theorising this global 
phenomenon. However, there has been less attention given to the role spatial planning 
may play in the process of high-tech development and to the factors that shape the spatial 
planning approaches to high-tech development in a particular place. The major objectives 
of this research are to advance the knowledge of the role of spatial planning in the process 
of high-tech development, and to establish an analytical framework that helps reveal the 
major institutional factors that shape spatial planning mechanisms for dealing with the 
spatial issues of high-tech development in different places. This contributes to the field 
of high-tech spatial policies transfer and lesson-drawing. 
In order to explore the major factors that shape the practices of spatial planning in high-
tech development, a comparative approach is applied in this research. The Eindhoven 
city-region in the Netherlands and the Hsinchu city-region in Taiwan are selected as 
case study areas. Both city-regions can be recognised as success stories of high-tech 
development not only on a national scale but also on a global scale, despite the fact that 
they apply different approaches. In the Eindhoven city-region, the governments act as 
supporters and governors. High-tech development in the city-region is a result of close 
collaboration between different levels of government and other parties. In contrast, in the 
Hsinchu city-region the governments act as providers in high-tech development. 
By critically reviewing relevant literature, the research begins with the identification of 
principal components of high-tech development and their spatial dimensions, and with 
the establishment of a set of comparative frameworks, which are built upon the concepts 
of institutionalism and previous comparative studies of spatial planning systems. On the 
basis of the frameworks, the comparative study is conducted. Four major conclusions are 
drawn in this research. 
First, R&D capital, relational capital and human capital can be identified as the principal 
components of high-tech development, but the conception of the principal components 
i
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is not static. It may change through time and space, and be influenced by contemporary 
technological development and dominant discourses about high-tech development. 
Additionally, how governments in a particular place conceptualise the principal 
components will influence the content of their strategies for high-tech development.
Second, how governments in a particular place use their spatial planning system and 
tools to conduct, facilitate and/or coordinate the development of high-tech spaces is 
influenced by the socio-political context (e.g. model of society, administration system 
and conceptualisation of rights in land), conceptualisation of the principal components, 
dominant style of spatial planning, but also by their historical roots and contemporary 
technological capacities. At the city-regional level, the particular culture characteristics 
and historical experience of a city-region also have effects on the approach to spatial 
governance.
Third, it is common that governments recognise the necessity of collaborating with 
knowledge institutes and high-tech firms in the process of high-tech spatial development, 
because they have access to a wide range of know-how and crucial resources. The creation 
of new institutional arenas to invite institutes and firms to participate in the process of 
decision-making is a good strategy for governments, although they must assure that the 
decision-making process is transparent and accountable, and meets the principles of 
social justice. 
Finally, the two cases have shown that a successful high-tech spatial development would 
have spatial effects on the surrounding areas, such as traffic congestion, imbalance 
between land supply and demand for housing and/or industrial land, and so on. It is 
necessary to anticipate and monitor continuously the externalities of the development 
from a more comprehensive perspective and to leave room for adjustment to the spatial 
planning and governance approaches. 
The analytical framework built upon the institutional concepts of Ostrom and Scharpf 
worked well in this research, but in the process of conducting the empirical study I 
found that the framework of institutional analysis I established for the empirical study 
implied a temporarily fixed situation for analysis. Such a framework did create an easier 
situation for analysis, but proved difficult to use to investigate and explain the dynamic 
interrelationships between the changing institutional contexts and the decision making 
of high-tech spatial planning at a specific place and time. 
While considering this limitation, I adopted a diachronic approach to complement the 
empirical study of part three, in order to understand the influences of prior institutional 
developments and specific episodes on later policy/decision making and action taking. In 
the future, if other studies consider applying the frameworks of this research, the effect of 
historical path dependency has to be taken into consideration.
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Samenvatting
De ontwikkeling van high-tech vormt het hart van processen van economische groei. Die 
ontwikkeling wordt erkend als een strategisch instrument voor een sterke internationale 
concurrentiepositie in zowel ontwikkelde en ontwikkelingslanden. Hoewel het concept 
high-tech ontwikkeling verschillend wordt gedefinieerd, staat het creëren van een 
omgeving waarin innovatie tot bloei kan komen in veel landen centraal. Dit concept heeft 
ook impliceert een duidelijke ruimtelijke dimensie. Verschillende ruimtelijke strategieën 
zijn geformuleerd en in de praktijk gebracht, met zowel bedoelde als onbedoelde effecten 
op economie, maatschappij en ruimte.
Een groot aantal studies is gewijd aan het verkennen, analyseren en theoretiseren 
van dit wereldwijde verschijnsel. Maar minder aandacht is tot nu toe besteed aan de 
rol van ruimtelijke planning in het proces van high-tech ontwikkeling, alsmede aan 
de institutionele factoren die inhoud en proces van deze planning mede bepalen. De 
belangrijkste doelstellingen van dit onderzoek zijn bijdragen aan kennis van de rol van 
ruimtelijke planning in het proces van high-tech ontwikkeling, en het formuleren van een 
analytisch kader van institutionele factoren die de mechanismen van deze ruimtelijke 
planning in verschillende plaatsen vorm geven. Dit zal aan het overdracht en het lessen 
trekken aan het high-tech ruimtelijk beleid bij te dragen .
Om de belangrijkste factoren die de praktijk van ruimtelijke planning in high-tech 
ontwikkeling vorm geven te verkennen, is in dit onderzoek een vergelijkende benadering 
toegepast. Daartoe zijn case studies uitgevoerd in de regio’s Eindhoven in Nederland 
en Hsinchu in Taiwan. Dit zijn twee stadsregio’s die kunnen worden beschouwd als 
succesvolle voorbeelden van high-tech ontwikkeling, niet alleen op nationaal niveau 
maar ook op wereldschaal, ondanks verschillen in benadering. In de stadsregio 
Eindhoven fungeert de overheid als een ondersteuning en een bestuurder: high-tech 
ontwikkeling is daar dus het resultaat van nauwe samenwerking tussen de verschillende 
overheidsniveaus en andere partijen. In Hsinchu City heeft de overheid een veel sterkere 
rol in high-tech ontwikkeling als aanbieder van vrijwel alle inputs.
Het onderzoek start met het identificeren van de belangrijkste componenten van high-
tech ontwikkeling en hun ruimtelijke dimensies op basis van een kritische evaluatie van 
relevante literatuur. Vervolgens is een reeks van vergelijkende kaders opgebouwd conform 
de concepten van institutionalisme en aan de hand van eerdere vergelijkende studies 
van ruimtelijke planningssystemen. Deze kaders vormen de basis van de vergelijkende 
studie. In dit onderzoek worden vier belangrijke conclusies getrokken. 
Ten eerste kunnen R&D–, relationeel– en menselijk kapitaal worden geïdentificeerd als de 
belangrijkste componenten van high-tech ontwikkeling. Maar de conceptualisering van 
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deze componenten zijn niet statisch: zij kunnen veranderen in tijd en ruimte, en worden 
beïnvloed door technologische ontwikkeling en de dominante discoursen over high-tech 
ontwikkeling. Daarnaast zal de manier waarop de overheid in een bepaalde plaats die 
componenten conceptualiseert invloed hebben op de inhoud van haar strategieën voor 
high-tech ontwikkeling.
Ten tweede wordt de wijze waarop de overheid in een bepaalde plaats gebruik maakt van 
haar ruimtelijk planningsysteem en de middelen die zij inzet om high-tech ontwikkeling 
te realiseren, te vergemakkelijken of te ondersteunen beïnvloed door de sociaal-politieke 
context (bv. maatschappijmodel, bestuurlijk systeem en grondgebruiksrechten), door 
de conceptualisering van de belangrijkste componenten, door de dominante stijl 
van ruimtelijke planning, en niet in de laatste plaats ook door historische wortels en 
technologische capaciteit. Op stedelijk-regionaal niveau oefenen ook de specifieke 
cultuur en historische ervaringen effecten uit op de aanpak van ruimtelijke governance.
Ten derde is het gebruikelijk dat in het proces van high-tech ontwikkeling de overheid 
streeft naar samenwerking met kennisinstituten en high-tech bedrijven omdat die 
beschikken over een breed scala aan kennis en cruciale hulpbronnen. De creatie door de 
overheid van nieuwe institutionele arena’s waarin die instituten en bedrijven deelnemen 
aan het proces van besluitvorming is een goede strategie, maar de besluitvorming moet 
transparant en verantwoordelijk zijn en aan de beginselen van sociale rechtvaardigheid 
voldoen.
Tenslotte tonen de twee bestudeerde casussen aan dat een succesvolle high-tech 
ontwikkeling ruimtelijke effecten heeft op omliggende gebieden, zoals verkeerscongestie, 
onevenwichtigheid tussen vraag en aanbod van grond voor woningen en bedrijventerreinen 
enz. Het is noodzakelijk om continu te anticiperen op externe effecten van high-tech 
ontwikkeling, te controleren vanuit een breed gezichtspunt en genoeg ruimte te laten 
voor aanpassing aan ruimtelijke planning en governance.
Het analytische kader dat is gebaseerd op de institutionele concepten van Ostrom en 
Scharpf heeft haar waarde bewezen in dit onderzoek. Maar tijdens de uitvoering van het 
empirisch onderzoek bleek die een tijdsdoorsnede te impliceren en problemen op te 
leveren voor onderzoek en verklaring van de dynamische relaties tussen veranderende 
institutionele situaties en besluitvorming van high-tech ruimtelijke planning op een 
bepaalde plaats en tijd. Om die beperking ongedaan te maken heb ik een  complementaire 
diachrone benadering toegepast in het empirisch deel van het onderzoek. Met die 
benadering bleek de invloed van voorafgaande institutionele ontwikkelingen en bepaalde 
sociaal-economische en politieke episodes op later beleid en latere besluitvorming en 
interventies te begrijpen. Het is daarom aan te bevelen om in toekomstige studies waarin 
men gebruik wil maken van dezelfde kaders als in dit onderzoek rekening te houden met 
de effecten van path dependency.
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 31 Introduction
1 Introduction
§ 1.1 Emergence of High-tech Spatial Development
High-tech development has had strategic importance for economic policy for a long 
time, because it has been broadly accepted that technological change ‘lies at the very 
heart of the processes of economic growth and development’ and innovation is key to 
promoting technological change (Dicken 2003, 85). After the Second World War, when 
other countries struggled to rebuild their damaged economies, the USA continued its 
rise in economic performance by consolidating its science and high-tech industry to 
trigger economic growth (Coopey 2004). The economic success of the USA influenced 
other countries to consider the promotion of technology as a main strategy to reconstruct 
their economy and establish their technology policy according to their own conditions. 
Advanced by government intervention and market-driven forces, since the 1970s 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been rapidly evolving and 
broadly applied to ‘flexible integrated production and management systems’, which 
support an internationally decentralised mode of production both functionally and 
spatially (Castells 1989, 12). Following the continuing evolution of ICTs and the dynamic 
process of decentralising production modes, an informational and global economy 
has emerged. In this new economic system, technological capacity is one of the main 
factors that determine the outcome of global competition—a capacity that ‘refers to the 
appropriate articulation of science, technology, management, and production’ (Castells 
1989, 103). 
Under such global conditions, since the 1970s both developed and developing 
countries have established technology policies to harness the potential of ICTs and 
other new technologies, aiming to enhance and sustain competitiveness in the global 
economic network. One commonly used strategy is to initiate and/or promote the 
development of high-tech spaces—such as technology parks, science parks, science 
cities, and technopolises—where technologically advanced industries and/or research 
and development (R&D) firms and institutes gather to trigger economic growth at the 
national, regional and/or local level. According to Science Park and Innovation Centre 
Association’s (SPICA) Directory, by the end of 2010 there were more than 395 science 
and technology parks (STPs) and 1,664 business incubators in 102 countries. While 
these figures are provisional and do not claim to be exhaustive, they give an impression 
of the extension of this global phenomenon.
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The concept and scale of high-tech spatial development varies according to time and 
place. Differences may result from the particular socio-economic, political and historical 
context of a place, but also from the way the initiators of a development understand 
and perceive the notion of high-tech development, which may be influenced by 
contemporary discourse and technological developments. For example, the French term 
‘technopole’ combines two key ideas, technology and city (polis in Greek), so in their well-
known book, Technopoles of the World, Castells and Hall (1994) chose technopole as a 
generic name for high-tech spaces. They define technopole as a planned place gathering 
technologically advanced, knowledge-intensive industries and R&D activities for the 
purpose of promoting technologically innovative, industry-related production. They 
further identify four types of technopoles, including new techno-industrial complexes, 
technology parks, science cities and the Technopolis programme in Japan. 
However, they exclusively select cases from industrialised and newly industrialised 
countries, within a period leading up to the beginning of the 1990s. Some of the 
case areas arose without significant planning by government (e.g. Silicon Valley and 
Boston Highway 128 in the US, Cambridge in the UK, etc.), others were the outcome 
of more specific, deliberate political decisions (e.g. Taedok Science Towns in Korea, 
Tsukuba Science City in Japan, Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan, etc.). Their definition 
of technopole does not include current high-tech spatial developments, which have 
received an additional impetus since the rise of ICTs and the advent of the Internet in 
the mid-1990s, such as the more recently established IT City and IT Corridor in India 
(Centre, van Westen, and Prasad 2008).
Moreover, in the past two decades many countries—including the countries where the 
cases are located—have been influenced by the doctrine of neoliberalism and/or huge 
financial burden, gradually changing the role of the public sector from a provider to an 
enabler, facilitator, or supporter. Ways of formulating and implementing technology 
policy and approaching high-tech spatial development have also been shifting from 
government to governance. For example, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) proposed 
a triple helix model of innovation governance. In this model, government focuses on 
the development of hybrid organisations and trilateral networks that overlap and 
connect government, academia and industry in order to build a tight interrelation and 
collaboration among the three sectors and to encourage the creation of an innovative 
milieu. The Brainport Eindhoven development is a good example of the triple helix 
model, presenting a more collaborative way to conduct high-tech spatial planning and 
development.
The experience of developing countries and the changing role of the public sector in 
industrialised and newly industrialised countries must be considered, because these 
situations might offer alternative perspectives to understand the relationship between 
high-tech development and its effects on the organisation of space. On the basis of 
the previous studies, there is a pronounced need to reinvestigate high-tech spatial 
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development. In light of this, this research focuses on the changing role of government in 
high-tech spatial development. I understand high-tech spaces to be places that gather 
technologically advanced industries and/or R&D firms and institutes, that have been 
specifically selected by technology policies—in developed or developing countries—and 
implemented to enhance high-tech development and trigger economic growth at the 
national, and/or regional level. This includes government led initiatives without, or with 
different degrees of private sector involvement, private-led initiatives with different 
degrees of public sector support, or the result of partnerships between the public and 
private sector.
§ 1.2 Problem Statement
A large number of studies have explored relationships between technology policy, 
economy, society and space. Many of the studies focus on how to achieve economic 
success through technology policy and high-tech spatial development. Although the 
main focus differs across the studies, they share the same underlying assumption that 
knowledge and technological innovation not only contribute to economic growth, but 
also can be stimulated and induced by well-focused policy in combination with certain 
spatial mechanisms. 
For example, Castells and Hall (1994) explored the development and success of global 
high-tech spaces in different parts of the world. Giarratana and Torrisi (2006) focused 
on the links between universities and industry in order to generate benefits for the 
economy. Carter (1989), Joseph (1989), Keeble (1989) and Annerstedt (2006) found 
that the development of technology-oriented complexes (TOC) contributes to growth 
of the local economy. Sternberg (1996b) evaluated several economic growth theories 
in relation to technology-based regional growth and proposed a theoretical approach to 
analyse the factors governing the genesis and development of high-tech regions in order 
to clarify the role of technology policy. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) and Lagendijk 
and Boekema (2008) explored mechanisms to govern discursive relations among 
government, academia, and industry in forming territorial innovation systems.  
Two issues have to be addressed in relation to the previous studies: neglect of the role 
of spatial planning and a questionable assumption of easy high-tech policy transfer. 
First, some studies have recognised that the development of high-tech industries ‘has 
very definite spatial dimensions, with far reaching consequences for the future of cities 
and regions’ (Castells 1989, 33), and examined how and to what extent high-tech 
spaces intentionally or unintentionally impact the surrounding areas. For example, 
Massey (2008) highlighted the ‘enclave’ character of certain high-tech spaces, which 
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are significantly problematic and may increase social polarisation and geographic 
inequalities. Lin (2000) also showed that if a high-tech spatial development succeeds, 
in the long term it might expand into surrounding areas because the agglomeration and 
spin-off effects of high-tech industries may raise the rent of industrial land and edge out 
traditional industries. 
According to the agglomeration theory of new economic geography, if the development 
of a high-tech space succeeds, it will create a circle of causation leading to growing 
varieties of goods and workers/people and thus form agglomeration forces (Fujita 
2008). At the same time, land demands to accommodate the various new activities 
will be triggered. This leads to competition over the limited supply of land and public 
investment among different sectors. Spatial planning, on the other hand, is argued to be 
a means of mediating the tensions and contradictions among sectoral policies (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2008) and to provide sound space and place 
qualities for economic and socio-cultural purposes (Healey 2010). Although the scope 
of spatial planning differs, in most countries the key function of contemporary spatial 
planning is managing spatial development and organisation in a particular place (Dühr, 
Colomb, and Nadin 2010; Healey 2006; Healey et al. 1997; United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe 2008). In other words, spatial planning not only can play a 
role in coordinating other sectoral policies to provide sound space and place quality 
for high-tech development, but also may need to anticipate and mediate the spatial 
consequences and agglomeration effects of the high-tech development, because spatial 
planning must take into consideration other socio-cultural and environmental needs. 
Second, there is a questionable assumption underlying some of the previous studies, 
which aimed to identify the successful elements of high-tech development. They often 
assume that ‘there are ways of understanding the problem and finding solutions that 
work can be applied in different places and can be broadly expected to have the same 
effect.’ (Booth 2011, 14) However, what works in one place may not necessarily work 
in another place. Policy transfer is difficult for a number of reasons, including a variety 
of local circumstances, a natural resistance to change, a lack of detailed knowledge and 
information of the so-called ‘good practices’ for application elsewhere (OECD 2001, 34; 
Stead 2012). 
Local circumstances are characterised by certain institutional variables, such as 
cultural attributes, socio-economic conditions, technology capacity, administration 
system, policy style, spatial planning system, and other sectoral policies. This implies 
that ‘success factors and good practices may vary between areas’ (OECD 2001, 34). In 
order to avoid this questionable assumption, before lesson-drawing it is necessary to 
acknowledge the differences of institutional context between places and to recognise 
advantages and disadvantages of practices applied in particular circumstances. This 
helps to clarify how certain success factors are created in some places but not in others, 
and to learn from other cases in a more cautious, effective and comprehensive way.
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§ 1.3 Research Aims and Questions
On the basis of the problems stated in the previous section, this research has two main 
aims. The first is to advance knowledge regarding the role of spatial planning in the 
development process of high-tech city-regions. The second is to provide an analytical 
framework that helps to reveal the major factors that shape high-tech oriented spatial 
planning practices of particular high-tech city-regions. This will contribute to the field of 
high-tech spatial policy transfer and lesson-drawing.  According to the research aims, I 
formulate a set of research questions that guide the research process as follows:
1 What are the principal components of high-tech development? What are the spatial 
dimensions of the identified components? 
2 What are the factors that shape the form and the means of spatial planning in a particular 
place? 
3 How do governments conduct, facilitate and/or coordinate the provision of the spatial 
elements that can contribute to high-tech development in a particular place? 
4 How do governments use the systems and tools of spatial planning and governance to 
mobilise resources and actors to deal with the spatial issues generated in the process of 
high-tech development? 
5 What are the major institutional factors that shape how governments formulate and 
employ spatial planning and governance mechanisms to conduct, facilitate, and/
or coordinate high-tech spatial developments in a particular place, and deal with the 
spatial issues generated in the development process? 
The first two research questions lead to the establishment of the theoretical framework 
of this research. The third, fourth and fifth research questions guide the empirical study 
of the research.
§ 1.4 Methodological Approach
In the past two decades, there has been a growing concern in the research field of spatial 
planning and development about the issues of policy transfer and lesson-drawing from 
good practices. According to this thinking, spatial planning is considered to be a social 
construction and the characteristics of planning systems and practices are recognised to 
vary widely among nations. Even within a country, differences between regions and cities 
can be found, because the characteristics are rooted in and restricted to the wider socio-
economic, political and cultural context (Sanyal 2005; Nadin and Stead 2008a; Knieling 
and Othengrafen 2009a; Booth 2011; Nadin 2012; Ernste 2012; Getimis 2012). 
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On the basis of this understanding, I employ two complementarily methodological 
approaches: comparative research and institutionalism. Comparative research can 
reveal implicit assumptions and other institutional factors, which shape the systems 
and practices of spatial planning in particular places but are often taken for granted or 
overlooked (Booth 2011; Nadin 2012; Nadin and Stead 2008a, 2012).  On the other 
hand, institutionalism provides a sophisticated way of viewing the interrelationships 
between structure and decision-making. This helps to explore the institutional factors 
that have shaped the practice of planning. I discuss the values and challenges of 
comparative research and introduce key concepts of institutionalism in the following 
sections.
§ 1.4.1 Values and Challenges of Comparative Research
There is a growing interest in comparative research of spatial planning systems and 
cultures. The value of comparative research is manifold. It not only encourages systematic 
examination of the transferability of good practices and deepens understanding of 
the nature and operation of spatial planning, but also contributes to planning theory-
building and to mutual understanding and learning between nations, regions and 
cities. High-tech spatial development is a ‘global’ phenomenon. The underlying logic 
and mechanisms of technology policy differ from country to country and high-tech 
spaces themselves show place-specific differentiation (Ramachandraiah, Westen, and 
Prasad 2008). It is reasonable to employ comparative analysis in this research to explore 
the factors that shape the means and practices of spatial planning when carrying out 
high-tech spatial development. However, there are three interrelated methodological 
challenges, namely the risk of misinterpretation, the validity of comparative research 
findings and the issue of cultural sensitivities. 
First, the risk of misinterpretation may occur when conducting international comparative 
research. This refers to the fact that ‘not all concepts are commonly understood across 
different cultures’ (Nadin and Stead 2012, 4) The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning 
Systems and Policies (Commission of the European Communities 1997, 23–25) notes 
that many terms are used in the EU member states to describe particular activities that 
are closely related to the idea of spatial planning, such as ruimtelijke ordening in the 
Netherlands or  aménagement du territoire in France, but each term represents a specific 
meaning in its own national context. It is inappropriate to suggest that the meanings 
are the same. ‘Translations are often fraught with unacknowledged cultural associations 
and words that are ostensibly direct translations may carry quite different overlays of 
meaning.’ (Booth 2011, 25) The EU Compendium proposes two useful ways to reduce the 
risk of misinterpretation. The first is to italicise ‘home language terms’ when they have 
specific meaning, and to explain the terms when they are first mentioned. The second 
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is to develop common categories for comparison. The terms used in the categories are 
supposed to be neutral.
Second, the validity of comparative research findings is another important issue. 
Nadin and Stead (2012, 3) remind that ‘comparison requires some common scale of 
measurement but various characteristics of planning systems are difficult to compare 
directly.’ In other words, it is necessary to study the particular phenomenon in its own 
context and setting. There are two useful approaches to learn from previous comparative 
studies towards overcoming this methodological issue, including the systematic 
classifications of planning systems applied in Davies et al. (1989), Newman and Thornley 
(1996) and Janin Rivolin (2008), and the use of ‘ideal types’ in the EU Compendium 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1997). 
Both approaches are helpful to position and characterise particular planning systems, 
but the latter approach may provide more fruitful analytical findings, because it can not 
only be used to appraise each planning system individually but also to measure their 
trends and directions of change (Nadin and Stead 2012). However, although the four 
planning traditions proposed by the EU Compendium claim to be ‘ideal types’, it is not 
set out explicitly how the four traditions relate to the seven criteria they select, including 
the scope of the system, the extent and type of planning, the locus of power, the relative 
roles of public and private sectors, the legal framework, the maturity or completeness 
of the system, and the distance between expressed objectives and outcomes. Further, 
the typology was developed according to the knowledge of the ‘old’ EU Member States. 
Hence, it is not easily employed by other cross-national comparative studies, especially 
when the country being studied is not one of the ‘old’ EU member States. 
The systems and objectives of spatial planning are not an independent phenomenon. 
Spatial Planning is culturally embedded and considers numerous variables, seemingly 
too many to explain easily (Booth 2011). It is common that researchers selectively choose 
variables to classify systems or create ideal types. Therefore, the main question is how 
to construct a methodological approach that can result in meaningful comparisons and 
avoid a bias, as Gullestrup (2009, 3 emphasis in original) argues ‘“reality” will always be 
perceived and understood through one’s own culture…[and] constructed on the basis 
of one’s own cultural background and experience’. The criteria and the principles of 
measurement, which are developed to classify planning systems or to create ideal types, 
have to not only correspond with the purpose of the research but also be underpinned 
by a theoretical stance. Both the research purpose and theoretical stance have to be 
explicitly explained in order to allow others to review.
Finally, on the basis of previous comparative studies, many reflections have been 
developed, mainly addressing aspects of historical evolution and planning cultures. 
They are grounded in the understanding that spatial planning systems and practices are 
embedded in a wider socio-economic, political, cultural and historical context. Most of the 
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criticism follows that the previous comparative studies focus too much on the description 
of formal institutions at one point in time and cannot characterise how spatial planning 
systems and tools actually operate in practice and how the systems and practices constantly 
evolve to respond to internal and external challenges (Knieling and Othengrafen 2009a; 
Booth 2011; Nadin 2012; Ernste 2012; Getimis 2012). The issue of planning cultures and 
their dynamics are thus being addressed in recent methodological discussions. 
However, there is no widely accepted definition of planning culture. For example, while 
Sanyal (2005, 3) considers planning culture as ‘the collective ethos and dominant 
attitude of professional planners in different nations toward the appropriate roles of 
the state, market forces, and civil society in urban, regional, and national development’, 
Knieling and Othengrafen (2009b, xxiv) refer to planning cultures as ‘the different 
planning systems and traditions, institutional arrangements of spatial development 
and the broader cultural context of spatial planning and development. It consists of 
more than planning instruments and procedures; it is the aggregate of the social, 
environmental, and historical grounding of urban and regional planning’. The former 
definition implies the influence of assumptions and values of planners on the systems 
and practices of planning in a particular place, but does not explicitly indicate the 
influence of the broader cultural context on the assumptions and values of planners. 
The latter definition, on the other hand, includes not just the formal systems, real 
practices and traditions of spatial planning but also the broader cultural context where 
spatial planning is embedded and operates. Following this definition, Knieling and 
Othengrafen (2009c, 55–58) further propose a culturised-planning model to expose 
culture and its impact on spatial planning and development practices. The model consists 
of three analytical dimensions, including ‘planning artifacts’, ‘planning environment’ 
and ‘societal environment’. Planning artifacts consist of the elements that can be easily 
observed and understood, such as visible planning products, structures and processes. 
Planning environment refers to the shared assumptions, values and cognitive frames 
that are taken for granted by planners. Societal environment describes the underlying 
unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, thoughts and feelings that affect planning. 
However, the model proposed by Knieling and Othengrafen does not present a dynamic 
perspective on planning cultures nor does it offer analytical strategies to uncover the 
shared assumptions, values, beliefs, thoughts and feelings hidden in the planning 
environment and societal environment, although they do claim that the hidden 
assumptions and values ‘have strong impact on the specific occurrence of cultural 
manifestations in planning models and practices.’ (Knieling and Othengrafen 2009a, 
58) In other words, they do provide rich theoretical reflections on the issue of planning 
cultures, but the model they propose is too abstract to operate directly. The value of 
comparative analysis—in revealing taken-for-granted factors and their impact on spatial 
planning practices in a particular territory—is not explicitly addressed in their research. 
In light of cultural sensitivity, the most essential methodological questions for this 
i
 39 Introduction
research are: What are the major structural and cultural factors that shape specific 
spatial planning practices? How can the use of comparative analysis expose these factors 
systematically and result in learning from the comparisons? How can a generic analytical 
framework be established that is not tied to specific places? Moreover, many comparative 
studies do not make a clear distinction between the institutional variables influencing 
the spatial planning system and the spatial planning system itself, and between the 
spatial planning system (structure) and planning practices (decisions/actions). Such 
studies mix these elements when they conduct empirical research. This may be a 
reason why sometimes the analytical frameworks or classification/categorisation of 
the systems established in previous comparative studies are difficult to apply in other 
comparative research. 
The major purpose of comparison in this research is to reveal implicit assumptions 
and institutional factors that shape the practices of high-tech spatial planning and 
development, and that are often taken for granted in their own context. This will increase 
mutual understanding and learning between different cases but also will contribute to 
theory-building with regard to high-tech spatial planning and development in different 
cultural contexts. Since the focus of this research is the practices of high-tech spatial 
planning and development, planning systems become one of the institutional factors 
that shape the practices. It is necessary to distinguish a planning system and its 
institutional variables from its practices. In order to overcome this issue in the process 
of analysis, an institutional approach may help to establish a more comprehensive and 
operational framework for comparative research.
§ 1.4.2 Concepts of Institutionalism
Institutionalism concerns the interrelationships between structure and decision-
making/action-taking. It offers a sophisticated way for this research to explore the 
interrelationships among spatial planning systems, other institutional factors and high-
tech spatial planning practices, while comparisons help to reveal the major institutional 
factors that shape planning practices. 
The definition of ‘institution’ varies in different studies. Two meanings have been 
distinguished:
One refers to the broader norms and practices which frame the ways in which, for 
example, conflicts are dealt with, resources are allocated and, action are taken in the 
realm of public affairs. In other words, how things get done! The other refers to specific 
configurations of agencies and organisations which operate within the parameter of the 
above wider norms. (Sturzaker et al. 2009, 7)
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In order to map the changing nature of the interrelations between structure and agency, 
it is necessary to distinguish institutions, actors and action arenas analytically. Hence, 
this research follows the definition proposed by Ostrom (Ostrom 2008, 822 emphasis in 
original) that ‘[t]he term “institution” is used to refer to many different types of entities 
including organizations as well as the rules, norms, and strategies used to structure 
patterns of interaction within and across organizations.’ Specifically, the focus of the 
institutional analysis is on the patterns of interactions within and among institutions and 
action arenas, and how the decisions are made, but not the decisions per se (Healey 2007).
Another important concept of institutional analysis is that decisions that are made at 
one level are constrained by the institutions at that level and deeper levels. ‘Changes 
in deeper-level rules usually are more difficult and more costly to accomplish, thus 
increasing the stability of mutual expectations among individuals interaction according 
to the deeper set of rules.’ (Ostrom 2005, 58) For comparative analysis, this concept of 
multiple institutional layers is especially useful for enhancing mutual learning but also 
for systematically examining the transferability of good practices between places.
Based on the understanding, I recognise that the two concepts of institutionalism—
the interrelationships between institutions and actors, and the multiple institutional 
layers—are very instrumental in establishing analytical frameworks for comparative 
research. I further explain the two theoretical concepts in the following sections.
A  The interrelationships between institutions and actors
Ostrom (2005; 2008) suggests a general framework that helps to recognise the 
universal elements in the institutional analysis and the relations among these elements 
(see Figure 1). The first step in using this framework is to identify ‘action arenas’, which 
include an ‘action situation’ and the actors in that situation. This identification can help 
to analyse and explain the behaviour of the actors. She further addresses the importance 
of nested-levels of rules, which consist of physical and material conditions, attributes of 
community and rules-in-use. The attributes of physical and material worlds determine 
what actions are physically possible. This may also involve the availability of technology. 
The attributes of community refer to values that are shared within a community. The 
nested-levels of rules deeply influence the action agenda, because ‘the rules of the 
game…structure the game itself’ and the rules are embedded in the physical, social and 
cultural environment (Ostrom 2008, 831). Rules-in-use refer to ‘shared understandings 
by participants about enforced perceptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are 
required, prohibited, or permitted’ (Ostrom 2005, 18, emphasis in original). The shared 
understandings are learned on the ground and may not exist in any written document 
as rules-in-form do.
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Figure 1  
A general framework for institutional analysis (source: Ostrom 2008, 829)
As Timmermans (2001, 317) argues, ‘a finite set of rule types allows institutions to be 
compared.’ Ostrom (1986; 2005; 2008) divides the nested-levels of rules into seven 
types of interrelated rules. These are, scope rules, access rules, position rules, payoff 
rules, competence rules, information rules, and decision rules. Together they shape the 
patterns of interactions. As shown in Table 1, I summarise definitions of the seven types 
of rule. The classification of rules helps to link the nested-levels of rules to the action 
arenas in the analysis process, but the concept of rules-in-use rather than rule-in-form 
has to be pointed out at the same time..
Type of rule Definition
Scope rules Scope rules delimit the range of potential externalities created by the decision  out- 
comes.
Access rules Access rules affect the number of participants and their attributes.
Position rules Position rules define the role an actor is supposed to play.
Payoff rules Payoff rules prescribe the distribution of benefits and costs for actors while actions 
and outcomes are made.
Competence rules Competence rules give participants jurisdictions and conditions for using resources 
within arenas.
Table 1  
Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Scharpf 1997, 44)
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Type of rule Definition
Decision rules Decision rules influence the procedures for decision-making and the level of control 
for participants when they exercise the decision function at a particular node.
Information rules Information rules authorise channels of communication among participants in 
positions.
Table 1  
Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Scharpf 1997, 44)
Different from the general framework proposed by Ostrom, which focuses more on how 
the institutions structure action situations, Scharpf (1997) proposes an alternative 
approach to explore how actors with their orientations, capacities, actor constellations 
and modes of interaction influence policy-making to cope with particular political 
issues, presenting an actor-centred institutionalism (see Figure 2). He recognises policy 
is ‘intentional action by actors who are most interested in achieving specific outcomes.’ 
(36) The term actor is used to describe an individual or an aggregate of individuals. In 
other words, in this approach policy-making is considered as an outcome of interactions 
among intentional actors—‘Games real actors play’.
Figure 2  
Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Scharpf 1997, 44).
In order to link actor’s action orientations to institutionally determined or empirically 
observable indicators, Scharpf (1997) disaggregates the notion of actor orientation 
into three major components: unit of reference, cognitive orientations and preferences. 
The most important unit of reference for empirical research is the role of positions that 
are associated with role-specific norms, expectations and identity. He argues that in 
most cases the normative expectations of a role are a more useful predictor of role-
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related action than individual self-interest, because the willingness of individuals to 
assume such a role is assured through benefits of membership, position, and career 
opportunities that cannot be otherwise obtained. However, this does not mean that the 
role self-interest plays in affecting the preference of actors’ choice can be ignored. 
Regarding cognitive orientations, Scharpf (1997, 62) ‘start[s] from the working 
hypothesis that actors’ perceptions of directly observable facts will be empirically correct 
and that their hypotheses about what they cannot observe as well as about causal 
linkages will be shaped by theories prevailing at the particular time and in the particular 
institutional setting.’ The specific combinations of knowledge, ignorance and theories 
tend to be shared among actors in institutionalised interactions. Collective learning 
plays an important role in the knowledge sharing process, which implies communication 
and public debate. Thus, the cognitive orientations of the specific actors can be obtained 
relatively easily for researchers from public documents, interviews, or participant 
observation. 
Scharpf (1997) divides preferences into four simpler components—basic self-interest, 
normative role orientations, identity, and interaction orientations. ‘Basic self-interest’ 
describes the basic preference of actors for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth. 
In terms of corporate actors, their self-interest can be identified with the conditions of 
organisational survival, autonomy and growth, so the specific requirements associated 
with the self-interest of collective actors and corporate actors are relatively transparent 
to researchers. ‘Normative role orientations’ are shared expectations among 
participants based on antecedent conditions of particular actions or the purposes to be 
achieved. However, actors have the possibility to emphasise selectively certain aspects 
of interest, rules and normative purposes according to the specific ‘identity’ they define 
for themselves. If only individual or corporate actors have a clearly defined identity, the 
uncertainty of their preference can be reduced for other actors as well as for researchers.
In short, both analytical frameworks, respectively proposed by Ostrom and Scharpf, try 
to create a linkage between structure and actors, although their main focuses are very 
different. The former focuses more on the analysis of action arenas and on how the nested-
levels of rules shape action situations and influence collective actions. Alternatively, 
the latter focuses more on the analysis of the interaction among intentional actors, 
which are structured by particular institutional settings. Indeed, these two frameworks 
do not conflict, but complement each other. Figure 3 illustrates the linkage between 
these two frameworks. Access rules determine the constellations of actors in the action 
arenas. Scope rules, competence rules, decision rules and information rules together 
structure the capacities of involved actors. Position rules and payoff rules affect action 
orientations of involved actors regarding their role of positions and action preference. 
Cognitive orientation is shaped by the theories prevailing at the particular time within a 
specific problem-field. In this research, the cognitive orientation especially relates to the 
theoretical concepts of high-tech development, which are discussed in the next chapter.
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Figure 3  
A combinative framework of action arenas.
B Multiple levels of analysis and institutional change
Ostrom’s framework also addresses the concept of multiple levels of action situations 
and decisions, which has a twofold meaning. First, policy decisions that are made at a 
higher level need to be implemented by lower tier actions. Second, what can be done 
at one level is defined by the rules at that level and deeper levels. Ostrom (2008, 842) 
distinguishes four levels of rules, including operational, collective-choice, constitutional-
choice, and meta constitutional levels of rules, which ‘cumulatively affect the actions 
taken and outcomes obtained in any operational setting’ (see Figure 4). On the other 
hand, Ostrom (2005, 58) explains that ‘[f]or most practical applications, three levels are 
enough.’ According to her opinion, the point of identifying layers is to ‘hit rock bottom—
the biophysical world’ (58), so there is no theoretical justification regarding how many 
levels should be identified in an institutional analysis. Despite a lack of theoretical 
justification, this structure does demonstrate the concept of multiple levels and provide 
an useful outline for multiple levels of analysis.
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Figure 4  
Levels of analysis and outcomes (Source: Based on Ostrom 2008, 843)
However, the analytical frameworks discussed above all assume a temporary fixed 
situation for analysis. This assumption can create an easier situation for analysis, but 
cannot help to explain dynamic interrelationships between structure and agency, an 
interactive process of social construction that should be emphasised. The dialectic of 
‘path dependency’ and ‘path shaping’ may provide a way to explore the process of social 
construction. ‘Path dependency implies that the prior development of an institution 
shapes current and future trajectories’, while path shaping conveys an idea that ‘social 
forces could intervene in current conjunctures and actively rearticulate them, so that new 
trajectories become possible.’ (Jessop 2001, 1229) Both situations can be explained in a 
relational perspective.
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§ 1.5 Research Design
In the following sub-sections, I explain the criteria of case selection and briefly introduce 
the two cases. Then, I explain the analytical approach and methods of this research.
§ 1.5.1 Case Selection
In the first year of this research I established a database, which consists of the 
information of 217 high-tech parks in the 25 most technology-advanced European 
and Asian countries. The data are mostly from the International Association of Science 
Park, World Alliance for Innovation, Science Park and Innovation Centre Association’s 
Directory, and the national science park association in each country, such as Korean 
Technopark Association, Finnish Science Park Association (TEKEL), Associazione Parchi 
Scientifici e Tecnologici Italiani (APSTI), and so on. This database collects information 
regarding each high-tech park’s major industries, activities, shareholders, planned area, 
year established, and number of employees and tenants. However, the database does 
not claim to be exhaustive, but offers a foundation for this research to choose cases for 
in-depth case studies.
Considering the research questions, there are four criteria that help in selecting the 
two case study areas. Firstly, the case study areas have been specifically selected by 
national/regional technology policies to trigger economic growth at the national and/
or regional level. In other words, both cases are the outcome of very specific, deliberate 
political decisions. But according to the role of government, two modes of formulating 
and implementing the policy of high-tech spatial development can be recognised in the 
database. In the first mode, the government dominates the development of the high-
tech space as a provider. In the second mode, the development of the high-tech space 
is a result of close collaboration between the government and other parties, such as 
universities. In the process, the government acts as a supporter and a governor rather 
than a provider. In light of this recognition, the two cases have to present respectively 
these two development modes. This helps to explore the relationships between the role 
of government in high-tech spatial development and its implications for the practices of 
spatial planning and the organisation of space.
Secondly, high-tech industrial clustering has formed in the two case study areas. The 
economies of the chosen areas both have to rely mainly on high-tech industries. This 
gives an easier approach to explore how government uses spatial planning and tools 
to promote and deal with the issues of high-tech development in the particular city-
regions. Thirdly, the scale of the chosen areas in terms of population and physical size 
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has to be comparable. Finally, data accessibility plays a major role in the process of case 
selection.
Based on the database and the criteria, the Eindhoven city-region, the Netherlands 
and the Hsinchu city-region, Taiwan have been selected as the case study areas in this 
research (see Figure 5). The former case is well known since the end of the 2000s for its 
triple helix model in high-tech development, while the latter has been widely studied 
as one of the most successful examples of state–led high-tech spatial development.  
As shown in Table 2, both of them exhibit high levels of performance in the national 
high-tech economy and are characterised as the technology and innovation hot spots 
in their own country. Their specialised industries are similar and their scale in terms of 
population and physical size are comparable as well.
Figure 5  
Hsinchu city-region and Eindhoven city-region (Source: Based on google map 2011).
Also of primary importance, I have relatively easy access to data about these two areas. 
This research is mainly conducted in the Netherlands and is related to the research 
on knowledge-based development carried out by A. M. Fernández-Maldonado in the 
Department of Urbanism, Faculty of Architecture, TU Delft. There are some connections 
between the university and the Brainport Eindhoven. On the other hand, I am originally 
from Taiwan and used to be involved in urban planning practice in the Hsinchu area. 
I remain well connected with the local governments and the Hsinchu science park 
administration. In the following sections, I briefly introduce the two cases.
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City region Hsinchu Eindhoven
Area (km2) 578 1,370
Population in 2012 1,054,000 742,000
Output value (Million 
Euro) in 2004
27,148 
(only within the Hsinchu Science Park; 
share in the GNP of Taiwan is 9.3 %)
21,199 
(Share in the GNP of the Netherlands 
is 4.3%)
Specialised Industries ICT, Electronics, and Life Tech industries
ICT, Mechatronics, Life Tech, and  
automotive industries
Local Political Entities
The Science Park Administration, 
Hsinchu city government and county 
government
Noord-Brabant Provincial Government, 
SRE, and 21 municipalities
City-region Strategic 
Plan
Hsinchu Science City Development Plan 
(1993)
Stimulus programme (1995),  
Horizon programme (2002),  
Brainport Eindhoven (2005)
Table 2  
Information about Hsinchu region and Eindhoven region (Source: Based on 2009 HSP Annual Report; National 
Statistics of Taiwan (http://eng.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=1); Eindhoven Region 2008, Facts & Figures)
Eindhoven city-region
In 2004 the Dutch central government appointed the Eindhoven high-tech city-region 
as the national ‘Brainport’, the most innovative region in the Netherlands (Ministry of 
Economy Affairs 2004) (see Figure 6). In the city-region, government has a role, together 
with the private sector, in strengthening regional innovation. This was triggered by the 
crisis in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. At that time, the Eindhoven City Region 
(SRE), business, knowledge institutions and public authorities joined forces to recover 
from the economic downturn. The SRE is a regional organisation made up of the city 
of Eindhoven, the city of Helmond, and another 19 surrounding municipalities, which 
created a joint fund to strengthen the economic structure of the region and set up the 
Stimulus programme. This cooperation laid the foundation for the Brainport of today 
(SRE 2009).  
i
 49 Introduction
Figure 6  
Dutch national strategic planning and Eindhoven city-region (Source: based on Ministry of Economic Affairs 
2004, 10; Brainport Foundation 2009, 32).
After two decades of efforts, the city-region has shifted from a manufacturing centre to 
an important innovation hot spot not only at the national scale but also at the European 
scale. According to Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2011 (European Union 2011, 208), in 
Europe the Eindhoven city-region ranks highest in terms of patents per population, 
more than 2, 000 patents per million inhabitants.
Hsinchu city-region
The Hsinchu high-tech city-region was formed due to the development of Hsinchu 
Science Park (HSP), which has been in operation since 1980. In order to acquire the 
land and create a sound industrial environment for the HSP, the HSP Special District 
was planned and established under the supervision of the National Science Council. The 
major aim of the HSP development is to foster the development of high-tech industry in 
Taiwan. As shown in Figure 7, the Hsinchu city-region is not an administrative division 
but rather a functional city-region, which consists of Hsinchu city, one county-controlled 
city and six townships of Hsinchu county and two townships of Miaoli county.
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Figure 7  
Taiwan national spatial planning and Hsinchu city-region (Source: based on CEPD 2010; SPA and TPC 1993).
The Science Park Administration (SPA) was funded by the central government under 
the supervision of the National Science Council as an independent authority to manage 
the park. The SPA even has a prevailing position in deciding the masterplan and detail 
plans of the HSP Special District, which is supposed to be under supervision of local 
governments. This has created huge tensions between the SPA, Hsinchu city government 
and Hsinchu county government, because the development of the HSP has serious 
environmental impacts on the surrounding area, but the earnings of the HSP go directly 
to the central government rather than the local governments (Chou 2007). 
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§ 1.5.2 Analytical Approach and Research Methods
There are two major concerns in this research—the role of spatial planning and the factors 
that shape the practice of spatial planning in the development process of a high-tech 
city-region. After the general introduction to the research problems and methodological 
approaches, I develop a theoretical framework of the research to understand the spatial 
dimension of high-tech policy and to recognise the variables at different institutional 
levels that may cumulatively affect the practice of spatial planning by reviewing literature 
in relation to economic geography, high-tech policy, innovation systems, regional study, 
science park development, and spatial planning and governance. This forms a theoretical 
base to guide the empirical study of this research (see Figure 8).
Figure 8  
Research structure.
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According to the institutional concept of multiple levels of analysis, I build a scheme to 
conduct comparative case study research. As shown in Figure 9, the scheme consists of 
four comparative analyses. I first explore and compare certain institutional variables in 
the two countries at the constitutional level as grounds for understanding what causes 
the significant differences between them regarding their spatial planning systems and 
dominant planning styles. Then, I review high-tech spatial policies in the Netherlands 
and Taiwan from 1980 to 2012 as a base to investigate and compare the high-tech 
spatial developments in 2012 in these two city-regions. In this part, I focus more on the 
major similarities and differences between their mechanisms to provide particular high-
tech spatial elements that have been identified in the theoretical framework. 
Figure 9  
Scheme of comparative case study.
In the first three comparative analyses, I investigate the socio-political context, high-
tech spatial planning policies and development in these two countries mainly through a 
desk study based on secondary data and internet searching, including relevant literature, 
reports, laws, regulations, official documents and statistics. The findings of the first 
three comparative analyses are helpful to explore the major institutional factors that 
have shaped the means and practices of spatial planning and governance for developing 
a high-tech city-region and led the planning practices of these two city-regions to have 
significant differences.
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In the final part of the empirical study, I address the role of spatial planning and governance 
in the development process of the high-tech city-regions. Since the degree of spatial 
coherence and the quality of place are expected to be the fundamental concerns of spatial 
planning, the emphasis is put on whether and how the governments in the two city-
regions use spatial planning and governance instruments to coordinate other sectoral 
policies to provide a sound environment for the purpose of high-tech development, to 
mediate the spatial impacts of high-tech development on surrounding areas, and/or to 
deal with complex spatial issues generated in the development process. In order to have 
better understanding of the spatial planning and governance practices in these two city-
regions, I respectively select three and two high-tech oriented spatial planning projects in 
the Eindhoven and Hsinchu city-regions to conduct in-depth case studies to investigate 
whether, and how the governments use spatial planning instruments and govern the 
complex relationships among various stakeholders to achieve the goal of high-tech 
development in practice. Most of the projects I choose are in progress and thus few 
studies have been done in relation to the projects, so except reviewing a large number 
of official documents, articles in magazine and (on-line) newspapers and relevant 
literature, the in-depth case studies also rely on field observation and in-depth personal 
interviews with key persons in relation to the formulation and/or implementation of the 
selected planning projects (for the interviewee list please see the Appendix). 
In order to avoid misinterpretation resulting from cultural differences, I have had 
discussions with Dutch peers (planners) during the research process and have asked 
interviewees to provide second opinions about my findings in relation to the first draft 
of the dissertation.
§ 1.6 Structure of the Dissertation
The thesis has eight chapters. In addition to the introduction, I organise the thesis in 
three parts. The second part of the thesis consists of chapter two and three. In chapter 
two, I first identify principal components of high-tech development. Together they 
underlie the core of high-tech development—innovation capacity. I then explore 
the spatial dimension of the identified components in order to make the connection 
between high-tech development and spatial planning more explicit. In chapter three, 
I recognise several institutional variables of spatial planning systems and practices that 
have been discussed in the previous comparative research of spatial planning systems. 
These two chapters together form the theoretical framework of the research to guide the 
following empirical study. 
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The third part has four chapters. In chapter four and five, I respectively review and 
compare the socio-political context and the spatial planning systems and dominant 
planning styles in the Netherlands and Taiwan mainly from 1970 to 2012. In chapter 
six, I first outline the high-tech spatial policy in the Netherlands and Taiwan and 
examine the provision of high-tech spatial elements in these two city-regions. Then, 
I investigate the major similarities and differences between the two cases regarding 
their means to conduct, facilitate, and coordinate the provision of high-tech spatial 
elements. The findings of the three chapters form a foundation for a comparative study 
of the spatial planning and governance means of high-tech development in the two city-
regions. In chapter seven, I present the practices of high-tech oriented spatial planning 
and governance in these two city-regions. Through comparisons, I recognise their major 
similarities and differences. On the basis of the findings in chapter four, five and six, I 
examine the major institutional factors that cause the differences.
In the last part, chapter eight, I make a synthesis of the main findings and the conclusions 
of the entire research, and also reflect on the methodology and give recommendations 
for future research.
i
 55 Introduction i
 56 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development 
PART 2 Theoretical Framework
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2 Principal Components of High-tech 
Development
In this chapter I develop a theoretical framework by reviewing literature that sheds light on 
regional high-tech development, including regional development, economic geography, 
high-tech policy, regional innovation systems and governance. Through the review, two 
themes are addressed: 1) the principal components of high-tech development, and 2) 
the spatial dimension of the identified components. The principal components, which 
constitute the core concept of high-tech development, assist in understanding the 
distinction between ‘high’ technology and middle/low technology development as well 
as the underlying ideas guiding policy-making for high-tech development. On the other 
hand, recognition of the spatial dimension of the identified components can help make 
the connection between high-tech development and spatial planning more explicit. 
The two themes together form a theoretical understanding of the ‘spatial’ in high-tech 
development and show the potential for spatial planning instruments to facilitate, 
induce and/or support high-tech development in a particular place.
§ 2.1 Conceptual Foundations of Regional High-tech Development
High-tech development has played a central role in regional development policy for 
decades. The emphasis on high-tech development is underpinned by understanding 
of the complex interrelationship between technological change, innovation, economic 
growth and places. As Dicken (2003, 85, 115; emphasis in the original) states 
technology is ‘an enabling or facilitating agent…[that] makes possible new structures, 
new organizational and geographical arrangements of economic activities, new products 
and new processes…Technological change, then, lies at the very heart of the processes of 
economic growth and development...Innovation [is] the heart of technological change…
Nevertheless, “conditions of knowledge accumulation are highly localized”. Knowledge 
is produced in specific places and often used, and enhanced most intensively, in those 
same places.’ 
Two groups of theories have provided important insights into regional high-tech 
development: theories that stress diffusion of growth or innovation and theories that 
focus on the analytical concepts of a regional innovation system. Both groups of theories 
view space as a type of network, but are developed in isolation from each other. The 
first group of theories refers to growth pole/growth centre and hierarchical theories. 
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Both address the ‘spatial filtering’ or ‘trickling down’ effects, but the former ‘focuses 
on the transmission of growth from center to hinterland within a region’, while the 
latter assumes ‘innovations are transmitted from larger to smaller metropolitan areas.’ 
(Goldstein and Luger 1990, 66) Growth pole/growth centre theory states that ‘the 
centers should offer the greatest agglomeration economies…[and] the investment would 
be targeted to those sectors (for example, microelectronics, biotechnology, or machine 
tools) with the greatest multiplier effects and competitive advantages in their region vis 
à vis the rest of the world.’ (p.67) This statement has underpinned the development of 
science/technology parks for decades.
Despite the fact that since the 1980s growth pole/growth centre theory has been 
severely criticised for its lack of empirical evidence, ignorance of the influences of the 
institutional context and path dependence (Dawkins 2003), the discourse has had 
significant effects on the practice of regional high-tech development and its spatial 
mechanisms. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s the French national government 
played a leading role in the genesis of technopoles in order to reshape the imbalanced 
regional development (Halbert 2008). In the 1980s, the Japanese central government 
launched the Technopolis programme as an instrument of regional development and 
industrial decentralisation (Castells and Hall 1994). Since the 2000s, the Taiwanese 
government has changed their science park development policy from a single technopole 
strategy to a technopolis programme (Hsu 2010). 
However, this group of theories cannot explain why some regions succeed while others 
fail to create growth poles/growth centres in their regions. This leads the field of regional 
development to a shift in focus towards the second group of theories, which address 
how valuable knowledge is generated by managing relationships between actors within 
a particular functional region, including industrial districts, cluster theory, innovative 
milieus and new regionalism. They reveal and explain some hidden operating rules and 
factors of a regional innovation system. The theory of industrial districts emphasises 
the presence of external economies, namely the ‘industrial atmosphere’, in shaping the 
development patterns of local production systems (Camagni, 1991). The term industrial 
atmosphere refers to ‘factors that reduce transaction costs and stimulate (informal) 
networking (e.g. trust) as well as factors pointing to (informal) labour skills such as tacit 
knowledge’ (Halbert 2008). 
Cluster theory emphasises the importance and advantage of regional clusters in the new 
economics of territorial competition because ‘a cluster allows each member to benefit 
as if it had greater scale or as if it had joined with others formally—without requiring it to 
sacrifice its flexibility’ (Porter 1998, 80). In other words, spatial proximity could ‘spread 
risks via increased access to other producers’ (Storper 1997, 41) and facilitate mutual 
learning through easily making site visits and frequent face-to-face contact (Porter, 
1998). 
i
 61 Principal Components of High-tech Development
From a network perspective, GREMI group developed the concept of innovative milieu. 
The concept recognises that ‘spatial proximity matters not really in terms of a reduction 
in physical “distance” and in the related transport costs, but rather in terms of easy 
information interchange, similarity of culture and psychological attitudes, frequency of 
interpersonal contacts and cooperation, and density of factors mobility within the limits 
of the local area.’  (Camagni 1991, 2) Storper (1997), one of the leading proponents 
of new regionalism, addresses the role of regions as a fundamentally spatial unit of 
economic and social life linking to the global network. He uses the relational dynamics 
among ‘technology—organisation—territory’ to explain the formation of flexible 
specialisation in the global economy.
While theories about industrial districts, clusters and innovation milieus are centred 
on how collective actors in a particular place benefit from physical proximity, new 
regionalism tries to provide a comprehensive framework regarding economic geography 
and territorial development. Although each theory has its own analytical approach based 
on its focus, they all indicate that high-tech economic development has a very definite 
spatial dimension. However, no theory alone can explain the emergence or dynamics of 
a high-tech region because its development is influenced by a large number of partly 
interdependent factors (Sternberg 1996a; Komnonis 2002). But taken together, these 
theories have revealed several hidden rules and factors of high-tech development. 
On the basis of the theories, a number of empirical studies have tried to explore a set of 
policy principles that can contribute to the emergence of high-tech regions in order to 
offer feasible suggestions to policy makers. For example, Sternberg (1996a) evaluates 
seven high-tech regions in France, Great Britain, Japan and the United States (See Table 
3). He concludes that while there is no single determinant that constitutes a necessary or 
sufficient precondition, national technology policy (such as R&D expenditure) together 
with R&D infrastructures (such as science park and research institutes) act as the main 
impacting factors in the emergence of the seven high-tech regions.
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Table 3  
An assessment of the genesis of seven high-tech regions (Source: Sternberg 1996a, 210).
Learning from the experience of Silicon Valley, Castells (1989) identifies three 
preconditions for the development of the innovative milieu that can be facilitated 
through technology policy. These are, ‘raw material’ of technology, a sufficiently large 
pool of mobile labour, and the accessibility of venture capital. He suggests that the first 
factor could be acquired from leading universities, public and private R&D institutes, 
and their networks. Later on, he works with Peter Hall to study technopole developments 
around the world and concludes that besides the three preconditions, the relationships 
between the state and the private sector in promoting R&D activities and the synergy of 
socio-economic networks are also the major factors that underpin the innovative milieu 
(Castells and Hall 1994).
As shown in Table 4, Komininos (2002) summarises six basic components of the 
innovation environment—including research and technological development, 
innovation finance, technology transfer, product development services, technology 
cooperation networks, and network infrastructures—and proposed 21 key organisations 
for a high-tech region. He argues that research results and scientific knowledge feed the 
cycle of innovation, but only with the support of the other five components can the ‘raw 
material’ be transformed into products. He further asserts that cooperation networks 
are the key elements in the construction of the innovation environment.
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Field Key organisation
In the field of R&D  – Universities
 – University labs
 – Public research centres
 – Private R&D centres
 – Patent offices
In the field of innovation finance  – Venture capital funds 
 – Business angels
 – Regional incentives for technology based companies
In the field of technology transfer  – Science or technology parks
 – Business innovation centres
 – Technology networks
 – Industrial/university liaison offices
 – Technology brokers
 – Best practices clubs/associations 
In the field of new product deve-
lopment
 – Specialised consulting companies
 – Graphic design companies/centres
 – Marketing companies
In the field of business networks  – Industrial districts
 – Knowledge-intensive tertiary clusters
 – Suppliers’ associations
 – Distribution networks
Table 4  
Twenty-one key organisations for an ‘innovating region’ (Source: Komninos 2002, 154)
Nijkamp et al. (1994) introduces a pentagon model based on the study of high-tech regions. 
They claim that the model could help reproduce favourable conditions for the development 
of science parks, which they recognise as ‘potentially powerful policy tools for regional 
development’ (23). The model consists of five dimensions: hardware, software, orgware, 
finware and ecoware. The hardware includes good transport and communications systems 
and availability of land for further development. The software represents accessibility 
to skilled labour force, research institutes, and markets of users and supply. The orgware 
relates to supporting services and policies that favour entrepreneurship, such as support for 
technological spillovers and knowledge flows between enterprises and technology-based 
spinoffs and start-ups. The finware refers to the availability of seed capital and venture 
capital. The ecoware regards favourable living quality. 
In short, all of the studies have a different focus and starting point, but their arguments 
are complementary rather than in conflict with one another. On the basis of the studies, 
I understand that R&D capital, relational capital and human capital play a vital role in 
innovation and recognise them as the principal components of high-tech development. 
Specifically, the high-tech development of a particular place refers to the development 
of these three components. They are interrelated and must be in place at the same time. 
In the following section, I outline theoretical discussions about the nature of the three 
types of capital and summarise a set of strategies that are expected to contribute to the 
three capitals, through literature review.
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§ 2.2 The Nature of the Principal Components
§ 2.2.1 R&D Capital
R&D capital refers to the effectiveness of R&D activities in generating valuable knowledge 
for the development of new products or services. Castells and Hall (1994) argue that 
governments can contribute by encouraging R&D activities that are too large-scale, too 
high-risk, or both, to be justified in a normal commercial balance sheet. Mani (2002, 5), 
based on OECD statistics about government and business enterprise R&D expenditure, 
indicates that ‘the relationship between government and business enterprise R&D is 
complementary, implying thereby that a reduction in the former will always be met with 
reductions in the latter.’ There is a consensus that public interventions in R&D activities 
are necessary, because leaving R&D activities entirely to the private sector will quickly 
lead to underinvestment. 
In addition to establishing physical infrastructures—such as universities, research 
centres, and patent offices—financial measurements are most commonly used in 
innovation policy to promote R&D activities. These include: 1) subsidising exchange 
of goods and services R&D personnel between the public and private sectors; 2) tax 
incentives for R&D; 3) direct funding through grants, soft loans, loan guarantees for 
R&D projects; 4) promotion of national R&D projects; 5) joint cooperative R&D projects 
between government and the private sector; 6) creation or improvement of specialised 
financial market mechanisms (e.g., venture capital); and 7) public procurement 
particularly in defence (Mani, 2002). However, a large amount of financial incentive 
for R&D activities does not guarantee a high value outcome. There is also a difficulty to 
quantify the outcome of R&D activities in advance.
These financial measurements are more or less based on a linear innovation model, which 
consists of a chain of successive, interrelated activities that ‘begin with basic scientific 
research and pass through applied and more developmental research activities, the 
development of new product and process ideas, the evolution and testing of prototypes, 
to commercial production and finally to diffusion’ (Massey, Quintas, and Wield 1992, 
56). The linear innovation model ignores the role of socio-cultural structures and the 
interactions among local firms and institutes in technological development. This 
involves a social process of ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by using’. In the process, tacit 
knowledge is produced. In other words, innovation is ‘a complex process involving users, 
producers and various intermediary organisations learning from each other regarding 
demand and supply capabilities and exchanging both tacit and codified knowledge’ 
(Cooke 2001, 33). 
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On the basis of this understanding, Chesbrough (2006) describes a desirable shift of 
innovation paradigm from a closed to an open model, which addresses the utilisation 
of not only internal but also external knowledge to create value and increase the 
effectiveness of R&D activities (see Figure 10).  The model is labelled as an open 
innovation paradigm, because in this model there are many ways for ideas to flow into 
the innovation process as well as to flow out into markets through R&D outsourcing, 
licensing or spin-offs, so the boundaries between firms and other research organisations 
are becoming blurred. Not only does proximity of innovative firms and other research 
organisations remain important, but also the management services of internal and 
external knowledge flows start to play a key role (Spithoven 2009). The transformation 
from Philips High Tech Campus to High Tech Campus Eindhoven in the Netherlands is a 
good example of the shifting paradigm, as their brochure1 claims that the shifts are not 
only from closed to open, but also ‘from owning everything to focus on core competences, 
from just knowledge sharing to developing together’.
Figure 10  
Closed (left figure) and open (right figure)  innovation models (Source: Chesbrough 2006, 3).
The policy issue regarding R&D activities is no longer limited to combating private 
underinvestment in R&D. Instead, the role of the three groups of actors and their 
interrelationships has to be addressed in policy: knowledge infrastructures (including 
universities and R&D institutes), high-tech firms (including large firms and small and 
medium-sized enterprises) and professional associations. First, regarding the role of 
knowledge infrastructures, a growing number of universities initiate entrepreneurial 
1 http://www.hightechcampus.com/viewfile.php/424 (Accessed in January 2012)
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programmes as well as technology transfer centres or business parks to help university 
graduates and personnel, or people from business to start their own company, and to 
arrange meetings between the emerging entrepreneurs and representatives of larger 
firms and organisations, such as the University of Twente in the Netherlands (Hosper 
and van Tongeren 2008). 
Nonetheless, Florida (2005, 146) argues that such initiatives may ‘tend to distract the 
university from its core missions of conducting [basic] research and generating talent’ 
and thus retard advances in basic science that underlie these technology intensive firms’ 
long term futures; furthermore, ‘[t]he region surrounding the university may not even 
benefit if it does not have the required infrastructure and environment to keep these 
companies [and talents] in the area’, or if the communities surrounding the university 
do not have the capacity to ‘absorb and exploit the science, innovation, and technologies 
that the university generates’ (150). This argument implies that it is impossible to rely on 
a single policy instrument or organisation to sustain or enhance local R&D capacity and 
to transform the R&D results into local economic wealth. To achieve this goal requires 
a mixed approach based on a relational perspective, the content of the approach has 
to depend on different territorial contexts and to take into account possible long term 
effects. 
Second, some small countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, rely more on a 
limited number of large multinational firms for business R&D. Governments have 
recognised the risks associated with these large firms undertaking more of their R&D 
overseas, so it is necessary to generate new entrepreneurial opportunities for the 
development of local technology-based firms that can provide R&D services and help 
to sustain the country’s R&D capacity (OECD 2005). However, this does not mean that 
the role of large firms in high-tech development is not important anymore, but rather 
their relationships with local small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have to be 
addressed. In other words, the policy issue regarding the enhancement of R&D capital 
has to include the strategies to foster SMEs and new technology-based firms, which 
can provide technology/knowledge-based services for large firms, but also to promote 
collaboration between the large firms and the SMEs. 
Finally, although some governments have launched certain initiatives such as federally 
funded Small Business Development Centres in the USA, a more effective way to help 
individuals to pursue entrepreneurial ventures may be to foster new technology-based 
firms by helping unions and professional associations to provide entrepreneurship 
training for their members, and to assist their members to identify new business 
opportunities, develop business plans, navigate capital access and intellectual property 
concerns (Markusen 2008). This strategy relates to the development of local support 
networks, which is discussed in the following section on relational capital.
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§ 2.2.2 Relational Capital
Relational capital refers to the capacity to identify specific resources, alongside the 
know-how to gain access to and mobilise these resources based on not only a monetary 
nature but also relations, which are based on ‘trust’ and ‘reciprocity’ (Crevoisier 2004). 
It has been recognised that networks that are maintained by social relations provide 
transmission routes for specialised knowledge and market information exchange within 
a cluster (Kenney and Patton 2005). This addresses the issue of coordinating and 
networking among actors in the innovation process. Crevoisier (2004, p.7; emphasis 
in original) suggests that territorialised economic development ‘is characterized by 
competition through innovation, not through production costs; an organization of the 
productive system based on networks, not on hierarchical or market mechanisms; and 
competition among territories, not among companies.’  
Studies from this perspective, such as those regarding innovative milieu, learning 
region, and institutional thickness, have endeavoured to explore the constitution 
of relational capital and its relation to regional innovation capacity. Based on their 
findings, the capacity to mobilise relations has been considered as one of the critical 
factors in the innovation process. Therefore determining the preconditions and kinds of 
strategies that can be used to build relations and promote collective learning becomes 
an essential question for the development of a high-tech economy. Several strategies 
have been proposed. I summarise the strategies according to three aspects, including 
the development of relations and trust between actors, enhancement of local innovation 
networks and construction of external knowledge linkages.
First, Storper (1997) proposes two strategies for the public sector to build relations with 
high-tech firms—‘talk’ and ‘confidence’. He recognises talk as the first step to build a 
relation, because it refers to communicative interactions that can help to achieve mutual 
understanding. Talk is a low-cost method, but gives the possibility to create depth in 
the interactions. This may lead to the development of a relation, which involves having 
confidence in what other actors will do and showing trust in them. He further argues that 
a relation based on special material incentives, which are provided by the public sector 
to private actors, is likely to work only as long as the incentives last, so it is necessary 
to apply other approaches at the same time, for example, public procurement, joint 
projects as well as other small, repeated, experimental interactions. However, he does 
not explain in detail how mutual understanding and confidence/trust can be achieved 
in practice. 
According to the empirical study of collective learning and networking in the Cambridge 
area, Keeble et al. (1999) suggest that trust can be developed on the basis of culturally 
based rules of behaviour, innovation engagement and collaboration, as well as accepted 
but tacit codes of conduct between individuals and firms. Specifically, these preconditions 
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of developing trust are based on the construction of shared knowledge that is not only in 
the form of establishing a common technological and organisational language (Keeble 
et al. 1999), but also in the form of developing a collective identity, convention, and 
cultural asset (Benner 2003). Keeble et al. (1999, 322-323) further assert that local 
universities and large R&D consultancies in this respect are key sources of such culturally 
based rules of behaviour, because their new knowledge will spill over into and help shape 
‘the wider culture of the local research based business community, via university spin-
off, research recruitment and direct research collaboration.’ Such spillovers also relate 
to the movement of knowledge workers. In other words, knowledge workers are carriers 
of knowledge, norms and socio-economic relations, so their movements actually play a 
role in increasing the density of local innovation networks and in shaping the culture of 
the local innovation community. 
Second, regarding local innovation networks, besides the networks among universities, 
research organisations and high-tech firms, appearances of entrepreneurial support 
networks, networks between big firms and SMEs and networks between upstream 
suppliers and downstream consumers in a value chain and are also considered as 
important elements in the innovation system of a high-tech region. For SMEs and start-
ups, business services and technology transfer are even more important than R&D 
and direct cooperation with research organisations (Komninos 2002). Actors of the 
entrepreneurial support network include law firms, venture capitalists, executive search 
firms, investment banks, business consultants, accountants, professional associations 
and other local business services, which help the commercialisation of innovations and 
facilitate the development of new products and services. 
Regarding the networks between big firms and SMEs and between upstream suppliers 
and downstream consumers, Tödtling et al. (2011, 1889) argue that innovation 
activities benefit from the presence of lead firms in a particular region, because they can 
afford to invest in R&D activities and if the lead firms can cooperate with small high-tech 
firms through outsourcing or licensing, ‘the strengths of both can be used to exploit open 
innovation opportunities.’ Further, ‘interaction with regional suppliers and customers 
makes it possible to include knowledge from these partners early in the development 
process to speed up the learning curve.’ (1889) They conclude that there is no uniform 
model that applies to all types of regions, but certain characteristics of regional culture 
do support the appearances and quality of the networks, such as cosmopolitanism, 
social tolerance, and openness to global interaction.
Further, it is important for policy makers and planners to recognise the correlation 
between clustering of different high-tech industries and emergence of their local support 
networks. Some studies suggest that networks have a strong geographical limitation 
because social relations maintain these networks, but Kenney and Patton (2005) argue 
that the clustering degree of a particular industry and its support networks differs 
according to its source of technology transfer and the characteristics of its production 
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system. Furthermore the concentration degree of actors in support networks is 
influenced by their service content and attributes of the interactions between high-tech 
firms and business services. For example, biotechnology industry reveals considerable 
clustering of firms and support networks, but its distribution is comparatively more 
dispersed than electronic-based industries, because biotechnology firms depend more 
on universities or research institutes rather than on suppliers and each other, which are 
more important for electronic-based firms. 
Third, many studies claim that external sources of knowledge are essential for continuous 
success of a high-tech region, a way to help local organisations from becoming locked 
into non-competitive technological trajectories (Camagni 1991;  Keeble and Wilkinson 
1999; Keeble et al. 1999; Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell 2004). For example, Bathelt 
et al. (2004) propose a buzz-and-pipeline model to explain the structure and dynamics 
of local networks and their global linkages in terms of knowledge collaborations and 
information exchange, both of which contribute to innovation (see Figure 11). In their 
model, the quality of a cluster depends on the amount of related yet complementary and 
heterogeneous knowledge, skills and information that resides in the local networks. They 
further argue that it is beneficial for firms to have a well developed system of pipelines 
to connect the cluster to elsewhere, based on two reasons. First, ‘[n]ew and valuable 
knowledge will always be created in other parts of the world and firms who can build 
pipelines to such sites of global excellence gain competitive advantage. Second, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the information that one cluster firm can acquire through its 
pipelines will spill over to other firms in the cluster through local buzz.’ (Bathelt et al. 
2004, 46)
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Figure 11  
The buzz-and-pipeline model (Source: Bathelt et al. 2004, 46).
However, it requires substantial time, cost and effort for a firm to establish and maintain 
a global linkage, because it is more difficult to develop trust between organisations when 
they are located in different territories. The difficulties result from not only long distance, 
which reduces the chance of face-to-face contact, but also differences in cultural and 
institutional contexts, which lead to greater uncertainty and less understanding. Hence, 
policy makers and planners may need to consider how to stimulate and assist in the 
development of global pipelines through institutional and infrastructure support, such 
as promoting international research collaboration, holding international conferences, 
developing local identity and reputation, providing a well-established internet network 
infrastructure, and so on.
§ 2.2.3 Human Capital
It has been broadly accepted that cities and regions with higher educated residents grow 
faster than comparable cities and regions with less human capital, although there is no 
consensus on the causes and effects of the correlation between high human capital and 
urban/regional growth (Glaeser and Saiz 2003). Two concepts underlie human capital 
models of regional development: people follow jobs, and jobs follow people, a complex 
chicken-and-egg relationship (Storper 2010). The former concept emphasises building 
a business climate that can attract firms to locate in the area and thus create a thick 
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labour market that can not only provide many high paying, challenging employment 
options (Florida 2005), but also secure a new post following layoff for talented people 
(Storper 2010). 
The latter concept, on the other hand, focuses on developing a creative environment that 
can supply and retain top-notch talent, both ‘home grown’ and imported (Markusen 
2008), because the location of labour skills and education is recognised as one of the 
essential factors that draw high-tech and knowledge-intensive firms (Anderstig and 
Lundgren 1994; Florida 2005). Although their starting points are different, they both 
recognise the contribution of the clustering of talented people or human capital to the 
productivity of a city or a region, especially in the emerging knowledge economy. This 
shows a complex chicken-and-egg relationship between talented people and high-tech 
firms.
Regarding the supply of knowledge workers, a group of scholars recognise well-
functioning education and training institutions as an essential element. Florida (2005, 
151) considers a university to be a talent magnet ‘that attracts eminent scientists and 
engineers, who then attract energetic graduate and undergraduate students, who create 
spin-off companies, all of which encourages companies to locate nearby.’ Anderstig and 
Lundgren (1994), on the other hand, indicate that the quality of the basic school system 
has a significant effect on the transition probability to university education. Markusen 
(2008) addresses the role of occupational organisations—including professional 
associations, trade unions, industry advisory groups, and other education and training 
organisations—in securing and enhancing the pool of regional talent, but policy makers 
and planners need to make sure their initiatives are systematically connected to the 
demand side of the labour market. This connection can also help to recruit regional 
graduates before they leave for a better situation elsewhere as well as to ensure the 
graduates remain current.  Her consideration implies another important policy issue, 
how to attract and retain knowledge workers.
Castells and Hall (1994, 26) argue that ‘quality of life is a highly subjective attribute, 
and many areas in the world are of startling beauty without having much chance to 
become technological or industrial centers.’ Storper (2010, 2034) also claims that ‘[s]
killed people appear in most cases to precede the creation of amenities’. But both in 
theory and practice, there is a growing focus on amenities, entertainment, and lifestyle 
considerations in attracting and retaining knowledge intensive firms and people, 
for example, Gottliep (1994; 1995), Florida (2002; 2005), Yigitcanlar et al. (2007), 
Baum et al. (2007).  They argue that since knowledge workers have high mobility and 
many job options, to attract and retain them, a high ‘quality of place’—consisting of 
infrastructural facilities, amenities, lifestyle, professional networks, urban diversity, 
tolerance, and territorial identity—must be in place (Florida 2005). Such an argument 
has had influential effects on contemporary high-tech policy making and spatial 
planning practices.
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§ 2.2.4 Remark
On the basis of previous discussions, three sectors can be identified as key players in a 
territorial innovation system: government, industry and academic institutes. The roles 
that governments, lead firms, and academic institutes play ‘are essentially strategic in 
that they shape the discursive and material settings for localized forms of economic 
development’ (Lagendijk and Boekema 2008, 933). This has profound implications for 
the governance activities of spatial planning, since governments may need to mobilise 
powerful high-tech players and their resources to induce and/or support high-tech 
spatial development and to deal with the spatial issues generated in the high-tech spatial 
planning and development processes. This identification can also assist in analysing and 
explaining the behaviour of the key players in the process of high-tech spatial policy/
plan/strategy-making.
As shown in Figure 12, the role of industry and academic institutes is twofold. They form 
the basis of both R&D capital and human capital in a high-tech region. Universities and 
research institutes are knowledge generators as well as talent magnets in a regional 
innovation system. Industry consists of large, medium and small high-tech firms 
and their support networks that provide services to the high-tech firms and help the 
commercialisation of innovation. Their constant interactions and collaboration may 
generate new knowledge and facilitate the development of new products and services. 
Besides, high paying, challenging occupational opportunities provided by the high-tech 
firms also contribute to the enhancement of human capital.
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Figure 12  
Interrelationships between the key players.
Regarding relational capital, these two groups of actors can be recognised as knowledge 
generators and knowledge exploiters—the interactions of which can be mutually fertile 
(OECD 2005; Benneworth and Hospers 2007). The dynamics of local networks between 
the two sectors and their external knowledge linkages can help to generate valuable 
knowledge and prevent a lock-in situation in the high-tech city-region. 
Government, on the other hand, is considered as the key supporter and governor who 
can provide and/or strengthen the principal components of high-tech development in a 
particular innovation system. In the previous sections, I discussed a set of strategies that 
are expected to contribute to the three principal components of high-tech development. I 
summarise the strategies in Table 5. Most of the strategies are comprehensive and have to 
be implemented through collaboration between the three sectors, because the strategies 
need certain resources that may be held by the high-tech firms and/or knowledge 
institutes rather than the government, such as generation of valuable knowledge, 
information about new trends in technology and the market, access to international 
markets, production and knowledge networks and to the talented labour pool.
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Principal components Strategies
R&D Capital  – Financial resources (e.g. incentives, funding, venture capital and public procurement)
 – Entrepreneurial climate (Knowledge transfer/spillovers, spin-offs from universities, 
R&D institutes and lead firms)
 – Other
Relational Capital  – Collaboration networks among knowledge infrastructures and high-tech firms
 – Local support networks (including the networks between big firms and SMEs as well as  
upstream suppliers and downstream customers)
 – External knowledge linkages
 – Professional networks
 – Other
Human Capital  – A sufficiently large pool of mobile labour and high paying, challenging occupational  
opportunities
 – Well-functioning education and training systems
 – Quality of place (e.g. quality of life, urban diversity, tolerance, and territorial identity)
 – Other
Table 5  
Strategies to enhance the principal components
For example, external sources of knowledge are essential for a high-tech region to 
avoid becoming locked in to a non-competitive technological trajectory. To stimulate 
and assist in the development of global pipelines, governments rely on not only a well-
established international transport system and ICT infrastructures in the region, but 
also a set of strategies to promote international research collaboration and knowledge 
sharing as well as the development of regional identity and reputation, such as holding 
international conferences and other events, providing international collaboration 
research funding, and so on. However, a large amount of public investment and research 
funding does not guarantee a high value outcome. The government is expected to 
provide a ‘sound’ environment, both physical and non-physical, that can stimulate 
and support the collaboration, but universities, R&D institutes and/or high-tech firms 
are the crucial actors—the ones conducting the collaboration. Their capacities and 
behaviours decisively affect the quality of the collaboration in terms of building social 
relationships and generating, exchanging, sharing and gaining knowledge. Policy makers 
and planners should be aware of the role that high-tech firms and academic institutes 
can play and should play. The two groups of actors may potentially bring necessary 
resources to assist in the high-tech spatial development, but also be powerful actors 
determining the effectiveness of a high-tech spatial policy/plan/strategy.
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§ 2.3 Spatial Dimension of the Principal Components
In the last section I discussed the nature of the three principal components—R&D capital, 
relational capital and human capital—for high-tech development and summarised a set 
of strategies and elements that can provide and/or strengthen the principal components. 
Since high-tech development has a definite spatial dimension, some of the strategies do 
have implications for spatial planning and development. In this section, I try to make the 
implications more explicit by identifying the spatial mechanisms that are considered to 
be useful for the development of the three principal components.
§ 2.3.1 R&D Capital: Role of Universities and Innovation Centres
One of the most important components of an innovation system is R&D capital, which 
refers to the ‘raw material’ of innovation generation. Universities, R&D institutes, 
R&D in large high-tech firms, innovative SMEs and their networks are considered the 
essential units of R&D activities. However, for governments there is always the risk 
that large-firms with high mobility can undertake more of their R&D overseas (OECD 
2005). Namely, ‘rationalising and restructuring large firms may function as resource-
removers’ in a regional innovation system (Benneworth and Hospers 2007, 113). 
Therefore, the emphasis of R&D capital accumulation more recently is being placed 
on local universities, R&D institutes, and innovative SMEs. Addressing the presence of 
universities and R&D institutes and promoting the development of innovative SMEs are 
thus considered as stepping-stones to creating an innovative milieu.
A Presence of universities and R&D institutes
Among discourses on innovation there has been consensus for decades that the presence 
of universities and R&D institutes are crucial for knowledge generation in innovation 
systems, essential for economic growth in the knowledge economy. The locations of 
leading universities and R&D institutes often play a strategic role for governments to 
conduct high-tech oriented development. Sometimes national governments may 
relocate leading universities or R&D institutes to less favoured regions or develop new 
universities or R&D institutes in those regions in order to raise the local technology 
level, trigger new high-tech industrial clustering, and thus achieve balanced regional 
development. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s the French government relocated 
some higher education institutes and research centres outside of the Paris metropolitan 
region to Southern France to balance regional development (Halbert 2008). In its 2004 
Pre-Budget Report the UK Finance Ministry announced a promotion of Science Cities for 
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the North, starting with Manchester, Newcastle and York. Strategies for the promotion 
included physical developments of large research organisations, such as new universities 
(Benneworth and Hospers 2007). 
However, the presence of universities or R&D institutes is not a panacea for all regional 
economic issues, because each region faces different innovation barriers requiring 
different combinations of strategies. For example, as shown in Table 6, Benneworth 
and Hospers (2007) summarise an OECD report, The Response of Higher Education 
Institutions to Regional Needs (1999), stating that when universities try to engage in 
regional innovation governance several research barriers may be present that vary 
depending on the institutional, regional, and national context. Moreover, the creation 
of an innovative milieu, which can effectively turn knowledge into products, relies on 
well-functioning coordinated networks among actors—including knowledge producers, 
knowledge users and appliers, knowledge regulators, knowledge funders (Cooke 
2005)—rather than on local universities or R&D institutes alone.
Background Conditions Research Barriers
On the scale of institution: 
University weakly focused on 
regional engagement at institu-
tional level
 – A lack of strong linkages between the senior management team and  
research centres to develop proposals for strategic research activities that  
underwrite and drive through greater regional engagement.
 – No inclusion of regional engagement as a criterion for promotion,  
undermining academic interest.
Regarding regional structure: 
Weak regional demand for 
universities’ outputs
 – Regions lack a strong base of local research users, such as a strong base of 
research-intensive multi-national businesses.
 – A lack of regional provision of studentships at the graduate level to allow  
high-level technology transfer between universities and regional  
businesses through ‘knowledge on legs’.
Regarding regional institutions: 
Poor regional governance and 
partnership systems
 – A lack of regional stakeholders to work constructively with universities in  
developing new courses.
 – A lack of regional science policy able to develop new research capacity and 
invest in latent research strengths with potential regional advantages.
 – A lack of awareness within the universities of the importance of regional  
networks because of an institutional emphasis of developing  
international research networks.
National/external barriers and 
threats to engagement
 – Nationally focused research agendas overlook the distinctive needs of  
regions.
 – The selective nature of research funding concentrates resources in 
regions  fulfilling national criteria.
 – A lack of sensitivity of research funders and sponsors to research, which  
meets regional needs.
 – A peer review system, which denigrates and undermines the quality of  
proposals, which support greater regional development activity.
Table 6  
Research barriers to universities’ regional engagement (based on Benneworth and Hospers 2007, 119-120)
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B Development of innovation centres
As discussed in the previous section, fostering small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and new technology-based firms is one of the major strategies considered to 
be useful for the enhancement of R&D capital in a particular place. A broadly adopted 
mechanism is to encourage universities or R&D institutes to establish an innovation 
centre on their property, on account of two reasons. First, compared to other types of 
high-tech industrial facilities, the size of innovation centres is considerably smaller, 
because they focus on start-ups, which usually employ less than five people. Therefore, 
‘most of the centres are based on a simple idea: an existing building is altered to make 
room for between 10 and 30 small businesses’ (Allesch 1986, 59). For a university or 
R&D institute, there is a high chance that they have the capacity to accommodate such 
initiatives, sharing their technological facilities—such as clean rooms and laboratories—
with the start-ups. Second, it is also a way to promote spin-offs and technology transfer 
from the university or R&D institute, and help to construct regional networks between 
the research organisation and industry. 
Some policy makers recognise SMEs as an innovative motor for the local economy (Allesch 
1986), so sometimes the establishment of innovative centres has spatial preference 
for less favoured regions in order to achieve a more balanced regional technology 
development. For example, from 1991 to 1995 around 43 technology centres in eastern 
Germany benefitted from federal funding in order to create new jobs. The German case 
shows that the technology centres ‘do not play a particularly significant role’ in economic 
development in terms of their contributions to local job creation, however the indirect 
effects are unknown (Sternberg 2004, 462). 
On the other hand, the Business Technology Centre established by the University of 
Twente in the Netherlands is recognised as a successful case to foster university spin-offs 
and promote a mutually reinforcing network of regional knowledge-intensive activities, 
which not only broadens the scope of the existing regional networks but also increases the 
innovation resources available to others (Hospers and van Tonferen 2008). The two cases 
indicate that the major function of an innovation centre may not be to create new jobs, but 
rather to play a role in promoting technology transfer, spillovers and spin-offs from local 
research organisations, and to enhance regional innovation networks. This may not fit the 
job creation demand of the less favoured regions, but can be one of the supplementary 
policy tools to support regional R&D activities and networking.
C Remarks
The presence of universities and/or R&D institutes and the development of innovation 
centres are considered as useful spatial strategies that can enhance regional R&D 
capital. However, the performance of these knowledge infrastructures is not always 
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as good as expected, because each region faces different innovation issues requiring 
different combinations of strategies. Nonetheless, it is also an undeniable fact that 
some universities, R&D institutes and innovation centres do play a significant role in 
enhancing regional R&D capital and innovation networks by promoting technology 
transfer, spillovers and spin-offs.
§ 2.3.2 Relational Capital: Development of High-tech Spaces
Spatial proximity of knowledge generators and users has been recognised as the most 
important precondition for the enhancement of relational capital, which relates to 
the capacity to build and mobilise relations and promote collective learning in the 
innovation process. One of the main spatial mechanisms is to provide a particular space 
with sufficient institutional and physical development to encourage the formation of 
local university-industry and inter-firm networks, to promote technology transfer and 
knowledge spillovers, and to connect local innovation systems with global innovation 
networks—the development of high-tech space. The term high-tech space in this study 
is defined as a place where technologically advanced industries and/or R&D firms and 
institutes gather, which have been specifically selected by national technology policies 
to trigger economic growth at the national and/or local level. This includes technology 
parks, science parks, science cities, technopolises, high-tech corridors and high-tech 
regions. 
Many countries have recognised high-tech spaces not only as an important element 
of national and regional innovation systems (Link 2009), but also as a nodal point of 
science and technology in a region or a country as well as a locally embedded hub in 
a global economic network (Anttiroiko 2004; Spithoven 2009). They also consider 
that such developments can help develop local identity and image that can be used to 
attract external investors and partners, and thus promote the construction of ‘global 
pipelines’. The global phenomenon is shown in the Science Park and Innovation Centre 
Association’s (SPICA) Directory. According to the directory, by the end of 2010 there were 
more than 395 science and technology parks (STPs) located in 102 countries. These 
figures are provisional and do not claim to be exhaustive, but they give an impression of 
the extension of the phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, the planning concept of high-tech spaces varies according to space and 
time. Based on previous academic studies, five types of high-tech spatial development 
are recognised in this research. On a district scale, research parks, science parks, and 
technology parks are identified. On a city-regional and a national scale, high-tech city-
region and technopole planning are categorised respectively.
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A On a district scale: research parks, science parks, and technology parks
As shown in Table 7, in 1994 the Of ficial Journal of the European Commission defined 
research parks, science parks, and technology parks (Guy 1996; Komninos 2002). The 
research and science parks are deliberately planned either by governments, universities, 
high-tech firms, or private sector parties. What distinguishes them from technology 
parks is the emphasis on basic and/or applied science research. The research and 
science parks address research more than product development. For them, the key is 
the link between academic and applied research and thus the production plants are 
normally precluded. 
Type Key features
Research Parks Normally located very near to one or more universities or similar academic and  
research institutions. The emphasis is placed on research rather than  
development, and the key is the link between academic and applied research.
Science Parks A real estate initiative in one or more sites that are geographically near to one or 
more higher education or R&D institutions, and maintains operative links with 
them. The main objectives of science parks are research, development and design, 
conceiving new products and developing them to the marketing stage.
Technology Parks A technology park is a group of high-tech companies in close proximity. Their 
activities include R&D, production, sales and services, but compared to science 
parks they emphasise production more. The presence of academic institutions is 
not essential.
Table 7  
Definition of research, science and technology parks in the European Union (based on Guy 1996; Komninos 
2002)
The latter emphasise R&D activities, conceiving new products and, and developing 
them to the market stage. Firms activities in the science parks often end at the stage 
of prototype design, while their production activities are located elsewhere (Guy 1996). 
From the main objectives and activities of the research and science parks, we can 
recognise that their original planning logic is based on the linear innovation model, 
whereby the scientific and applied research activities can be spatially separated from 
production and diffusion activities. The philosophy of the planning model is the ‘science-
push’, ‘which sees scientific results as raw material for innovative activities among the 
business firms’ (Annerstedt 2006, 287).
However, a group of scholars, such as Massey et al. (1992), Asheim (2000), Cooke (2001; 
2005), argue that the linear model not only is weak in connecting the development 
of research and/or science parks to local economy, but also ignores many feedbacks 
and loops that occur between different stages in the chain of successive, interrelated 
innovation activities. On the other hand, they propose an interactive innovation model, 
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which is underlined by the logic that innovation is a social process of ‘learning by doing’ 
and ‘learning by using’ that is based on tacit knowledge. The emphasis is on the role 
of socio-cultural structures and the interactions among local firms and institutes in 
technological development (Asheim 2000). 
The logic of the interactive model implies that the essence of high-tech economic 
development is to promote technology transfer and knowledge spillovers, which 
are ‘relying on close university-industry cooperation, where large and smaller firms 
establish network relationships with other firms, universities, research institutes, and 
government agencies’ (Asheim 2000, 472). In other words, knowledge generation is not 
limited to the R&D activities within universities and R&D institutes, but also develops 
in the interaction process between the knowledge infrastructures and high-tech firms, 
between upstream suppliers and downstream customers in a value chain, and between 
the firms and their support networks.
A technology park is a specific zone that is designated to accommodate firms that are 
engaged in the commercial application of particular high technologies. The firms normally 
work in similar or complementary areas. The planning logic of the technology park is 
based on the concept of industrial district, so it addresses more the interrelationships 
among high-tech firms. The purpose of such initiatives is to trigger particular high-tech 
industrial clustering, enforce the ‘industrial atmosphere’, and thus contribute to local 
economic growth and job creation. The emphasis is more on production than the link 
with academic activities, although academic involvement is also essential (Guy 1996; 
Komninos 2002). Governments often initiate the development of technology parks as 
part of their industrial cluster policy.
According to the implementation experiences of cluster policy in Asian countries, including 
Japan, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand, Kuchki and Tsuji (2005; 2008) proposed a 
flowchart to illustrate the development process (see Figure 13). This approach is applied 
to the development of technology parks as well. In the beginning, governments devote to 
capacity building—such as developing infrastructure, and providing incentives, business 
services, human resources and superior living conditions—to attract selected high-tech 
industries to a specific zone. Capacity building may successfully trigger the industrial 
agglomeration process. In the later phase anchor firms and their related firms start to 
play a role in reinforcing local innovative activities. This flowchart approach is based on 
the interactive innovation model and argues that new industries and new businesses do 
not emerge alone but rather are part of regional economic and innovative activities. This 
argument implies that it is important to promote university-industry collaboration, but 
for local economic development the key strategy is to harness the power of industrial 
clustering, which forms the base of the creation of the regional innovation milieu.
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Figure 13  
A flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy (Source: Kuchki and Tsuji 2008, 5)
B On a city-regional scale: science cities and high-tech city regions
On a city-regional scale, developments of a science city and/or a high-tech city-region 
are the most common approaches to high-tech development. The starting points of the 
two approaches are different. While the former refers to a new town project acting as a 
high-tech growth pole for a region, the latter is an urban extension plan of one or more 
science/technology parks with an aim to create or enhance favourable conditions for the 
development of an innovation milieu on a city-region scale. But both of their underlying 
concepts imply that the linkages between R&D activities and industrial activities are so 
important that on a city-regional level it is crucial to provide adjacent or well-connected 
spaces for these two activities from the outset. Following is an explanation of the origin 
and planning concepts of these two approaches.
On the basis of high-tech spatial development experiences from the 1960s to 1980s 
in the USA, Europe as well as Asia, Castells and Hall (1994) identify a science city 
development approach. According to their case studies, including Akademgorodok 
in Russia, Taedok Science Town in Korea, and Tsukuba Science City in Japan from the 
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1960s to 1980s, they define science cities as ‘new settlements, generally planned and 
built by governments, and aimed at generating scientific excellence and synergistic 
research activities, by concentrating a critical mass of research organisations and 
scientists within a high-quality urban space’ (p.39). Specifically, a science city is a new 
town plan that consists of strictly scientific research complexes and high-quality urban 
assets with no direct territorial linkage to industrial activities, a planning concept that is 
based on the ‘science push’ model. 
However, Castells and Hall find that in such an isolated environment, remote from normal 
human society, research communication and networks could hardly be developed, so many 
existing science cities alter their development strategies to have closer linkages between 
scientific research and industrial activities. The adjustment in planning and development 
shows an underlying concept that knowledge exploitation and generation can interact and 
cross-fertilise, so it is essential for a regional innovation system to promote the linkage 
between knowledge producers and exploiters by providing space for industrial activities 
adjacent to the proximity of R&D activities. Thus, the original conception of science cities 
is too narrow to encompass current development. 
On the other hand, since the 1990s some successful science or technology parks have 
gradually evolved towards a city-region scale, such as Kista in Sweden and Hsinchu 
in Taiwan. Anttiroiko (2004, 396) points out that this evolution involves ‘the wider 
geographic area, new infrastructures and logistical solutions, housing projects, wider 
commercial services, and closer relations with the surrounding urban community’, 
comprehensive spatial planning and development on a city-region level. In those city-
regions there is a considerable concentration of academic, R&D and industrial activities 
with dense interactions among these activities and sufficient supplies of infrastructure, 
housing, business and commercial services, entertainment, recreation and amenities. 
This concentration is deliberately planned and developed by governments and can be 
seen as an urban extension of one or more science or technology parks.
C On a national scale: technopole planning
Technopole planning is a set of larger scale high-tech spatial developments based on 
the concept of balanced regional development, a tool of regional policy rather than 
technological innovation on the basis of growth pole/growth centre theory (Masser 
1991). In other words, it is a national policy aiming to balance geographical development 
and to improve local competitiveness by promoting local high-tech industrial 
development. The implementation is usually based on a new town model, conducted 
by local governments and supported by national governments. It involves cooperation 
between different government levels, but the way of cooperating differs from country 
to country and shifts from over time depending on the administrative, legal and spatial 
planning systems of the country at that time.
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For example, since the 1960s the concept of technopole has appeared in France under 
the intervention of the state in the context of the specific French spatial planning 
strategies developed by DATAR—the Prime Minister’s National Agency for Spatial 
Planning and Regional Action (Halbert 2008). In the 1960s and 1970s, the French 
government relocated some higher education institutes, research centres and national 
industrial firms outside metropolitan Paris to Southern France, areas such as Toulouse, 
Grenoble and Nice. Following the decentralisation of the French government’s powers 
between 1982 and 1984, local governments greatly increased their influence on 
technopole planning (Benko 2000; Halbert 2008; Simmie 1994). Furthermore, the 
planning strategy altered from exogenous to endogenous development and aimed to 
accelerate existing growth poles rather than to create new ones. 
In 1980, according to the Technopolis Law, the Japan Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) founded the technopolis (technology-intensive city) programme 
aiming to promote local technological and industrial development by raising the local 
technology level, establishing new high-tech industries, encouraging local research and 
development, and creating attractive communities where people could live and work. 
The underlying logic was to reduce the geographical imbalanced between Japan’s three 
major metropolitans—Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka—and other peripheral areas (Castells 
and Hall 1994; Simmie 1994; Suzuki 2004). At that time twenty-six regions were 
designated as technopolises, and the role of the Japanese government was to facilitate 
local developments rather than directly invest, except for Nishi-harima Technopolis 
(Masser 1991; Castels and Hall 1994; Suzuki 2004).  
However, the Technopolis Act was terminated in 1998. The programme ended in 
failure due to the gap between theory and reality (Suzuki 2004). The technopolis 
programme in Japan ‘was a development policy that depended upon the investment of 
big companies outside the concerned region’, but there were technical gaps leading to a 
weak relationship between the invited industries and the local existing industries (600). 
Since 1998 the MITI has changed its technology planning and policy model to promote 
venture business and to enhance the links between universities and industries, a shift 
from exogenous to endogenous development as well.
Influenced by Japanese, the Korean government also established its own technopolis 
programme in 1989 and designated nine sites as technopolises, but only Kwangju was 
built. The remaining eight technopolises were re-designated as local high-tech industrial 
parks—technoparks. The scale of the technoparks is smaller than the technopolises, 
because the national government intended to authorise local governments to conduct 
the development with limited national support (Oh 1995). Compared to the French 
case, the Japanese and Korean technopolis programmes are more production oriented, 
but all of their technology planning and policy models have the tendency to shift from 
exogenous to endogenous development and their national governments also changed 
to play a more strategic and supportive role rather than to lead the implementation of 
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high-tech space developments. Further, they all recognise the presence of both R&D 
and industrial activities as important, but the French and Japanese cases emphasise 
more the role of big firms, while the Korean case addresses more the role of locally-based 
SMEs and new technology-based small firms in the development process.
D Remarks
The previous studies show that most cases identify the role of science and/or technology 
parks as important for high-tech spatial development whether on an urban, regional 
or national scale. This is because the cases recognise that the parks can provide 
adequate spaces for R&D and high-tech industrial activities while helping them to 
develop linkages with each other, facilitate industrial clustering, and promote valuable 
knowledge generation and application. In other words, science and/or technology parks 
are expected to be the basic spatial elements for high-tech development in a particular 
place. Learning from the studies on larger scale high-tech spatial developments, 
including science cities, high-tech city-regions and the technopole programme, we can 
understand that besides the development of science and/or technology parks, sufficient 
supplies of transport and communication infrastructures and spaces for business and 
commercial services are recognised as crucial spatial elements for such developments.
§ 2.3.3 Human Capital: Planning and Design Strategies
Human capital is another principal component that is commonly addressed in high-tech 
development. Many studies have shown that there is a strong and steady connection 
between education levels and urban/regional population, employment, and income 
growth (Glaeser 2001; Glaeser and Shapiro 2001; Glaeser and Saiz 2003). The major 
issue is how to produce, attract and retain knowledge workers in a particular city/region. 
In academic discussions, the two most commonly mentioned and complementary 
factors in relation to the issue of reinforcing human capital are ‘quality of education 
system’ and ‘quality of place’. These discourses have had fundamental influences on the 
content of spatial strategies.
Some scholars recognise the importance of well-functioning education and training 
systems, from higher education down to basic school. For example, Florida (2005) 
claims that universities can act as a talent magnet to attract eminent scientists and 
engineers, while Anderstig and Lundgren (1994) argue that the quality of basic school 
system significantly affects the transition probability to university education. Glaeser and 
Shapiro (2003) also suggest that knowledge workers may be produced and attracted by 
the provision of quality public schools. In the practice of high-tech spatial planning, the 
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argument has been transformed into the establishment of international (basic) school 
in order to create a friendlier environment for international knowledge workers and their 
families.
Other scholars claim that the provision of a high ‘quality of place’—consisting of 
infrastructural facilities, amenities, lifestyle, professional networks, urban diversity, 
tolerance, and territorial identity—is another effective strategy to attract and retain 
knowledge workers. For example, Markusen (2008, 59) argues that ‘to build a regional 
identity around key occupations that allows it to be known as a “place to be” for that 
occupation’ can attract particular group of knowledge workers on regional and urban 
levels, such as IT professionals in the Bay Area, media artists in the Los Angeles, software 
engineers in Seattle, and so on. 
Florida (2005) also conducts a study of talent via focus groups and interviews, and 
statistical research in the USA to explore the factors that enable places to mobilise and 
attract technology and talent. He concludes that the diversity and tolerance of a place, 
in other words openness and low barriers to entry, are the most important factors that 
attract and retain talent rather than the supply of high-paying, challenging employment, 
which is recognised as a necessary but insufficient condition. However, some scholars 
have challenged the validity of the data Florida presents to support his argument, such 
as Glaeser (2005) and Rausch and Negrey (2006). 
Despite the issue of validity, the discourse of creative capital has inspired planners and 
designers to generate spatial strategies for high-tech spatial development. For example, 
one-north in Singapore seeks to create an intellectually stimulating and creative physical 
environment that can attract, retain and form a critical mass of talents
by providing residential options such as home of fices to create a ‘work-live-play’ 
environment; by fostering a ‘vibrant’ cultural scene with art galleries, restaurants, pubs, 
and cafes...JTC [,the master developer of one-north,] attempted to enhance existing 
bohemian spatial qualities so as to attract more creative talents who would in turn further 
contribute to the ‘innovative milieu’ at one-north (Wong and Bunnell 2006, 76, 78).
However, the concept of quality of place is very abstract and can be interpreted in different 
ways. Spatial demands and preferences of different groups of knowledge workers may 
vary according to their life stages, nationalities, professions, and so forth, so for planners 
and designers to fit all the potential demands of knowledge workers often becomes a 
commonly used strategy. This results in a compact, diverse, mixed-use urban form with 
a variety of sufficient facilities and amenities.
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§ 2.3.4 Remarks
In the previous sections, I discussed a set of spatial strategies that are expected to 
make a contribution to the three principal components of high-tech development. The 
spatial strategies and their spatial implications are summarised in Table 8. Two types of 
spatial implications can be identified, including 1) land supply for accommodating R&D, 
knowledge-based production, training and/or education activities, and 2) particular 
spatial conditions for inducing knowledge generation and application, for supporting 
production activities, or for attracting and retaining human resources. The former is 
more visible than the latter. 
Principal  
Components
Spatial Strategies Spatial Implications
R&D Capital  – Knowledge infrastructures:  
universities, R&D institutes, and  
technology centres/incubators 
 – Lead high-tech firms
 – Land supply for  
accommodating R&D activities
Relational Capital
 
 – Research/Science/Technology/ 
Industrial Parks
 – Land supply for accommodating R&D  
and other knowledge-based production  
activities
 – Spatial conditions for inducing knowledge  
generation and application
 – International and internal accessibility 
(e.g. Airport, highway,  
ICT infrastructure, etc.)
 – Spatial conditions for supporting  
knowledge-based production activities
Human Capital  – Education and training institutes  
(including international schools)
 –  Land supply for accommodating  
education and training activities
 – A variety of sufficient facilities,  
 amenities, commercial and business  
 service centres and housing choices;  
 landmarks
 – Spatial conditions for attracting and  
retaining human resources
Table 8  
Spatial strategies for enhancing the principal components
However, it is important to highlight that in many studies the spatial elements 
are considered as preconditions for a high-tech space, but their presence does not 
guarantee the success of the development, because synergy between physical (e.g. the 
establishment of knowledge infrastructures and science/technology parks, etc.) and 
non-physical developments (e.g. R&D capacity, quality of human resources, etc.) is 
key. This implies the importance of linking the governance activities of the territorial 
innovation system with the planning activities of high-tech spatial development.
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3 Institutional Variables of Spatial 
Planning Systems
§ 3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I identified the three principal components of high-tech 
development and their correlated spatial elements based on the theories of high-tech 
development. But few of the theories draw attention to the role of spatial planning and 
governance in the high-tech development process. The concept of spatial planning 
encompasses more than land use planning and development control. Although the 
term ‘spatial planning’ is considered a ‘Euro-English’ concept that has been formidably 
advocated by the European Community since the 1990s (Thompson 2000; Harris 
and Hooper 2004), there are two reasons why the term particularly fits the domain of 
this research. First, spatial planning can be used as a generic term to name different 
sorts of ‘governance system[s] for managing spatial development and/or physical land 
use in a particular place’ (Dühr et al. 2010, 26). Its generic nature is useful for cross-
country comparison, because the term is not specific to a particular country. Second, the 
term spatial planning is often used to describe a specific spatial approach that focuses 
on policy coordination and spatial cohesion, so it can be used to address the ‘spatial’ 
concern of this research on the policy of high-tech development and its implications for 
managing the organisation of space. 
In this research, I understand the key function of spatial planning to be managing spatial 
development and organisation in a particular place in order to provide sound space and 
place qualities for a range of economic and socio-cultural purposes. Spatial planning 
includes a set of governance practices not only ‘for developing and implementing 
[spatial] strategies, plans, policies and projects, and for regulating the location, timing 
and form of development.’ (Healey et al. 1997, 4), but also for mediating the tensions 
and contradictions among sectoral policies (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe 2008). Specifically, in the development process of a high-tech economy, spatial 
planning needs to play a role either in providing sound space and place qualities for the 
purpose of high-tech development, and/or in mediating the tensions and contradictions 
between high-tech development and other sectoral policies at different scales. The 
question is what are the major factors that lead different countries to adopt different 
spatial planning and governance approaches to high-tech spatial development?
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Learning from previous comparative research of spatial planning systems and practices 
(e.g. Davies et al. 1989; Newman and Thornley 1996; Commission of the European 
Communities 1997; Ng 1999; Sanyal 2005; Farinós Dasí 2007; Nadin and Stead 2008a; 
Knieling and Othengrafen 2009a; Booth,2011; Ernste 2012; Getimis 2012), I identify 
six groups of variable that may affect the operational situations of spatial planning and 
governance practices, including 1) model of society, 2) legal system and constitutional 
law, 3) property relations, 4) administration system, 5) planning doctrine, and 6) spatial 
planning system (see Figure 14).
Figure 14  
Institutional variables of spatial planning and governance.
According to the concept of multiple layers proposed by Ostrom (2005), rules at a deeper 
level are more difficult and costly to change, but what can be done and/or changed at 
a lower level is defined by the rules at that level and deeper levels. This implies that it is 
important to distinguish different levels of institutional variables, whether the purpose 
of research is to understand the origin of the rules at one level, or to identify the causes of 
policy problems with an intention to solve the problems by changing institutions. Since 
in this research I aim to explore the major institutional factors that shape the practices of 
spatial planning and governance in the development process of high-tech city-regions, 
it is necessary to clarify the relationships between different groups of variables. 
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Hence, I divide six groups of variables into two analytical levels, including the 
constitutional level and the collective-choice level, and assume that they will cumulatively 
shape the rules-in-use at the operational level: the mechanisms of spatial planning and 
governance of high-tech development. Besides, regional cultures (cultural attributes of 
community) and spatial organisation (physical world) are recognised as the other two 
major elements that will affect the operational arenas and action situations of high-tech 
city-regional development according to Ostrom’s framework. In the following sections 
I explain the implications of the six groups of variable for spatial planning practices by 
reviewing theoretical concepts and typologies corresponding to the variables on the 
basis of previous comparative research. In the end of this chapter, I propose a typology 
of spatial planning and governance approach as a generic analytical tool to position and 
characterise spatial planning practices in particular places and measure their trends and 
direction of change. 
§ 3.2 Institutional Variables at the Constitutional Level
In this section, I explain the concepts of the four institutional variables, including model 
of society, legal system and constitutional law, property relation, and administration 
system, at the constitutional level and their implications for spatial planning systems 
and practices according to previous comparative research.
§ 3.2.1 Model of Society
The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (Commission of the 
European Communities 1997) has considered the relative roles of the public and private 
sectors in spatial planning and implementation as one of the essential factors of a 
national spatial planning system. On the basis of the studies of European social models 
and planning systems, Nadin and Stead (2008a, 35, 44) define the notion of model of 
society as ‘the diverse values and practices that shape relationships between the state, 
the market and citizens in particular places’, and illustrate ‘how the planning model is 
embedded in the wider model of society.’ For example, due to the rise of neoliberalism in 
the 1980s and 1990s, English spatial planning has changed from serving public interests 
to selling a service. This shows that the liberal ideology has become the dominant model 
of English society, in which the planning system has evolved and is practiced. 
i
 90 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development 
The typology of welfare state regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) forms 
a theoretical base for the social models. He considers the quality of social rights, the 
effects of social stratification and state-market-family relationships in social provision 
as three major criteria to classify three ideal types of welfare state regimes: liberal, social 
democratic and conservative regimes. The number of regime types and criteria have 
increased over time not only because of more sophisticated analyses of welfare systems 
but also because of the need to put more countries into the classification and to present 
simultaneously their prominent attributes in policy-making. For example, Holliday 
(2000, 707-708) argues that the criteria set by Esping-Andersen only consider the 
states that ‘are deeply affected by their social policy that they are best defined as welfare 
states’ and exclude the states ‘that do engage in social policy, while also subordinating 
it to other policy objectives.’ She further suggests a productivist welfare state regime, 
and puts this into Esping-Andersen’s typology to demonstrate the social models of East 
Asian countries (see Table 9).
Welfare state 
regime
Social policy Social rights Stratification effects
State-market-family 
relationship
Liberal Neither privileged 
nor subordinate
Minimal Equality of poverty 
for minority; market 
differentiated  
welfare for majority
Market provision 
encouraged
Conservative Neither privileged 
nor subordinate
Quite extensive Existing status  
differentials  
preserved
Family protected
Social  
democratic
Privileged Extensive Universal benefits 
graduated according 
to accustomed 
earnings
Market crowded out; 
family socialised
Productivist Subordinate to 
economic policy
Minimal; extensions 
linked to productive 
activity
Reinforcement of 
productive elements
Premised on 
overriding growth 
objectives
Table 9  
Four worlds of welfare state regimes (Source: Holliday 2000, 709; emphasis in original)
The typologies of welfare state regimes provide a way to explore the social model of a 
country that underlies its spatial planning system and planning practices, although 
most countries present hybrid forms of the regimes and ‘the classification of countries 
into regime types is time-dependent’ as well as their planning systems (Nadin and Stead 
2008a, 38). For example, the Dutch planning system was recognised as a typical social 
democratic model in the 1980s and 1990s, but has since undergone a change towards 
a more liberal approach. Additionally, if we consider the model of society as a collection 
of values and practices, the discourse of welfare state regimes, which mainly focuses 
on social policy and its relation to other policies in general, can only reflect the model 
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of society to a certain degree. Besides the social perspective, the political economic 
dimension has to be considered in the model of society as well. Friedman (2005) 
argues that political culture is another variable for differentiating societies in ways 
that affect planning systems. Political culture is a broad term that includes the degree 
of civil participation in public decision-making, the degree of openness in the political 
process, the party system of the state, and so on. These elements must be taken into 
consideration.
§ 3.2.2 Legal System and Constitutional Law
The legal system has been recognised as one of the crucial factors that determines the 
characteristics of spatial planning systems and practices (Davies et al. 1989; Healey and 
Williams 1993; Newman and Thornley 1996). National ‘legal style’ and constitutional 
rights are considered as the foundation of the legal system, which also have effects on 
planning systems. Planning Control in Western Europe (Davies et al. 1989) is the first 
example that categorised planning systems according to the effects of law on the legal 
certainty and mechanisms of spatial planning systems. It identifies two types of planning 
systems: the ‘English system’ based on English common law and the ‘continental system’ 
based on the Napoleonic and Scandinavian law. The English common law is case-law, 
which originates from the court and gradually develops from decision to decision. On 
the other hand, the Napoleonic and Scandinavian law is enacted law, which comes from 
study and relies on abstract rules and principles in advance. 
In practice, following legal thinking, there are no legally binding zoning plans in the 
English system, in which a higher degree of discretion is given to politicians and 
professionals. The decisions they make do not necessarily have to be to in accordance 
with policies and plans if they have good reasons at the time for doing otherwise (Nadin 
and Stead 2008b). In the other systems, administrative decisions are made according 
to legally binding plans and regulations, a lower degree of administrative discretion that 
thus guarantees higher legal certainty (Davies et al. 1989). However, this approach may 
create two misleading implications. First, although this way of categorising is simple 
and effective, it reduces the other four northern European countries (Denmark, France, 
the Netherlands and West Germany) into one category and ignores some important 
distinctions between them (Nadin and Stead 2008b; 2012). 
Second, this categorisation does not simply imply that the English legal style remains 
more flexible, while the other legal style provides more certainty. All systems require 
discretion regarding when to apply or how to interpret plans and rules. For example, 
in Italy although plans are legally binding, informal political networks play a key role 
in the operation of planning regulations, and the distance between a plan and its 
i
 92 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development 
implementation may be considerable (Healey and Williams 1993). This example 
shows that in practice, greater flexibility exists in the planning system that is based on 
Napoleonic law. Although the fundamental differences between the two legal styles 
cannot be removed because new mechanisms can only be generated and operate 
within the existing legal system, it is important to avoid oversimplifying the influences 
of different legal styles by being aware that all systems incorporate discretionary and 
indicative elements, and planning practices often seek innovative mechanisms to 
combine the advantages of flexibility and certainty. 
In addition to the effects of different legal systems, the constitution of a country, which 
defines individual and government duties and rights and the relationships among 
different levels of governments, also has an enormous influence on the institutional 
arrangement, priorities, competences, and operation of spatial planning (Newman 
and Thornley 1996; Commission of the European Communities 1997). For example, 
in Germany the protection of property rights are explicitly written into the Constitution 
and a particular right is reserved to challenge the decisions of government through 
administrative courts. This is interrelated with the ‘principle of legality’, which ‘holds 
that the government is only authorised to intervene in and determine limitations on the 
freedom and property of its citizens on the basis of statutory power…therefore relates 
to the power of public bodies’ in spatial planning practices and control of development 
(Hobma 2011, 4; emphasis in original).
§ 3.2.3 Property Relations
Regarding property relations, the conceptualisations of ‘rights in land’ and who owns 
the rights in a given location are the two factors that substantially influence the systems 
and practices of spatial planning, and affect the laws that underpin the planning system 
and practice in a particular country (Booth 2005; 2007; Needham 2005; 2006). First, 
‘[a] property right is the right to use some thing in a particular way’ (Needham 2006, 30; 
emphasis in original). A right ‘is a social creation…[that] give[s], or should give, clarity, 
certainty and stability in the relationships between people with respect to a thing’ 
(31-32). The ‘thing’ can refer to landed property ‘that is a piece of land and “things” 
connected to that land’ (31; emphasis in original). Specifically, the attitude toward 
‘rights in land’ and ‘market in rights in land’ will influence the spatial planning systems 
and practices in a particular country.
For example, the major reason why the British government in 1947 could nationalise 
future development rights without affecting the rights to current enjoyment of land 
is due to two deeply ingrained concepts about rights in land, ‘the capacity to envisage 
overlapping interests in a single piece of land’, and a separation ‘between current and 
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future rights to beneficial enjoyment’ (Booth 2005, 264). In contrast, countries that are 
deeply influenced by Roman law—legitimacy of the government to restrict the exercise 
of rights in land under public law, ranging from expropriation to land use regulation and 
building control—is based on the concept of imperium (Booth 2005, 2007; Needham 
2006).  According to the concept, ‘the enjoyment and occupation of property must be 
within the limits proposed by laws approved by government.’ (Booth 2005, 275) This 
gives the government the right to intervene and govern spatial organisation.
Second, ‘who has responsibilities, duties, rights, liabilities, etc. with respect to which 
parcels of land’ also affects the practices and the outcomes of spatial planning in a given 
area (Needham 2006, 10). This relates to the degree of difficulty to implement a spatial 
plan involving a change of land use and/or an acquisition of land for new development, 
because the transition costs of bargaining have a direct relationship with the number 
of stakeholders and the ‘initial assignment’ of those rights with respect to the parcels 
of land in the given planning area. For example, if in an area land ownership remains 
concentrated and land holdings are large and contiguous, it will be relatively easier for 
someone to assemble plots for a large-scale development.
§ 3.2.4 Administration System
Administrative systems also have fundamental implications for spatial planning 
systems. In the comparative planning studies, the emphasis is often on not only 
governmental structures, but also the power relations among levels of government and 
their planning competences, although the focus of the studies may differ according to 
their research aims and underlying assumptions. For example, the the ESPON (2007) 
Governance of Territorial and Urban Policies paid particular attention to the distribution 
of power in relation to spatial planning among levels of government by analysing state 
structures, decentralisation processes and devolution of powers based on a combination 
of taxonomies (see Table 10). Eight types of devolution of planning powers, three types 
of additional planning features and five types of regionalisation were used to tabulate 
120 categories to characterise styles of planning in each country. Through the tabulation 
the dynamics of administrative structures and power relations within governments 
were described, but the interrelations among the typologies and their effects on spatial 
planning systems were not explained.
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Taxonomy Type
Devolution types of 
planning powers 
Powers to 
regions
1. Unitary state—power in central state; 2. Unitary state— 
power in regions; 3. Unitary state—centralisation, dominant 
state; 4. Federal state—strong central state and regions; 5. 
Federal state—weak central state and regions; 6. Federal 
state—weak central state, strong regions.
Powers to local 
authorities
1. Powerful local – municipal level (with equally strong central 
state); 2. Powerful local – municipal level (with relatively weak 
central state).
Additional planning 
features
1. Regional spatial planning through inter-municipal cooperation; 2. National –  
regional interactive, negotiative and / or contractual approaches to spatial  
planning; 3. Other
Regionalisation types 1.Administrative Regionalisation; 2.Regional Decentralisation; 3.Regionalisation 
through the existing Local Authorities; 4.Regional autonomy (Political  
Regionalisation); 5.Regionalisation through the Federate Authorities.
Table 10  
Taxonomies used in the ESPON Project 2.3.2, Annex B (based on Farinós Dasí 2007)
On the other hand, Newman and Thornley (1996) and the EU Compendium of Spatial 
Planning Systems and Policies (Commission of the European Communities 1997) 
emphasise the locus of power and its effect on the systems rather than its dynamic 
nature. The former emphasises ‘the role of central government and the extent of its 
involvement in planning at the urban level’, because they assume that ‘the locus of power 
will have a significant effect on the autonomy and strength of urban planning.’ (Newman 
and Thornley 1996, 5, 28) The latter gives a more general view about the locus of power 
regarding the extent to which the operation of the planning system is centralised, 
regionalised or localised. They further suggest that ‘there is no simple correlation 
between the structure of government and the real locus of power and responsibility of 
spatial planning in practice.’ (Commission of the European Communities 1997, 41) 
Learning from the studies, it is crucial to keep in mind the dynamics of administrative 
systems and of governance attributes because previous institutional development will 
influence the current and future trajectories of planning systems and practices. However, 
the focus should be on their implications for the organisation of spatial planning and on 
the way they affect the relationship between a national planning system and planning 
practices at each level of government.  
§ 3.3 Institutional Variables at the Collective-choice Level
In the previous section, I described why the model of society, legal system and 
constitutional law, property relation, and administration system are four essential 
variables at the constitutional level that shape spatial planning systems. At the 
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collective-choice level, besides the spatial planning system, which is often the focus 
of comparative research, planning doctrine will also shape the mechanisms of spatial 
planning and governance in a particular place. Planning doctrine can be used to describe 
the attributes of a planning community in decision-making and implementation. I 
further explain the two groups of variable in the following sections.
§ 3.3.1 Planning Doctrine
According to the definition of Faludi and van der Valk (1994), planning doctrine is a 
set of interrelated and durable notions about the principles of spatial organisation and 
planning principles. The principles of spatial organisation refer to a body of thoughts 
concerning spatial arrangements within a given area and the development of that area, 
such as the planning concepts of Green Heart in the Netherlands and of Green Belt in the 
UK. The concept of planning doctrine indicates an arena for discussion and action, which 
involves the process of consensus seeking in a particular planning context. But planning 
is a long term process. Progressing from the initiative stage to the implementation stage 
often takes years or even decades. The planning context is so dynamic that planning 
concepts may be replaced in the planning process due to the changes of political 
preference, socio-economic conditions and contemporary scientific knowledge over 
time (Roodbol-Mekkes, van der Valk, and Korthals Altes 2012).
Planning principles, on the other hand, relate to the way of handling the principles of 
spatial organisation, including the preparation, form, uses and implementation of plans. 
Adopting the concept of policy style, which was introduced by Richardson et al. (1982, 
2), I identify four styles of planning principles based on two criteria, which respectively 
refer to 1) the interaction between the government’s approach to spatial problem solving 
(proactive vs. reactive) and 2) the relationships between government and other actors in 
the spatial planning and implementation process (imposition vs. consensus).  As shown 
in Figure 15, governments that are located in the first category tend to have a reactive 
attitude to problem-solving or goal-achieving and less concern for consensus seeking in 
the planning process. This shows a regulative oriented planning style, which relies more 
on precise regulatory rules than interpretive and discretionary regulation.
Governments located in the second category act as a provider. They are also less 
concerned with consensus seeking in the planning process and prefer an active 
approach to problem-solving or goal-achieving. Such an active attitude is triggered 
by a set of normative values, such as the duty to provide a reasonable quality of space. 
The third category refers to a negotiative style of planning, which stresses consensus, 
with a reactive attitude to problem-solving. The fourth category implies a collaborative 
character of planning style, which also emphasises consensus in the planning process 
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and is inclined to apply an active approach to problem-solving or goal-achieving. This 
typology is so simple and generic that it is manageable for cross-national comparisons. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that even within one government more than one 
planning style may exist according to the planning context. Hence, even if a dominant 
planning style can be identified, exceptions will always occur.
Figure 15  
A typology of planning principles
§ 3.3.2 Spatial Planning System
According to Healey and Williams (1993, 702), planning systems consist of three 
functions:
• a plan-making function, expressing strategies and principles for spatial organisation 
and land use/built form arrangement;
• a developmental function, which may range from land assembly and servicing, to 
infrastructure provision and construction and development activity; and 
• a regulatory function relating to the control of building location and form, and activity 
change within existing buildings.
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In other words, spatial planning systems contain two major elements. The first is the 
various institutional arrangements for formulating and expressing the objectives, 
strategies and principles of spatial organisation (plan-making). The second is the 
planning mechanisms that are used to realise the plans. The planning mechanisms 
include a collection of planning instruments and their accompanying proactive 
(developmental) and/or reactive (regulatory) planning powers. I further explain the two 
elements in the following sections.
Institutional arrangements for plan-making
Regarding the institutional arrangements for plan-making, I apply the combinative 
framework (as shown in Figure 3) to link the institutional arenas of plan-making to 
the institutional variables at the constitutional level through identifying the relations 
between the variables and the seven types of rule. As shown in Table 11, the actor 
constellations refer to the number and attributes of primary actors who can be involved 
in the legal procedure for spatial planning. The primary actors may not include all the 
stakeholders who can influence the decisions or who will be affected by the decisions. 
The constellation of primary actors in a particular arena has to be identified through 
both formal and informal interactions in the decision-making process. The model of 
society and administration system may provide directions to understand the variation 
between different planning systems. 
Action orientations of primary actors are shaped by the position rules and pay-off 
rules. Position rules refer to the responsibilities of different levels of government and 
how they perceive the relative roles of public and private sectors in spatial planning 
and development. The model of society, constitutional law and administration system 
may be the major factors of this type of rule. Pay-off rules will influence the interest of 
stakeholders, so property relation and land policy mechanisms can be identified as the 
most important factors.
The decision rules, information rules, scope rules and competence rules together shape 
the capacities of primary actors. The decision rules determine the level of control for 
primary actors when they exercise the decision function at a particular moment. The 
information rules define the conditions for the actors to communicate with each 
other. The scope rules refer to the scope of a spatial planning system. According to the 
Commission of the European Communities (1997, 34), the scope of a planning system 
‘refers to the range of policy topics over which the planning system has some competence 
or influence, and the extent of integration between the spatial planning system and 
planning and investment in particular sectors.’ The model of society, constitutional law 
and administration system may have influences on the delimitation of the scope.
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Action situations Type of rule In the field of spatial plan
Actor  
constellations
Access rules This type of rule refers to the number and attributes of primary actors 
who can be involved in the legal procedure for spatial planning. This may 
relate to the model of society and administration system.
Action  
orientations
Position rules Referring to the responsibilities of different levels of government and 
the relative roles of public and private sectors in spatial planning and 
development. This may relate to the model of society, constitutional law 
and administration system.
Payoff rules Property relation and land policy mechanisms are identified as the most 
important factors that will influence the interest of stakeholders. 
Actor capacities Decision rules This type of rule refers to the legal and administrative procedures of 
plan-making. This may relate to legal framework, constitutional law and 
administration system. 
Information 
rules
Conditions for actors to communicate to each other and gain relevant 
information and knowledge. This also relates to the model of society, 
especially the level of public participation.
Scope rules Referring to the scope of spatial planning. This may relate to the model of 
society, constitutional law and administration structure.
Competence 
rules
This type of rule refers to the planning instruments and planning powers. 
The legal system, constitutional law and administration system may have 
influential effects.
Table 11  
Rules used to structure the arenas of plan-making
The competence rules refer to the planning instruments and planning powers. The 
forms of planning powers in a planning system reflect the scope of resources that are 
empowered to each level of governments and conditions for them to use resources, 
such as land use plans and regulations. The land policy mechanisms—such as land 
acquisition, expropriation, pre-emption right, etc.—not only relate to the competence 
of governments to implement the plan, but also affect the benefits and costs (pay-off 
rules) that governments, developers, owners and other relevant stakeholders in relation 
to the supply and demand of land property may gain or lose due to planning decisions. 
This shows that the types of rules are interrelated.
Planning mechanisms
The framework proposed above also takes the planning mechanisms into account, because 
they reflect the pay-off rules and the competence rules that influence the situations of 
plan-making. The planning mechanisms consist of the planning instruments and their 
accompanying planning powers. The planning instruments include statutory and non-
statutory plans, regulations and guidelines, and the full range of political documents that 
are used to express spatial planning policy. The Commission of the European Communities 
(1997, 51-53) has recognised four types of planning instruments according to the form 
and purpose of the instrument, including national policy and perspectives, strategic 
instruments, framework instruments, and regulatory instruments (see Table 12).
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Type of  
instrument
Purpose Areas covered Sub-categories
National policy &  
Perspectives
To identify the national 
government’s spatial 
planning policy and strategy. 
They include documents 
that give general guidance 
or performance criteria for 
development, and those that 
are spatially specific and are 
described as national plans. 
The whole Member 
State, significant parts 
or special areas.
 – National perspectives
 – Spatial policy  
guidance
 – Sectoral plans/ 
   guidance
Strategic To identify broad spatial 
development patterns or 
areas below Member State 
and above the municipality. 
They do not generally iden-
tify specific locations and are 
intended to be implemen-
ted by other ‘lower tier’ 
instruments, which specify 
locations.
They are often tied to 
the administrative tier 
of government that 
prepares them (region 
or province), but they 
can be prepared for a 
functional planning 
region.
 – General strategic  
   instrument
 – Second level strategic  
   instrument
 – Sectoral instrument
 – City region plans
Framework (Masterplan) To identify a general spatial 
framework and criteria for 
the regulation of land use 
over an area. They are 
locally specific. They may 
be binding or non-binding 
in respect to regulation but 
are generally implemented 
through lower tier plans.
Generally the whole of 
one municipality, but 
where local authorities 
are small they may 
cover several munici-
palities—a functional 
planning area.
Regulatory  
(Control may also be 
exercised by general 
codes, which can apply 
over very large areas, 
even whole countries)
To regulate the development 
and protection of individual 
parcels of land. These may 
be general regulation zoning 
plans, implementation in-
struments, or special instru-
ments to secure particular 
types of development.
Ranging from one site, 
a neighbourhood of one 
municipality, the whole 
municipality or more 
than one.
 – Regulatory zoning  
   instrument
 – Local building control  
   instrument
 – Implementation  
   instrument
Table 12  
Categorisation of planning instruments of EU Member States (Source: Commission of the European Communities 
1997, 52)
However, this categorisation of planning instruments is based on the statutory planning 
instruments used in EU Member States at the time it was conceived. The categorisation 
already masks many subtle differences between instruments, but it is still unmanageable 
and may not be sufficient for the purpose of comparisons when the studied nations are 
outside the EU. It is necessary to propose a simple and universal way to categorise planning 
instruments. Learning from a decision-centred view of planning, which views planning as 
a process of decision-making (Needham 1988; Faludi and van der Valk 1994), I categorise 
planning instruments into two categories according to the moment of decision-making: 
strategic instruments and operational instruments (see Table 13).
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Type of instrument Major characteristics
Strategic instruments The purpose of strategic instrument is to provide a framework to build  
planning consensus in a given area and/or to provide a frame of reference for  
the formulation of the operational instruments. They may or may not identify 
specific locations and include statutory as well as non-statutory instruments.  
The object of the strategic instruments is decisions.
Operational instruments Operational instruments are implemented at the lower tier including the prepa-
ration of regulations and/or regulatory zoning plans and the taking of measures 
based on them, by which the government can directly intervene in the organisation 
of space. The object of the operational instruments is material.
Table 13  
Categorisation of planning instruments in this research 
The definition of strategic instruments covers the first three categories proposed by 
Commission of the European Communities (CEC) and includes cross-border planning 
instruments, such as the European Spatial Development Perspective (Commission of the 
European Communities 1999). The strategic instruments are intended to be applied 
by lower tier strategic instruments and/or implemented through the operational 
instruments. The purpose of the strategic instruments is to provide a framework to 
build planning consensus in a given area and/or to provide a frame of reference for the 
formulation of the operational instruments. Since one of the purposes of this research is 
to identify the major factors that shape the practices of spatial planning and governance 
when conducting high-tech spatial development, I focus more on the implications of 
the strategic instruments for the practices of spatial planning and governance rather 
than the form and content of the strategic instruments themselves. Hence, the strategic 
instruments that I refer to have a very broad definition. They may or may not identify 
specific locations and include statutory as well as non-statutory instruments.
The definition of operational instruments is beyond the last category proposed by the 
CEC. They are instruments implemented at the lower tier including the preparation 
of regulations and/or regulatory zoning plans and the taking of measures based on 
them, by which the government can directly intervene in the organisation of space. 
Therefore, they always go alongside certain proactive and/or reactive planning powers. 
The mechanisms of proactive planning powers range from different public powers for 
acquiring land ownership (such as the right of expropriation, zone expropriation and 
urban land consolidation) to diverse market mechanisms based on private law (such as 
purchase, ground lease, agreement and various forms of public-private partnership) in 
order to effectively realise the plans. On the other hand, the reactive planning powers 
mainly refer to the control of land use and building activities as well as the protection 
of particular environmental and cultural heritage by issuing different kinds of permit.
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Specifically, the object of the strategic instruments is decisions, while the object of the 
operational instruments is material. This categorisation can be used to describe two 
forms of planning mechanisms—framework-based planning and project-based planning 
(see Table 14). The former mechanism addresses the role of strategic instruments in 
guiding operational decisions. It more focuses on the interrelationships between spatial 
elements and aims to provide a frame of reference for operational planning decision-
making or to be used as a tool to build planning consensus in a given area. Project-based 
planning, in contrast, refers to a form of spatial planning and governance by which the 
operational decisions are made without strategic instruments as a frame of reference. 
In other words, the decisions are made case-by-case. In some cases, the project may be 
so grand that planning can only take place within the context that is set by the project. 
However, these two forms of spatial planning mechanisms may be simultaneously 
employed by the same level of government according to the planning context, such as 
time of preparation. The point is to identify the dominant planning mechanism and its 
implications for the practices of spatial planning and governance.
Type of mechanism Major characteristics
Framework-based planning Framework-based planning addresses the role of strategic instruments in 
guiding operational decisions and more focuses on the interrelationships 
between spatial elements.
Project-based planning When applying project-based planning mechanism, the operational 
decisions of spatial planning are made without strategic instruments as a 
frame of reference.
Table 14  
A typology of planning mechanisms
§ 3.4 A Typology of Spatial Planning and Governance
In a search of a simple, manageable and generic typology of spatial planning and 
governance approaches as an analytical tool, I choose the two variables at the level of 
collective-choice as the criteria—the style of planning principles (planning doctrine) and 
the mechanisms of spatial planning (planning system)—because I consider these two to 
have more direct and obvious effects on spatial planning and governance approaches 
(see Figure 14). The first criterion refers to the dominant attributes of a planning 
community in terms of its governance mode. As shown in Figure 15, I have identified four 
ideal types, including the regulative type, the provider type, the negotiative type, and the 
collaborative type. The second criterion consists of two types of planning mechanisms, 
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including framework-based planning and project-based planning (see Table 14). As 
shown in Table 15, the two criteria together form seven types of spatial planning and 
governance approaches.
Mechanism of Spatial Planning
Style of planning principles Framework-based Planning Project-based Planning
Regulative  
(Reactive-imposition)
1. A legally binding spatial framework 
and criteria for the regulation of land 
use over an area
Provider  
(Active-imposition)
2. Self-binding strategic plans/frame-
works guide public investments and 
infrastructure developments
3. Project plans (initiatives of 
government) without frameworks as 
reference
Negotiative  
(Reactive-consensus) 
4. Strategic plans/frameworks guide 
project developments (based on 
individual bargaining) 
5. Project plans (initiatives of private 
sector) without frameworks as refe-
rence (based on individual bargaining) 
Collaborative 
(Active-consensus) 
 6. There are recursive interactions 
between strategic plans/frameworks 
and project plans. The function of the 
strategic plans/frameworks is to build 
consensus between stakeholders and 
to guide, facilitate and coordinate 
project developments
7.Project plans (initiatives in a form of 
public-private cooperation) without 
frameworks as reference
Table 15  
A typology of spatial planning and governance approaches
Some types of spatial planning and governance approaches may coexist in a given area 
according to the planning context, such as the purpose of the spatial planning and 
governance activities, the time of preparation, and which level of government is the 
major promoter. Nonetheless, the typology is useful not only for the characterisation 
of each single spatial planning case and for the identification of the dominant spatial 
planning and governance approach in a given territory, including a nation, a region, a 
city-region/metropolis, or a municipality, but also for measurement of their trends and 
directions of changes.
However, although the typology of spatial planning and governance approaches can be 
used to identify the dominant planning style in a particular place, it cannot explain how 
planning decisions are made and how the decision-making relates to the institutional 
variables. The typology has to be used alongside the combinative framework (see Table 
11), which provides a clear direction to explore the institutional arrangements for plan-
making and their relations to institutional variables. The utilisation of the combinative 
frameworks can deepen our understanding of a particular planning system and its 
practices. For comparative analysis, the combinative framework can also help us explore 
the significant factors that shape planning decision-making in a particular place.
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The value of comparative research is great, especially for revealing the implicit 
assumptions and other institutional factors that shape the systems and practices of 
spatial planning in particular places but are often taken for granted or overlooked. In the 
next two chapters, I respectively investigate and compare the socio-political contexts 
and the evolution of planning doctrines and planning systems in the Netherlands and 
Taiwan on the basis of the analytical tools I have established in this chapter. This forms a 
foundation to explore the major factors that shape the means and practices of high-tech 
spatial development in these two case study city-regions.
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PART 3 Emperical Study
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4 Socio-political Context in the 
Netherlands and Taiwan
In the past four decades, it is possible to recognise two correlated wider forces that 
are bringing about major changes in policy-making as well as spatial planning: global 
competitiveness and neoliberalisation (Manuel Castells 1989; Green-Pedersen, 
Kersbergen, and Hemerijck 2001; Hall and Pain 2006; Hsu 2009; Waterhout, 
Othengrafen, and Sykes 2012). Some scholars have warned that a growing concern with 
economic competitiveness in the political agenda leads to the danger to exclude other 
possible perspectives, such as social, cultural, and environmental, and to neglect non-
monetised issues and interests, such as social housing, environmental protection and so 
on (such as Friedman 2005; Waterhout et al. 2012). However, this does not mean that 
every country will follow the same trajectory. In fact, within different national contexts 
the manifestations and interpretations of global competitiveness and neoliberalisation 
differ (Green-Pedersen, Kersbergen, and Hemerijck 2001; Friedman 2005; Dicken 
2003; Waterhout, Othengrafen, and Sykes 2012). 
In this chapter I review how the constitutional variables—including the model of society, 
legal system and constitutional law, property relations and administration system—
have evolved in the Netherlands and Taiwan from 1970 to 2012 under global forces, 
and investigate the significant similarities and differences between the two countries 
based on the analytical framework I established in chapter three (see Figure 14). The 
framework follows the concept of multi-level analysis proposed by Ostrom (2005; 2008) 
and assumes that the variables at the constitutional level and collective-choice level will 
cumulatively shape the rules-in-use at the operational level—the means and practices 
of spatial planning and governance. The investigation forms a foundation to explore the 
relationships between the institutional variables and the practices of spatial planning 
and governance in the development process of the high-tech economy in the Eindhoven 
city-region and the Hsinchu city-region.
§ 4.1 The Netherlands
Due to the wider forces of globalisation, Europeanisation, and neoliberalisation, 
the relationships between the Dutch government, the market and civil society have 
changed. The Dutch government has gradually accepted the market in policy measures 
since the end of the 1980s. Economic competitiveness now is not just ‘the way it is’ 
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but also a goal that takes priority over other policy concerns (Lagendijk and Boekema 
2009; Waterhout, Othengrafen, and Sykes 2012). Although the Dutch legal system and 
the way Dutch society conceptualises property rights remain intact, the Dutch societal 
model and administration system have had certain changes in response to the wider 
forces. I investigate the changes in the following sections.
§ 4.1.1 Model of Society
The model of society can be understood as the type of welfare state regime that presents 
‘the diverse values and practices that shape relationships between the state, the market 
and citizens in particular places’ (Nadin and Stead 2008a, 35). In the tradition of the 
three ideal types of welfare state regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990), the 
Dutch welfare state is often classified as either a conservative type, social democratic 
type, or a hybrid type in-between these two (van Oorschot 2006; Vis et al. 2008). Some 
scholars argue that ‘it is neither of them, and its development has not been a movement 
from one to another type but a change of its hybrid character.’ (Vis et al. 2008, 43) In the 
post war period, the Dutch welfare system expanded rapidly with a strong paternalist 
character. The right to social protection was regarded as universal and unconditional (van 
Oorschot 2006). The Dutch welfare system was also recognised as a verzorgingsstaat 
(caring state), which embodied a concept that ‘“[t]he strong” had to care for “the weak” 
and for the sake of social harmony benefits had to be generous’ (Vis et al. 2008, 43; 
emphasis in original). 
However, since the financial crisis of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Dutch 
welfare system has experienced financial problems, gradually leading to the development 
of a new concept of social protection. The new concept further emphasises personal 
responsibility and has led to various liberalised policy measures, such as privatisation, 
decentralisation, and so on. The growing pressure of global competition and effects of 
Europeanisation have further enhanced the reorientation process, but some paternalist 
features and social democratic elements still remain in the system (van Oorschot 2006; 
Vis et al. 2008). In other words, the new Dutch welfare system embraces ‘both an 
acceptance of the market as a superior mechanism for arriving at certain outcomes, and 
a crucial role for strong state intervention.’ (Green-Pedersen, Kersbergen, and Hemerijck 
2001, 320)
The reorientation of the Dutch social model has also altered the relative role of the 
public and private sectors in spatial planning and implementation. For example, 
Stellingnamebrief Nationaal Ruimtelijk Beleid (the Position Statement of National 
Spatial Policy) in 2002 proposed close and early cooperation of governments, civil 
society organisations and market participants, for the spatial development of an area, 
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and jointly formulated quality goals followed by incremental agreements between the 
parties (VROM 2002). This proposal shows that the focus of Dutch national spatial 
planning policy has shifted from government to governance. Since the middle of the 
1990s, market participants have played a larger role in spatial development and market 
finance has replaced public funding in many cases (Needham 2007; Roodbol-Mekkes et 
al. 2012). This implies that the government tends to share the responsibility of spatial 
development with other sectors.
§ 4.1.2 Legal System, Constitutional Rights and Property Relations
According to the classification of Zweigert and Kötz (1998), the Dutch legal system 
is located in the Napoleonic legal style. The ideology that underpins the legal style 
is to make plans, to regulate things in advance, and to draw up abstract rules and 
systematise them. The Dutch Constitution defines a right for all citizens to have a decent 
home and requires local authorities to ensure good living conditions, a responsibility 
combined with a legitimacy that is given to each level of government to maintain the 
quality and quantity of housing through spatial planning (Commission of the European 
Communities 1997). The right to a decent home is one of the most substantial concerns 
of Dutch planning practices.
The realisation of spatial policy and plans relies on certain planning powers, such as 
land use regulations and building permits, to manage the location and forms of spatial 
development, which may limit landowners in how they use their property. When 
considering the protection of property rights in relation to Dutch planning powers, the 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code)2 declares that:
Ownership is the most comprehensive property right that a person, the ‘owner’, can 
have to (in) a thing. The owner is free to use the thing to the exclusion of everyone else, 
provided that he respects the rights and entitlements of others to the thing and observes 
the restrictions based on rules of written and unwritten law. The owner of the thing 
becomes the owner of its separated fruits and benefits, except when another person is 
entitled to them.
2 http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook055.htm [accessed in December 2012]
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In 2005, the Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State (Department of Administrative 
Justice of the Council of State) stated that:
the new land-use plan regulations do not take away the property of the appellants; they 
stay entitled to the enjoyment of their possessions within the planning framework. 
Insofar as the limitations on the use of the property as set forth in the land use plan can be 
interpreted as infringement of the right to unimpeded enjoyment of possessions, art. 1 of 
the First Protocol of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms leaves intact the application of laws that can be considered to be necessary to 
regulate the use of property in keeping with the public interest. (Hobma and Schutte-
Postma 2011, p.21-22)
In other words, although the Dutch law protects the ownership of rights in land, including 
the enjoyment and occupation of land, the Dutch state has the power to restrict the 
ability to exercise rights in land in keeping with public interests. However, two conditions 
have to be addressed under Dutch law. First, the restrictions to exercise rights in land 
have to follow the principle of legality, which holds two core values: universal equality 
before law and legal certainty. That is to say, ‘the government is only authorised to 
intervene in and determine limitations on the freedom and property of its citizens on the 
basis of statutory power.’ (Hobma and Schutte-Postma 2011, 11) Second, according to 
Dutch spatial planning law the owner of a right in land can claim planning compensation 
for loss, when the loss results from governmental restrictions on the owner’s right in 
land, such as a change to a land use plan (Needham 2006; Hobma and Schutte-Postma 
2011). This follows the principles of Napoleonic law that consider ownership of land to 
include the rights to own not only current but also future benefits from the land (Booth 
2007; Needham 2007). 
The legal principle also means that the owner of the land owns any increase in land 
value, even if the increase is caused by public works or planning decisions (Needham 
2007, 29, 153–155). Nonetheless, after the enforcement of the new Wet ruimtelijke 
ordening (Dutch spatial planning act) in 2008, if a bestemmingsplan (municipal land 
use plan) contains an exploitatieplan (land servicing plan), it is possible to impose 
financial conditions on the granting of a building permit as a contribution to the costs 
of infrastructure and other public works within the plan area as well as to the costs of 
planning compensation paid for the loss caused by the development of the plan (162-
163). But the underlying ideology is not so much about skimming off the ‘unearned 
increments’, but rather to use a part of the value increment to increase the quality of 
what is being developed (29). This does not conflict with the legal principles.
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§ 4.1.3 Administration System and Interaction Modes
There are three levels of government in the Dutch administration system, including the 
national government, provinces and gemeenten (municipalities). Despite the shifting 
role of the public and private sectors, the Dutch public administration system maintains 
the feature of a decentralised unitary state (Faludi and van der Valk 1994; Hajer and 
Zonneveld 2000; Lagendijk and Boekema 2009; Needham 2007). Rather than through 
a top-down system of command and control, public policy is enacted through ‘a subtle 
mix of inducement and dialogue primarily based on discursive practices, alongside 
a sophisticated system of financial support and control.’ (Lagendijk and Boekema 
2009, 129) On the one hand, the income of both provinces and municipalities heavily 
depend on the national government. They respectively make only 24 per cent and 19 per 
cent of their total income themselves and the rest comes as a grant from the national 
government (Needham 2007; Rfv 2010). This strengthens the power of the national 
government. 
On the other hand, the system requires different levels of government to seek consensus 
on policy-making (Faludi and van der Valk 1994; Hajer and Zonneveld 2000; Lagendijk 
and Boekema 2009). Two forms of coordination mechanisms are established in 
the planning practices—the vertical and horizontal coordination and the diagonal 
coordination (see Figure 16 and 17). The supervisory powers of the state are used to 
facilitate bottom-up coordination, to generate consensus, and to exchange experience. 
The underlying logic of the Dutch institutional arrangement rests on a theory—‘unity 
cannot be imposed on the state from above’ but rather comes from ‘a plurality of forces 
thrashing out their differences within an agreed-upon framework.’ (Faludi and van der 
Valk 1994, 33) This contributes to the stability of policy.
i
 112 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development 
Figure 16  
Intergovernmental coordination in Dutch planning practices (based on Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 224; 
Needham 2007, 148).
Figure 17  
Diagonal coordination in Dutch planning practices (based on Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 224).
The diagonal coordination approach refers to ad hoc working practices for large national 
projects (see Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 223-224 ; Needham 2007, 233-236). 
Such projects often involve many policy sectors at all levels of government, so the 
best coordination approach is considered to be the establishment of ad hoc teams 
instead of the vertical and horizontal coordination routine, which mainly relies on 
mutual notification. The coordination process starts with the amplification of relevant 
policies into specific strategies and concrete projects. Based on the amplification, the 
responsibilities of each actor can be recognised and formulated into a commitment 
package to assure the realisation of various projects (Faludi and van der Valk 1994). 
The national project Brainport Avenue in the Eindhoven city-region is one of the best 
examples of diagonal coordination, as is further discuss in chapter seven.
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In the past two decades, a rescaling process has been occurring in the Dutch 
administration system. On the one hand, responsibilities of spatial planning have been 
decentralised to the twelve provinces without accompanying resources to execute 
their new duties (Waterhout, Othengrafen, and Sykes 2012). On the other hand, a 
centralisation trend of the Dutch spatial planning system has emerged parallel to the 
decentralisation process. In the decentralised unitary setting each level of government 
can formulate a strategic plan, but the relations between the plans at different levels is so 
unclear and complex that the plans and policies made by the higher authorities cannot 
perform well (Hajer and Zonneveld 2000; Needham 2005). This issue of inconsistency 
has led to a series of revisions to strengthen the planning power of the central and 
provincial governments at the cost of the municipalities. I further discuss the parallel 
decentralisation and centralisation trends of spatial planning system in chapter five.
§ 4.2 Taiwan
In the past three decades Taiwan has gone through a smooth and peaceful democratic 
transition from a party-state authoritarianism to a liberal democracy (Rigger 1999; 
Hsiao 2006; Ho 2010). Taiwan has twice carried out agriculture land reform, in 1949 
and 2000 (Lai 2012). The transitions of political system and land policy have had 
profound influences on the Taiwanese spatial planning system and its practices and 
spatial outcomes. It is necessary to outline the evolution of the four constitutional 
variables as a basis to inspect the Taiwanese planning system and its practices.
§ 4.2.1 Model of Society
From the 1950s to 1980s Taiwan was recognised as a developmental state, where 
economic policy had a privileged position compared to other policy issues (Holliday 
2000), because becoming competitive in the global economy was its way of surviving 
and becoming independent in the world, both as a state and as a society. In contrast 
with the democratic state, its legitimacy principle was exercised on behalf of the societal 
project, which ‘aims at a fundamental transformation of economic order’, rather than on 
behalf of the society (Castells 1992, 57). In other words, economic development for the 
Taiwanese state was not a goal but a means. 
The relationships between the state, the market and civil society were highly authoritarian 
and hierarchical. Political participation was encouraged only when the carried out in 
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ways that favoured the ruling regime (Rigger 1999; Hsiao 2006). Moreover, under the 
centralised control of the Kuomintang (KMT) led party-state, the local government had 
minimal administrative powers and their elected heads were a symbol of democracy 
rather than the substance of self-government. However, the steady high rates of 
economic growth in Taiwan did provide resources, both material and psychological, for 
its citizens to question the authoritarian practice of the single party-state and pushed 
the state to end the Martial Law in 1987, the demise of authoritarianism. 
After that, political obstacles restricting the development of civil society were dramatically 
removed. The rise of social movements and emerging civil society had forced a series 
of political reforms. For example, the temporary provisions effective during the period 
of communist rebellion, which scrapped certain emergency powers that superseded 
the Constitution, ended in 1991 and the first direct presidential election was held in 
1996. At the same time, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) quickly grew to be the 
biggest opposition party balancing the power of the KMT regime, eventually winning the 
presidential election in 2004 and 2008. Several relatively small but significant political 
parties, such as People First Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union, were successively 
established and developed in the early 2000s. The political system has thus become a 
multi-party system. 
On the one hand, a close relationship between government elected officials and 
business interests strengthens ‘gold-power’ politics (Ng 1999). Local factions and big 
business groups, which used to be passively subordinate to the state, now play an active 
role, intervening in policy-making and spatial development in order to reap huge profits 
(Chen 1995). On the other hand, issue-rich electoral debates have forced the Taiwanese 
government to address key policy areas in relation to general public concerns, such as 
creating a more equitable welfare system, working on environmental protection and 
tackling political corruption (Fell 2010). 
Regarding state-civil relations, Rigger (1999) argues that in the democratisation process 
of Taiwan, elections were the most important channel that gave the opposition regular 
opportunities to demonstrate its popularity, to publicise its ideas and to influence 
policy-making. Hsiao (2006) addresses the role of Taiwanese indigenous NGOs in 
promoting socio-political reforms and influencing policy-making to safeguard a healthy 
and mature democratic political system. Based on a survey of 250 NGOs in the Taipei 
metropolitan area, he states that ‘NGO-government relations have gradually changed 
in favo[u]r of NGOs, though they do still face the legacy of past authoritarianism’ (219). 
In terms of spatial planning, it is common that citizens challenge the contents of 
planning based on the support of NGOs and other relevant civil society organisations. 
Some of the citizen groups, if they have a sufficiently large following, will try to motivate 
local politicians to support their demands during an election period. In spite of changing 
relations between the state and civil society, economic development still retains its 
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priority on the political agenda even during the 2000 to 2008 period of DPP government, 
which used to have close collaboration with social movement organisations (Ho 2010). 
Spatial planning and development becomes one of the crucial political arenas, where 
different stakeholders from the government, business sector and civil society fight for 
their own interests.
§ 4.2.2 Legal System and Property Relations
The Taiwanese legal system applies a diversified and hybrid legal style, consisting of 
traditional Chinese legal culture that derives from Confucian thought and westernised 
modern legal culture based on German- and Japanese-style legal codes. The former 
emphasises social harmony and collectivism, while the latter stresses individualism 
and personal rights (Lin 2011). The Taiwanese legal system gives priority to statutes 
rather than case law. The hierarchy of the law system ranks from the Constitution, codes, 
statutes, to ordinances. There is a slight distinction between property rights and rights 
in land in the Constitution. Articles 5 and 23 state that:
The right to live, the right to work, and the right to own property shall be guaranteed to 
the people…All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding articles shall not 
be abridged by law except such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the 
freedoms of others, to avert an imminent danger, to maintain social order, or to promote 
public welfare.
But article 143 in chapter 13, the fundamental national policies of the Constitution, 
further declares the protection and restrictions of landownership as follows:
All land within the territorial limits of the Republic of China [Taiwan] shall belong to the 
entire body of citizens. Private ownership of land, acquired by the people in accordance 
with law, shall be protected and restricted by law. Privately owned land shall pay taxes 
according to its value and may be purchased by the Government according to its value… 
The State shall levy a land value increment tax on any land whose value has increased not 
through the application of labour or capital, and the proceeds therefrom shall be used for 
the people at large.
The declaration shows three concepts of Taiwanese land policy. First, the whole 
national territory is seen as one entity and belongs to the entire body of citizens. This 
distinguishes rights in land from general property rights. This relates to the second 
concept. That is, the protection of rights in land should be controlled on the basis of 
statutory powers, because land is considered as a scarce and irreplaceable resource that 
cannot be monopolised by a small number of people or certain consortium (Hu 2006).  
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Third, land value increment, which is not derived from the application of labour or 
capital, should belong to the public. These three concepts are underpinned by one core 
value—equalisation of land rights. This shows the ultimate goal of Taiwanese land policy 
and has fundamental effects on the Taiwanese land system.
In the name of equalisation of land rights, Taiwan carried out the first land reform 
soon after World War Two. The redistributive land reform successfully channelled 
land capital into industrial capital and encouraged the movement of rural labour into 
the industrial sector. The policy of land redistribution has not only laid a foundation 
for economic development but also resulted in a high degree of land fragmentation in 
Taiwan (Deininger 2003; Lai 2012). Compared to other countries, the high degree of 
land fragmentation and real estate values can be identified as distinct features of the 
Taiwanese land system (see Table 16). The features increase the difficulty to conduct 
integrated land development projects for the need of national economic policy, new 
community development, and enhancement of social benefits. As a result, various land 
acquisition and assembly instruments have been invented, including zone expropriation, 
agriculture/urban land consolidation, and so on, for implementing the projects based 
on the principle of equalisation of land rights and the assumption that the unearned 
increment of land value belongs to the public.
Since the 1980s the Taiwanese government has gradually adopted neoliberalisation 
measures in public policies, such as privatisation, financial liberalisation and public-
private partnership (Hsu 2009), and encourages private investment and participation in 
spatial development. Learning from other countries two concepts have been introduced 
to Taiwan: beneficiary pays principles and development impact fees. Additionally, due 
to a series of social movements the government pays more attention to the protection 
of land ownership. In response to the changing socio-political context, not only are new 
land assembly instruments being invented, such as case-by-case rezoning exaction, but 
also existing instruments have been revised to safeguard rights and interest in private 
land, and to encourage the participation of the private sector in land assembly practices 
for spatial development.
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Country Total farmland  
(Km2)
Average farm real estate 
values per hectare  
(1000 euro)
Average farm size 
(hectare)
Taiwan (1999) 8,500 483.9 1.08
Korea (1999) 19,000 50.1 1.37
Japan (1999-2001) 47,900 78.7 1.56
Netherlands (2000-2001) 19,600 46.9 20.4
Germany (1998-1999) 171,500 9.4 36.34
France (1997-1999) 283,300 3.6 41.68
US (2000) 3,816,000 3.0 175.63
Table 16  
Farm real estate values and average size (based on Huang 2002, 171-180)
§ 4.2.3 Administration System and Interaction Modes
At the end of the 1990s the Taiwanese central government decided to downsize 
provincial authority and to promote a central-local two-tier government in order to 
increase administrative efficiency. This decision led to several initiatives that devolve 
administrative powers and responsibilities from the provincial government to local 
authorities, but also centralise some powers and responsibilities. In the past ten years 
these government initiatives have changed the relation between central and local 
governments and their functional divisions in spatial planning and governance. In terms 
of the spatial planning system, the review of detailed plans for urban planning purposes 
becomes the authority of local government. The local government only needs to report 
the result to central government. 
However, urban planning masterplans still need to report to the central competent 
authority for approval. Although there is more and more space for negotiation between 
the central government, local governments and local communities in the reviewing 
process, the central government still plays the most decisive role. Further, the allocation 
of government revenues and expenditures is highly asymmetrical. Around 73 per 
cent of the net government revenue belongs to central government, but only 63 per 
cent of total government expenditure at all levels is spent by the central government 
(Yen 2011). Except for the two major municipalities, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, 
which are directly under the central government, only 50 per cent of local government 
expenditure, including centrally allotted revenue (17 per cent), is derived from their 
own-source revenues. Most Taiwanese local governments highly rely on project grants 
and subsidies from the central government. This has undermined the autonomy of the 
local governments.
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Although in the past three decades Taiwan has transitioned from a party-state 
authoritarianism to a liberal democracy, its governance system still tends to be 
hierarchical and centralised. Nevertheless, there is more and more space for the 
business sector as well as civil society to participate in the decision-making process. 
Not only the central government, but also the local governments have recognised the 
changing relationships between the government, the market and civil society and 
have been learning how to deal with the new relationships. Further, the emerging 
competitive city-region discourse has pushed some local governments to acknowledge 
the importance of intergovernmental networking. Eight city and county governments in 
Northern Taiwan thus established the Northern Taiwan Development Commission in 
2005 to facilitate inter-regional cooperation, a bottom-up initiative that is looking for 
support of the central government. However, the intergovernmental and interagency 
relations in Taiwan are always criticised for a lack of institutional support as well as of 
internal officials’ willingness to coordinate and collaborate (Pei, Shih, and Chen 2011). 
It is not yet clear whether or not the eight local governments can resolve the internal 
institutional barriers through a more innovative approach.
§ 4.3 Comparisons
I summarise the major characteristics of the Dutch and Taiwanese socio-political 
contexts in Table 17. Both countries can be identified as strong states, but when 
formulating and conducting certain public policies they have gradually accepted 
market-based measures—such as public-private partnership, privatisation of state-
owned enterprises, and so on—due to the influence of neoliberalisation since the 
1980s. However, their starting points are different. The Netherlands is categorised 
as a caring state with a decentralised unitary nature. Policy-making is based on broad 
consensus among different levels of government and stakeholders. Taiwan is known as 
a developmental state with a hierarchical nature. Although Taiwan has shifted from a 
party-state authoritarianism to a two-party democratic system with a growing role of civil 
society in policy-making, the legacy of authoritarianism and economic development-
oriented policy-making remains.
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Major characteristics
Constitutional Variables Netherlands Taiwan
Model of society
 – A caring state (but has gradually 
accepted the market in the policy 
measures but some social democratic 
elements and strong state inter-
ventions retain)
 – Multi-party democratic system
 – A developmental state (has adopted 
the public-private partnership 
 approach to conduct infrastructure 
and economic developments)
 – From a party-state authoritarianism 
to a liberal democracy
Legal system &  
constitutional rights
 – Napoleonic legal style
 – The right to housing
 – A diversified and hybrid legal style 
consisting of Confucian thought and 
German- and Japanese-style legal 
codes
Property relations
 – The right to property may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of 
public need
 – Land value increment belongs to 
property owners, because the land-
owner owns the (current and future) 
rights and interests in land
 – The ultimate goal is the equalisation 
of land rights
 – The protection of rights in land 
should be under control on the basis 
of statutory powers
 – Land value increment belongs to the 
public
Administration system
 – A decentralised unitary state
 – Decision-making is based on broad 
consensus
 – An unitary state
 – Hierarchical direction
Table 17  
Comparisons of the Dutch and Taiwanese socio-political context
Regarding the conceptualisation of rights, there is a fundamental difference in rights in 
land between these two countries. In the Netherlands, rights in land are part of property 
rights, which can only be encroached upon in the interest of public need. There is no 
distinction between current and future rights to beneficial enjoyment. According to the 
legal principles, it is considered somewhat indecent if the landowner profits fully from 
the land value increment when the increment is caused by public works or planning 
decisions. In contrast, the core value of Taiwanese land policy is the equalisation of land 
rights, which is written in the Constitution. In light of the core value, rights in land are 
distinguished from other property rights and should be under control by law, because the 
whole national territory is seen as one entity belonging to the entire body of citizens and 
land is considered as a scarce and irreplaceable resource that cannot be monopolised by 
a small number of people or certain consortium. The institutional setting and design of 
land policy mechanisms in Taiwan is mainly based on the value of equalisation of land 
rights.
Further, the conceptualisation of rights in land has led to a series of land reforms. As a 
result, the landownership of farmland in Taiwan is much more fragmented and its real 
estate value is also higher than the farmland in the Netherlands. As shown in Table 16, 
the average farm size in the Netherlands is thirty-six times more than in Taiwan, and 
the average farm real estate value per hectare in the Netherlands is around one-tenth of 
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the average farm real estate value per hectare in Taiwan. It is no wonder that other than 
expropriation the Taiwanese government tends to develop and employ various land 
policy mechanisms to undertake integrated land development projects and acquire land 
for public uses, such as zone expropriation, urban land consolidation, etc. In the next 
chapter, I outline and compare the spatial planning systems and practices in these two 
countries and further investigate the influences of the constitutional variables on their 
spatial policies and planning systems.
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5 Spatial Planning Policies and Planning 
Systems in the Netherlands and 
Taiwan
Under the forces of global competitiveness and neoliberalisation, the relationships 
between government, the market and civil society in the Netherlands and Taiwan have 
changed to accept the market in policy measures. They both are acknowledged as strong 
states but with different natures. The former is recognised as a caring state based on 
consensus building/seeking, while the latter is identified as a developmental state with 
a hierarchical nature. Dutch and Taiwanese spatial policy has evolved in accordance 
with the neoliberalisation trend. The changes can be explained with reference to spatial 
planning policy and the broader notion of ‘planning doctrine’. 
According to the definition of Faludi and van der Valk (1994), planning doctrine is a 
set of interrelated and durable notions addressing principles of spatial organisation 
and planning principles. The former refers to a body of thoughts concerning spatial 
arrangements within a given area and the development of that area, such as the planning 
concepts of Green Heart in the Netherlands and Green Belt in the UK. The latter relates 
to the ways that the principles of spatial organisation are handled. This includes the 
preparation, form, and implementation of plans. Planning doctrine indicates an arena 
for discussion and action, which involves the process of consensus seeking in a particular 
planning context. But the planning context is so dynamic that various planning concepts 
may be replaced during the planning process due to changes of political preference, 
socio-economic conditions and contemporary scientific knowledge over time (Roodbol-
Mekkes, van der Valk, and Korthals Altes 2012). On the basis of the understanding of 
the socio-political context of these two countries in the previous chapter, I respectively 
investigate the evolution of spatial organisation principles and planning principles in the 
following sections.
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§ 5.1 The Netherlands
Since the end of the 1980s a trend of ‘economisation of spatial policy’ has occurred in 
the Dutch spatial planning system (Hajer and Zonneveld 2000; Lagendijk and Boekema 
2009). The primary concern of Dutch national spatial planning policy has shifted from 
housing to improving competitiveness (Hajer and Zonneveld 2000; Faludi 2005). In 
response to the forces of globalisation, Europeanisation and neoliberalisation, a more 
fundamental revision of the planning act was enforced in 2008 with attempts to simplify 
the decision-making procedure, ensure planning effectiveness and to encourage rather 
than to restrict spatial development. Many new planning instruments have been 
introduced. This has changed the power relations between the national government 
and local authorities. In this section, I outline the evolution of Dutch spatial planning 
policy and planning instruments and review relevant literature that evaluates planning 
practices in the Netherlands to explore the essence of the Dutch planning system in the 
form of rules-in-use rather than rules-in-form.
§ 5.1.1 The Evolution of Spatial Planning Policy
The right to housing written in the Dutch Constitution gives each level of government a 
responsibility combined with a legitimacy to keep the quality and quantity of housing 
through spatial planning (Commission of the European Communities 1997).  While 
housing has always been a vital element of Dutch spatial planning, since the 1980s the 
primary concern of national spatial planning policy has shifted from housing to economy, 
a trend of ‘economisation of spatial policy’ (Hajer and Zonneveld 2000). This trend was 
triggered by four contextual factors: the changing relationship between spatial planning 
and other sectoral policies, the severe economic recession, rising global competition 
and the declining planning identity. Figure 18 illustrates the changing planning context, 
the core threads of discursive concepts and the scope of every national spatial planning 
document from 1970 to 2012 in the Netherlands.
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Figure 18  
Core trends in discursive concepts and spatial policy
First, the spatial planning agency in the Netherlands does not have a substantial budget, 
so spatial planning lies in extensive intra-governmental coordination, negotiation 
and consultation (Hajer and Zonneveld 2000; Needham 2007; Roodbol-Mekkes, van 
der Valk, and Korthals Altes 2012). It is common for the spatial planning agency to 
collaborate with other departments to achieve its planning goals. Furthermore, Dutch 
spatial planning was not independent of housing policy until the separation of the 
Woningwet (Housing Act) and Wet Ruimte Ordening (Spatial Planning Act) in 1962 
(Faludi and van der Valk 1994). Since the 1980s, economic and infrastructural sectors 
have become the new partners of spatial planning. This change has been underpinned by 
the remaining three factors—the severe economic recession, rising global competition 
and the declining planning identity in the 1980s.
In the early 1980s rapid growth and urbanisation came to an end. Dutch unemployment 
rose enormously. More than one-quarter of national income was thus needed to pay for 
social insurance, a huge burden on the national economy (Faludi and van der Valk 1994). 
On the other hand, the Dutch government became aware that internal European boarders 
would disappear by the end of 1992. This would create great opportunities for Dutch 
business and industry (Carter 1996). Hence, the potential to grasp the opportunities 
and strengthen national competitiveness were dominate topics on the political agenda. 
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At the same time, Dutch national spatial planning faced severe criticism about the 
loss of its identity and political appeal because it became too technocratic and lacked 
vision. The need to clarify the core business of planning with an innovative approach 
became urgent (Faludi and van der Valk 1994).  As the economy became the dominant 
topic on the political agenda, asserting a role for spatial planning within this the topic 
became an imperative. As a result, in 1988 the Vierde Nota (Fourth National Policy 
Document on Spatial Planning) proposed a Mainport strategy from a more selective and 
strategic perspective. The strategy emphasised the essential role of Schiphol airport and 
Rotterdam seaport for the Dutch economy. According to Faludi and van der Valk (1994, 
195), this shift implies that the Dutch national spatial planning had became ‘a tool of 
economic recovery’ rather than ‘an instrument of overall guidance’. 
Ruimetelijke Ontwinkkelingspolitiek (Spatial Development Policy), a report from the 
National Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in 1998, further promoted 
the trend of ‘economisation of spatial policy’. This report proposed an area-based 
proactive development concept that has been broadly adopted on the planning agenda. 
It was deemed better to ‘let spatial policies follow autonomous spatial developments’ 
and pay more attention to implementation and finance rather than controlling spatial 
developments (Gerrits et al. 2012, 338). Nota Ruimte: Ruimte voor Ontwinkkeling 
(National Spatial Strategy: Getting Space for Development) in 2004 and the National 
Policy Strategy for Infrastructure and Spatial Planning (SVIR) in 2012 continued to 
follow this trend and tried to integrate with other sectoral policies, such as infrastructure, 
nature and agriculture. The first goal listed in both policies is to enhance competitiveness 
strategically by identifying what is nationally important, addressing the role of urban 
regions and strengthening national spatial and economic infrastructure (Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken 2004; Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu 2012). According to 
the letter from Minister Schultz van Haegen to the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 
(House of Representatives), the Multi-Year Plan for Infrastructure, Spatial Planning and 
Transport (MIRT) has been used as a framework for balancing national interests and 
projects with local interests and projects (van Haegen 2012, 1). In other words, planning 
concepts of Dutch spatial planning policy since the 2000s are mainly derived from the 
emphasis of area-based economic development through an infrastructure network 
approach. 
However, the shifts of planning concepts and scope do not necessary imply that Dutch 
planning doctrine has encountered a revolutionary change. Five basic principles of 
spatial organisation have been identified in the Dutch national spatial policy since the 
first national spatial policy in the 1960s: concentration of urbanisation, spatial cohesion, 
spatial differentiation, spatial hierarchy and spatial justice (Netherlands Scientific 
Council for Government Policy 1999; Hajer and Zonneveld 2000; Needham 2007). 
Concentration of urbanisation is an ambition to avoid urban sprawl. Spatial cohesion 
indicates a good geographic relationship between various activities in a given area on 
different scales. Spatial differentiation relates to the manifestation of city and country 
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concerning the prevention of uniformity and monotony. Spatial hierarchy refers to an 
intention to create and keep a range of urban centres. Spatial justice means that people 
should have access to adequate facilities and services wherever they live. The national 
spatial planning policy has followed the principles for decades, although in different 
ways and to different degrees. The principles do provide an element of stability in Dutch 
planning doctrine and form the core of the professional approach and negotiation 
framework for the Dutch national spatial planning policy.
§ 5.1.2 Dutch Spatial Planning System
On 1 July 2008 the new Dutch Spatial Planning Act (Wro) came into effect, replacing 
the old act (WRO) that was promulgated in 1965 and since revised only marginally. 
Deregulation, coexisting trends of centralisation and decentralisation of certain 
planning powers, and a focus on development are the important features of the new 
act. These lead to three major changes in terms of planning instruments. The first is the 
introduction of projectbesluit (project plan), a new form of implementation plan that 
can be made by the national government, provinces and municipalities. A project plan 
allows deviation from existing bestemmingsplan (municipal land use plan), but within 
a year after the plan gets approved, a bestemmingsplan consisting of the project plan 
has to be prepared and put on public display, otherwise the project plan will lose its 
legal force. This new instrument is designed to maintain flexibility in bestemmingsplan 
(Needham 2007).
Second, the Planologische Kernbeslissing (key planning decision) of the national 
government, the streekplan (regional plan) of provinces and structuurplan (structure 
plan) of municipalities are replaced by the structuurvisie (structure vision) at each 
level of government (see Figure 19). The structuurvisie expresses a vision of how a 
planning agency seeks to shape its territory and serves as an important basis for the 
bestemmingsplan and the projectbesluit to assure the consistency between planning 
decisions and the cohesion of physical developments in a particular area (Needham 
2007; PBL 2010). The structuurvisie is a ‘self-binding’ indicative plan. The major 
measure to realise the visions of national and provincial governments is through AMvB 
Ruimte (General Regulation on the Management of Spatial Planning) of the national 
government and Verordening Ruimte (spatial regulations) of provinces.
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Figure 19  
Changes of Dutch spatial planning system after 2008.
Under the new act, the establishment of structure visions is obligated for the entire 
territory of each municipality. However, according to an evaluation report of the new act 
in 2010, only a limited number of municipal structure visions have been established, 
because there is no penalty for a municipality when it does not establish a structure 
vision for its entire territory (PBL 2010). While some municipalities are planning to 
comply, others have already made a structure plan according to the old act and do not 
plan to make a new structure vision in the near future, although their spatial planning 
frameworks have become obsolete. Others still use a non-statutory form of plan, such as 
a development vision. Those municipalities that do not follow the new act to establish 
structure visions often have other priorities on their planning agenda, such as updating 
their land use plans. 
The third change refers to the coexisting trends of decentralisation and centralisation 
of planning powers. Previously, municipalities were obliged to make bestemmingsplan 
for the land outside the built area within the municipal territory and the plans had to 
be approved by the province. A bestemmingsplan determines what can be built where 
and which regulations apply to it. It also relates to three public powers: environmental 
permit, the pre-emption right and the expropriation, which are explained later. Since the 
enforcement of the Wro, municipalities have to make bestemmingsplan for the entire 
territory and the plans do not need approval from the province anymore. This shows a 
decentralisation of planning powers to the municipality. 
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However, there is also a centralisation trend. National and provincial governments now 
can give an aanwijzing (directive) to municipalities to produce a land use plan with a 
given content, or make an inpassingsplan (imposed land-use plan), which has all the 
legal force of the bestemmingsplan. When an inpassingsplan is made in a particular 
area, the land use power of the municipality in the area is taken away. Generally, the 
inpassingsplan is made when the planning area crosses municipal boundaries, such as 
the construction of roads or power lines. The revision of the planning law does provide 
new possibilities for the national and provincial governments in negotiations with 
municipalities, and thus alters ‘the balance of power between the actors’ (Needham 
2005, 340). 
Nonetheless, based on the interviews of central, provincial and local government 
officials the evaluation report of the new act shows that the move to give aanwijzing 
to municipalities is undesirable and often not necessary, because the draft land use 
plan of the municipalities is modified according to the zienswijze (submitted views) 
of the national or provincial governments. This can be demonstrated by the statistics 
highlighting that from 2008 to 2010 the aanwijzing has been given by the national 
government only once and by provincial governments eleven times. Compared to 274 
withdrawals of bestemmingsplan approval in 2007, which were all made by provincial 
governments under the old act, it can be said that at present the national and provincial 
governments restrain the use of the directive power. The report also shows that almost all 
plans that are established by higher authorities are obviously beyond local significance, 
and in good consultation with the municipalities (PBL 2010). 
Further, in 2011 the Minister of Infrastructure and Environment announced that the 
AMvB Ruimte (General Regulation on the Management of Spatial Planning) would be 
redrafted in a more decentralised form (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu 2011). 
This indicates that although the planning power has been centralised under the new act, 
the central and provincial governments tend towards setting general regulations and 
developing common agreements rather than directly influencing land use in a particular 
area through giving an aanwijzing or making an inpassingsplan. This tendency reflects 
the Dutch culture of consensus-seeking as well as their principle of governance—
decentralised if possible, centralised if necessary—within the daily practices of planning 
principles since the 1990s.
According to the National Policy Strategy for Infrastructure and Spatial Planning 
(Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu 2012, 29–67), the position of the national 
government in the field of spatial planning and development is limited to thirteen 
national interests as follows:
1 an excellent spatial-economic structure of the Netherlands consisting of an attractive 
business climate and good international accessibility in the city-regions where the top 
sectors of high-tech industry are clustering;
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2 the main networks (renewable) energy and the energy transition;
3 space for the transport of (hazardous) substances through pipelines; 
4 efficient use of the subsoil;
5 a robust network of main roads, rail and waterways around and between the main urban 
areas and hinterland;
6 the capacity of the existing transportation system (road, rail and waterways);
7 the maintenance of main networks of road, rail and waterways;
8 the improvement and protection of environment (air, soil and water);
9 space for flood protection, sustainable fresh water supply and protection (significant) 
climate change;
10 preservation of unique cultural and natural qualities (such as the World Heritage);
11 space for a national network of nature for biodiversity;
12 space for military sites and activities;
13 careful consideration and transparent decision-making at all spatial plans. 
Outside national interests, responsibilities in the field of spatial planning and development 
fall on provinces and municipalities, such as the supply of housing and business sites. It is 
expected that provinces and municipalities are more aware of the regional situation and the 
demands from residents, businesses and organisations, so the decisions made by provinces 
and municipalities can better fit the needs and challenges of their area.
§ 5.1.3 Means to Influence Land Use Directly
Hobma and Schutte-Postma (2011) classify planning powers into two categories—
reactive powers and proactive powers. With reactive powers the government reacts to the 
development initiatives of the private sector through issuing permits for development 
activities, such as a building permit, on the basis of the land use plan and other general 
regulations, such as building codes. In the Netherlands, since 2010 a single permit has 
replaced various permits in the areas of housing, spatial planning and the environment 
in order to simplify the permission system and encourage development. It is called the 
omgevingsvergunning (environmental permit). 
Proactive powers enable the government to take development initiatives, such as land 
development, urban expansion, infrastructure construction, etc. Under Dutch public 
law, the government can exercise the voorkeursrecht (pre-emption right) based on the 
Wet voorkeursrecht gemeenten (Municipal Pre-emption Rights Act) and onteigening 
(expropriation) on the basis of the Onteigeningswet (Expropriation Act). After exercising 
the pre-emption right, governments can be the first party to enter into negotiations with 
the owners of the appointed land, if the owners are willing to sell or lease their property. 
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Article 77 of the Onteigeningswet allows expropriation ‘in the interests of spatial 
planning and housing.’ In other words, the land can be expropriated for either executing 
the land use plan for purposes of new infrastructure and/or future urban development, 
or for maintaining the status quo to be in accordance with the land use plan. The 
argument is that ‘if a land use plan has been adopted, this is sufficient proof of the public 
interest.’ (Needham 2007, 169)  But if the owners of the land want to realise the plan 
on their own, expropriation is not necessary. According to the law, compensation paid 
for the expropriation shall consist of not only the loss of the property according to the 
market price with the proposed new development, but also the loss suffered as a result 
of disturbance, removal, etc. 
In addition to the interventions on the basis of public law, the Dutch government 
commonly uses private law to achieve planning ambitions, including purchase, sales, 
ground leases, and public-private partnerships (Needham 2007; Hobma and Schutte-
Postma 2011). For example, if a municipality owns a piece of land, they can sell or lease 
the land with some conditions based on private law and the buyer or the leaseholder is 
obliged to satisfy the conditions. But in the latter situation, the government can impose 
numerous obligations on the leaseholder in relation to use, maintenance, and upkeep.
§ 5.1.4 Summary of the Dutch Planning System and Practices
I summarise the Dutch spatial planning system and practices in Table 18 according to 
the framework proposed in chapter three. Under the forces of global competitiveness and 
neoliberalisation, in the past two decades the primary concern of Dutch spatial planning 
policy has shifted from housing supply to economic development with an infrastructure 
network approach. Parallel to the shifting concern of Dutch spatial planning policy, 
there has been evolution of the Dutch legal planning system. Important features of 
the new planning act are expected to be deregulation, decentralisation, and a focus on 
development. According to the explanatory memorandum of the new act, the Dutch 
planning system needs to fulfil a dual concept, which embraces a steering function and 
a safeguard function at the same time (Buitelaar and Sorel 2010). On the one hand, the 
steering function implies that the new act has to create more room for development 
under the pressure of global competition, so it simplifies the legal procedure and 
introduces the projectbesluit. The safeguard function, on the other hand, leads the new 
act to an inclination for a plan-led system and a stronger role of the land use plan in 
order to guide spatial development and enhance legal certainty (Buitelaar, Galle, and 
Sorel 2011). Hence, the new act requires municipalities to make the bestemmingsplan 
for all of their territories and reduces the possibility of granting exemptions (Needham 
2005; 2007).
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Effects on  
(Type of rules)
Action situations for planning agencies in the Dutch planning system
Actor  
constellations
Regarding the bestemmingsplan and the inpassingsplan
 – In the stage of preparation: Involvement of citizens and societal organisations.
 – In the stage of draft plan: Any person may express their views on the draft plan.
 – In the stage of final plan: Elected representatives discuss and vote upon the final version.
Regarding the structure vision
 – It is a self-binding plan, so the procedure is not stipulated in the act.
Action  
orientations
Position of each level of government 
 – National government: determines spatial policies in the national context and is expected to 
focus only on the 13 national interests.
 – Provincial governments: are responsible for translating national spatial policies into the 
regional context.
 – Municipalities: implementing national policy and strategy on spatial planning is largely 
decentralised to municipalities. The municipalities play a decisive role in detailing and 
implementing spatial planning throughout the country.
Pay-off rules
 – Compensation for expropriation is based on market price. 
 – Planning compensation: for the loss suffered resulting from planning decisions. 
 – The exploitatieplan (land-servicing plan): Implementation of the bestemmingsplan has to 
be financially feasible. The costs of certain municipal services for land development must be 
recovered from those parties who profit from the municipal services.
Actor capacities
(Planning  
instruments)
Municipalities—bestemmingsplan and projectbesluit (project plan)
National and provincial governments
 – Inpassingsplan and projectbesluit 
 – Aanwijzing (directive)
 – Regulations on spatial planning (e.g. AMvB Ruimte of national government and Verordening 
Ruimte of provinces)
Means to influence land use/development
 – Public law: rights to pre-emption and expropriation.
 – Private law: purchase, ground lease, sale and public-private partnership.
Table 18  
Summary of the Dutch planning system after 2008 (based on: Needham 2007; Hobma and Schutte-Postma 2011; 
Spatial Planning Act 2006 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020449/ ; Government of Netherlands website http://
www.government.nl/issues/spatial-planning [Accessed in July, 2012])
However, there are high ambitions for the physical environment and land use in Dutch 
planning practices. Dutch municipalities commonly use the legally binding land use 
plan as a form of contract to regulate informal agreements between stakeholders rather 
than as a means to guide spatial development (Needham 2007; Buitelaar and Sorel 
2010). Based on empirical research, Buitelaar and Sorel (2010, 988) conclude that ‘the 
Dutch planning system was neither plan-led nor based on legal certainty.’ Even after 
the promulgation of the new act, the bestemmingsplan is primarily used for recording 
new development initiatives or maintaining existing land uses rather than for planning 
and guiding future development (PBL 2010; Buitelaar, Galle, and Sorel 2011). In other 
words, it is a plan-led system within development-led practices.
Many consider that there is a centralisation tendency of planning powers rather than 
decentralisation under the new planning law, because several new planning instruments 
i
 131 Spatial Planning Policies and Planning Systems in the Netherlands and Taiwan
have been introduced to national and provincial governments, including projectbesluit, 
inpassingsplan and aanwijzing. This has increased the planning powers of national and 
provincial governments at the cost of the municipalities. But in practice the national 
and provincial governments follow the principle—decentralised if possible, centralised 
if necessary. In other words, they do not intervene with municipal planning decisions 
unless it will influence national or provincial interests. They are encouraged to lay down 
spatial regulations and to build consensus on spatial policy rather than to influence 
land use directly. Specifically, municipalities are expected to be the level of government 
obliged to detail and implement spatial planning throughout the country.
§ 5.2 Taiwan
Spatial planning in Taiwan is centralised, state-led, technocratic, blueprinted and 
development-oriented (Chang 1988; Hsia and Chang 1995; Lai 2000; Lee, Lan, and 
Juang 2005). These features can be traced back to 1936 when the urban planning law 
was first promulgated during the Japanese occupation period (Hsia and Chang, 1995). 
Although national economic development has always been the priority on the political 
agenda, changing socio-political context and discursive concepts have incrementally 
altered the scope and direction of national spatial planning policy. Since the 1990s, 
national economic development and relevant infrastructure construction are no longer 
the sole concern. Other issues, such as living quality, national land conservation and 
disaster prevention, have been addressed in national spatial planning policy due to 
the changing socio-political context, the emerging civil society and the outbreak of 
several severe disasters, such as the 921 Earthquake3 in 1999 and Typhoon Morakot4 
in 2009, which resulted in thousands of deaths. How to manage national land in a more 
sustainable way has become one of the major challenges for the Taiwanese planning 
community in the twenty-first century. In the following section, I review the evolution of 
Taiwanese spatial planning policies and planning instruments.
3 The 921 earthquake occurred in 1999. It was the second-deadliest quake in recorded history in Taiwan. It 
caused the death of 2,415 people, the injury of 11,305 people, and the damage of US$10 billion.
4 Typhoon Morakot hit Taiwan in 2009. It was the deadliest typhoon in recorded history in Taiwan. It resulted in 
461 people dead, 192 others missing and roughly $3.3 billion USD in damages.
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§ 5.2.1 The Evolution of Spatial Planning Policy
The dynamic interrelationships between the planning context and spatial planning 
policies in Taiwan are shown in Table 19. The evolution of Taiwanese spatial planning 
policy can be divided into five periods. In the first period from 1949 to 1964 the 
planning emphasis was put on short-term, partial improvements to individual urban 
areas (Chang 1988). Due to the financial and technical support of spatial planning from 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) from 1966 to 1971, systematic 
planning methods and regional planning concepts were introduced to Taiwan (Chang 
1988; Hsia and Chang 1995). At the same time, Taiwan encountered rapid urbanisation 
and industrialisation. Some sub-regional plans were made for the extension of port 
and metropolitan areas, but there was no nation-wide spatial planning until the 
announcement of the Plan for the Overall Development of the Taiwan Area in 1979 (Lee, 
Lan, and Juang 2005). 
Planning policy Planning context Principles of Spatial Organisation
1949-1964
Urban plans
 – Significant migration from mainland 
China 
 – Imposition of Martial Law in 1949
 – The first land reform in the 1950s
 – Individual urban area as the planning 
object 
 – Focus on short-term, partial 
 improvements of problem areas
1964-1979
Urban and 
Regional Plans
 – Rapid urbanisation and industrialisation
 – Financial and technical support from the 
UNDP (1966-1971)
 – Diplomatic isolation in the 1970s
 – Sub-regional planning for the extension 
of port and metropolitan areas
1979-1996
Plan for the Overall 
Development of the 
Taiwan Area
(CEPD 1979)
 – Increasing uneven regional development 
 – Emerging social and environmental 
movements
 – End of Martial Law
 – Democratisation 
 – Economic liberalisation
 – Emphasis the directives of major 
public investment projects and sectoral 
developments
 – Establishment of an urban hierarchy 
system and introduced the concept of 
local living perimeters 
1996-2001
National Com-
prehensive Land 
Development Plan 
(CEPD 1996)
 – Asian financial crisis in 1997
 – Toward a two-tier governments system 
in 1999
 – 921 Earthquake in 1999
 – First political party rotation in 2000 
(DPP government)
 – Identification of national spatial 
 structure, including two development 
axes, three metropolitan belts and 
twenty living perimeters
2001-2012
Strategic Plan for 
National Spatial 
Development
(CEPD 2010)
 – Economic crisis 
 – Second political party rotation in 2008 
 – Typhoon Nalee in 2002 and Typhoon 
Morakot in 2009
 – Identification of central mountain 
range conservation axis, coastal 
development conservation belt, and 
seven regional living perimeters and 
city-county cooperation regions
Table 19  
An outline of spatial planning policy evolution in Taiwan (based on Chang 1988; Hsia and Chang 1995; CEPD 
1996; CEPD 2010; CEPD 2011a; Ministry of Interior, R.O.C. 2004; Lee et al. 2005; Bristow 2010; Hsu 2010)
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There has been one essential administrative issue in relation to spatial policy formulation. 
That is, the confusion of functional divisions within the level of central government. The 
Ministry of Interior is the authority in charge of territorial planning on the national level, 
but in actuality the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD)5 plays a 
decisive role in formulating national spatial development policy, including the Plan for 
the Overall Development of the Taiwan Area in 1979, the National Comprehensive Land 
Development Plan in 1996, and the Strategic Plan for National Spatial Development in 
2010. These policies determine public investments and national spatial structure. As 
a result, the land resource in Taiwan has been treated as a developmental instrument 
to encourage economic growth rather than a precious asset to be carefully managed 
(Lai 2000), because the mission of the CEPD is to formulate and coordinate national 
economic development policy. 
Nonetheless, two events have the potential to promote the reorientation of Taiwanese 
national spatial policy from spatial planning dominated by economic development to a 
more balanced and comprehensive land management. First, in 2013 the CEPD will be 
merged with the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC), the Public 
Construction Commission (PCC) and other evaluation agencies to become a national 
development council. In contrast to the CEPD’s over-concentration on economic 
planning, the new council will be authorised for national development planning, 
coordination, consideration and resource allocation from a more comprehensive and 
balanced perspective.
Second, learning from the lessons of the 921 earthquake and the Typhoon Morakot, the 
issue of disaster prevention has been more significantly addressed in the new version of 
the national plan and the central mountain range conservation axis was identified in the 
national spatial structure (CEPD 2010). The central mountain range conservation axis 
aims to link a national park and conservation area and to form a 340 kilometres long, 80 
kilometres wide ecological corridor. This identification would be the first step towards 
making the concept of sustainable development more than a political slogan in the 
planning agenda, however its legitimacy relies on the promulgation of a new planning 
law—the National Land Planning Law. A draft has been revised several times since 2001 
and is still in the review process in the Legislative Yuan, the Taiwanese parliament. The 
result is still uncertain.
5 The CEPD evolved from the Council for U.S. Aid (CUSA), which was established as part of the Sino-American 
Economic Aid Agreement signed between the Republic of China and the United States in 1948, and reformed 
three times in the 1960s and 1970s. Since 1948, the CEDP has served as an advisory body for the Executive 
Yuan to promote comprehensive national economic development and to coordinate sectoral policies and 
projects.
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§ 5.2.2 Taiwanese Spatial Planning System
Table 20 outlines the evolution of the spatial planning system according to the five 
periods of spatial planning policy. The Urban Planning Act (UPA) was first announced 
in 1939 by the Kuomintang government in China mainland. However, the content of 
the UPA was very simple and could not meet the actual demand of Taiwanese society, 
so even after the Kuomintang government took over the dominion over Taiwan in 1945, 
urban planning in Taiwan basically followed the Urban Planning Decree issued by 
Japanese government during its occupation (Lee, Lan, and Juang 2005).
In the beginning of the 1960s the Kuomintang government recognised urban 
development as a part of infrastructure development to support economic development 
and began to revise the UPA. At the same time, Taiwan encountered rapid urbanisation 
and industrialisation. The rapid growth had led to severe urban sprawl and rural 
industrialisation and caused intensive land conflicts between industrial use and 
agricultural use. The Urban Planning Act had provided the legal base to manage urban 
land, but there was no clear statute to manage non-urban land until the enforcement 
of the Regional Plan Act in 1974 (Hsu and Lai 2007). Since the enforcement, the two 
land management systems—urban planning system and non-urban land use control 
system—were formed. 
These two systems are respectively based on the Urban Planning Act and Regional Plan 
Act, which have different types of land use and control systems. The planning emphasis 
of the urban planning area is put on development, so various planning instruments and 
development mechanisms are provided in the urban planning area on the basis of the 
Urban Planning Act under the supervision of the Construction and Planning Agency, 
Ministry of the Interior (CPAMI). On the other hand, the planning emphasis of the 
non-urban area is put on the protection of agriculture land, so the Regional Plan Act 
addresses land use regulation function under the supervision of the Department of Land 
Administration, Ministry of the Interior (Hua 2010). 
In the dual land management system, three interrelated planning issues appear 
regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning system. First, the system is 
inflexible and lacks efficiency. If the government initiates a new urban development 
plan, it first has to get permission from the regional planning commission on all levels 
of government to change the planned area from non-urban land to urban planning 
land. Based on the comments of the regional commissions, the government drafts a 
masterplan together with one or several detail plans to go through the legal process of 
the urban planning system to gain approval from the urban planning commission on all 
levels of government. After this complicated process, the plan can then be implemented. 
It is common to spend more than ten years going through these two systems in order to 
initiate a new urban development plan.
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Planning policy Planning context Planning Principles 
1949-1964
Urban plans
 – Significant migration from 
 mainland China 
 – Imposition of Martial Law in 1949
 – The first land reform in the 1950s
 – Adoption of the highly centralised and 
state-led urban planning system introduced 
in Japanese occupation period
 – Urban plan as a legally binding land use plan
1964-1979
Urban and 
Regional Plans
 – Rapid urbanisation and industria-
lisation
 – Financial and technical support 
from the UNDP (1966-1971)
 – Diplomatic isolation in the 1970s
 – Urban development as a part of infra-
structure development to support economic 
development
 – The first revision of Urban Planning Act 
based on the advises of the UNDP experts 
 – Regional Plan Act was established in 1974 
to regulate non-urban land. Two land ma-
nagement systems are thus formed.
1979-1996
Plan for the Overall 
Development of the 
Taiwan Area
(CEPD 1979)
 – Increasing uneven regional 
 development 
 – Emerging social and environmental 
movements
 – End of Martial Law
 – Democratisation 
 – Economic liberalisation
 – Ministry of Interior promoted the esta-
blishment of County/City Comprehensive 
Development Plan in 1989, aiming to 
complete the structure of Taiwanese spatial 
planning system
 – Respectively adopted the concepts of 
development permit and urban design in 
non-urban area and urban planning area
1996-2001
National Com-
prehensive Land 
Development Plan 
(CEPD 1996)
 – Asian financial crisis in 1997
 – Toward a two-tier governments 
system in 1999
 – 921 Earthquake in 1999
 – First political party rotation in 2000 
(DPP government)
 –  Towards a two-tier reviewing system 
 –  Aiming to integrate the urban and non- 
urban land systems into a coherent land 
planning system
 –  Adopted the concept of exaction  mechanism 
(回饋機制) in urban planning area
2001-2012
Strategic Plan for 
National Spatial 
Development
(CEPD 2010)
 – Economic crisis 
 – Second political party rotation in 
2008 
 – Typhoon Nalee in 2002 and 
 Typhoon Morakot in 2009
 – Setting up a platform for regional 
 cooperation governance
 – Promoting National Land Planning Law 
(in progress) to establish a more flexible, 
 coherent, decentralised and market- 
oriented planning system
Table 20  
An outline of spatial planning system evolution in Taiwan (based on Chang 1988; Hsia and Chang 1995; CEPD 
1996; CEPD 2010; CEPD 2011a; Ministry of Interior, R.O.C, 2004; Lee et al. 2005; Bristow 2010; Hsu 2010)
Second, the dual land management system has led Taiwanese spatial planning to a 
fragmented project-oriented planning approach, by which planning decisions are made 
case-by-case, lack comprehensive long-term vision and ignore the interrelationships 
among different developmental initiatives. This has become one of the most fundamental 
issues in Taiwanese spatial planning system and is the reason why the Ministry of 
Interior was eager to promote the establishment of County/City Comprehensive 
Development Plan at the end of the 1980s. The Ministry of Interior had asked city and 
county governments to propose their own comprehensive plan to guide local long-term 
development and to deliver spatial strategies for their territory as a whole in order to 
complete the structure of the Taiwanese spatial planning system (see Figure 20).
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Figure 20  
The plan system hierarchy in Taiwan, 2012 (modified on the basis of Chen and Shih 2010, 106)
However, the function of the comprehensive plan was weak because it did not have a 
legal status (Chen and Shih 2010). Besides, the local governments did not have enough 
resources, including planning professionals and funding, to undertake the task, so they 
would ask the Housing and Urban Development Bureau (HUDB) of the Taiwan provincial 
government for help. However, the plans made by HUDB hardly matched the politics of 
the elected head of the local government, so the plans were often shelved by the local 
governments. Eventually, the formulation of local comprehensive development plans 
had become merely a formality to serve the requirement of Ministry of Interior, and 
failed to fulfil the original intention of the Ministry of Interior.
The failure relates to the third issue—poor spatial quality in non-urban areas. The 
regulatory characteristic of the non-urban land management system does not promise 
the quality of non-urban space, because the local governments have no effective 
spatial planning instruments to govern local spatial development and to deliver spatial 
strategies for their territory, including both urban and non-urban areas, as a whole. 
Under this context, agriculture policy takes on a crucial role in managing the non-urban 
land in Taiwan. In response to the impact of accession on the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) on the agricultural industry, since 1995 the Execute Yuan has launched a 
farmland release program to release surplus agrarian land. The new agricultural policy 
eases restrictions on the sale and purchase of farmland and allows a farm cabin to be 
built on each piece of farmland. This has encouraged the sprawl of rural development 
surrounding metropolitan areas (Hua 2010). 
Following several severe disasters in the 1990s and 2000s, the Taiwanese central 
government has recognised the urgency to restructure the planning system and 
legitimise the position of national spatial planning in order to have better territorial 
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management and to increase the symmetry between national land development and 
environmental protection. The Ministry of Interior has undertaken the task to reform the 
spatial planning system by promoting the new National Land Planning Law. There are 
some probable contributions of the new law. First, in the new National Land Planning 
Law, the two land management systems will be integrated into a coherent land planning 
system underpinned by a development permission system combined with a growth 
management approach. After the promulgation of the new law, the Regional Plan Act 
will be abolished, but the Urban Planning Act will remain. 
Second, land plans both at the national and local levels will have a legal status and 
the plan system hierarchy will be completed. Land plans at the local level will serve as 
a framework for making operational decisions, such as the issuance of development 
permits. Third, the new law allows local governments to delineate urban and rural 
development areas and agricultural development areas within their jurisdictions, 
while the central government is responsible for the designation and delineation of the 
conservation areas and marine resource areas. This will strengthen the conservation 
measures as well as decentralise the planning powers to local governments.
Finally, public participation and sectoral coordination in the planning process will 
be enhanced through establishing wider, more informed, inclusive and transparent 
mechanisms. For example, according to article 16 of the draft National Land Planning 
Law from the stage of preparing a land plan, the government has to provide public 
hearings and invite the public, academics, experts and interest groups to provide their 
opinions. Although the Legislative Yuen has not yet approved the new law and the result 
is uncertain, it has demonstrated that planning principles in Taiwan have the tendency 
to be more flexible, coherent, decentralised and market-oriented.
§ 5.2.3 Means to Influence Land Use Directly
In Taiwan, the major means to influence land use in urban planning areas are the 
principal masterplan and its supplementary detail plans. It is the power and obligation 
of municipalities to prepare and review a masterplan, to make and review a detail plan, 
and to issue building/user permits according to the detail plan. Central government is 
responsible for making spatial planning and land management policies in the national 
context, implementing major public investment and sectoral development projects 
(including industrial land supply and science park development), providing project 
grants to stimulate local development and supervising local land development and 
conservation. 
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According to the Urban Planning Act the masterplan has to set out development goals 
and planning principles on the basis of understanding complex relationships between 
land uses both inside and outside the planned area. Under the masterplan, one or several 
detail plans are made for implementing the masterplan. A detail plan specifies what can 
be built where and which land use regulations and urban design guidelines apply. A detail 
plan also relates to four public powers, including building/user permit, expropriation, 
zone expropriation and urban land consolidation. However, the masterplan is often 
criticised for its lack of vision and for not being proactive. Furthermore, the detail plan, 
as its implementation instrument, is considered as an extended zoning ordinance rather 
than a ‘plan’ (Hua 2010; Chen and Shih 2010). 
Figure 21 illustrates the legal procedure of masterplan-making. The urban planning 
commission (UPC) at each level of government, particularly the national level, plays a 
decisive role in decision-making. The UPC members at the national level are appointed 
by the minister of the Ministry of Interior, and at the local level are appointed by the 
elected head of local government. The members can be heads of competent authorities, 
heads or representatives of relevant authorities, spatial planning experts with academia 
experience and public-spirited people. At the local level, more than half of the members 
must be either the experts or public-spirited people as mentioned above. Specifically, 
the legitimacy to appoint the UPC members provides the head of local government with 
the power to intervene in the content of urban planning, but requires supervision of the 
central government.
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Figure 21  
Legal procedure of masterplan-making in Taiwan (based on Urban Planning Act 2010).
As shown in Table 21, various proactive instruments can be employed by the Taiwanese 
government to acquire land for public use or to conduct integrated development projects 
on the basis of public law. The Urban Planning Act gives the planning authorities not only 
reactive powers to control land use and building activities by issuing building permits and 
user permits, but also various proactive instruments to implement actively integrated land 
development projects. For example, article 48 of the Urban Planning Act signifies that the 
government can apply the mechanisms of expropriation, zone expropriation or urban land 
consolidation to acquire land for the development of public facilities. Article 58 indicates 
that the government can conduct the development of a new urban planning area through 
zone expropriation or urban land consolidation. 
The measures of zone expropriation and urban land consolidation create partnerships 
between the government and landowners. When the government conducts zone 
expropriation in a particular area, the landowners can choose to take their land back 
as compensation after the land is converted into building plots for new uses. Both the 
government and the private sector can employ urban land consolidation to implement 
a new urban land development or an urban redevelopment project. Through urban 
land consolidation, the government can acquire building lots from the landowners 
as payment for the construction cost of local public facilities within the consolidation 
area. In other words, the government can share the benefits and risks of urban land 
development with landowners via these two mechanisms.
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Instrument Explanation
Expropriation The Land Act allows the possibility of expropriation for the purposes of public undertakings 
or for the implementation of national economic policies.
Zone  
expropriation
Zone expropriation is an alternative way of expropriation. The Land Act and the 
 Equalisation of Land Rights Act allow the possibility of zone expropriation for the  purposes 
of public undertakings or for the implementation of national economic policies and 
urban development projects. After re-planning and re-development, except for the land 
needed for public facilities that will be directly controlled and used by the  government, the 
 government can sell the remaining part of land to balance the cost of land  development. 
The compensation may be paid in kind, if so applied for by the landowner, with the 
 construction land after zone expropriation of which the land value is equivalent to 
 compensation in cash. In principle, the total area of lands in lieu of compensation should 
be 50 per cent of the total zone expropriation area, unless approved by the superior 
authorities due to special conditions. But it should not be less than 40 per cent. This 
institutional design was originally based on the principles of equalisation of land rights and 
unearned increment of land value belongs to the public. 
Urban land 
consolidation
The Land Act allows the government or landowners to conduct urban land  consolidation 
to execute the urban planning detail plan. The consolidated plots of land should be 
redistributed to their original owners in proportion to the area or value of the original plots 
(no less than 45 per cent of the total consolidation area). After the consolidation of land, 
those who have gained thereby should compensate the landowners who have sustained 
loss. The government should pay the compensation for the value of lands used for public 
purposes. The institutional design is based on the principle of equalisation of land rights 
and beneficiary pays.
Case-by-case  
rezoning  
exaction
If land right owners in an urban planning area apply for rezoning to increase market value 
of the land, local government can require exactions from the owners in the form of land, 
building lots, floor areas, or equivalent money. The institutional design is based on the 
principles of unearned increment of land value belongs to the public and of internalisation 
of externalities.
Other  
approaches
Such as development right transfer, mortgage rights, real estate security (such as REITs, 
REATs) and normal trust, etc.
Table 21  
Proactive planning instruments in Taiwan (based on Land Act 2011; Equalisation of Land Rights Act 2011; Urban 
Planning Act 2010; Chen and Shih 2010)
According to the statistical data from the Department of Land Administration, up 
to December 2011 the amount of land subject to zone expropriation was 7,650.58 
hectares. Around 46 per cent of the land has been acquired for public uses6. The total 
amount of the land subject to urban land consolidation was 14,940 hectares. Around 35 
per cent of the land has been acquired for public uses7. Since 1991 the Execute Yuen has 
issued an ordinance that requires planning agencies to apply zone expropriation rather 
than urban land consolidation for the implementation of integrated land development, 
6 http://www.land.moi.gov.tw/chhtml/content.asp?cid=86 [Accessed in December 2012]
7 http://www.land.moi.gov.tw/chhtml/content.asp?cid=993 [Accessed in December 2012]
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because they consider that by zone expropriation they can acquire more land for public 
use, provide better spatial quality and save more on development costs. However, the 
decision conflicts with the interest of landowners, because it means they will take less 
land back for development. In some cases, this has led to strong protest against the 
government.
§ 5.2.4 Summary of the Taiwanese Urban Planning System
I summarise the Taiwanese urban planning system in Table 22 according to the 
framework proposed in chapter three. In light of the system of spatial planning and 
the legal procedure of masterplan-making (see Figure 20 and 21), it can be recognised 
that the planning system in Taiwan is centralised, technocratic and project-based. 
However, the promotion of the National Land Planning Law since the late 1990s and the 
reorganisation of CEPD in 2013 imply that spatial planning policy in Taiwan may have 
the potential to change from an economic development dominant spatial planning to a 
more balanced and comprehensive land management.
The draft version of the National Land Planning Law shows that there may be three 
fundamental changes to the Taiwanese spatial planning system. First, the central 
government will play a less proactive role and the planning powers will be decentralised 
to local governments. Second, the plan system hierarchy will be completed. It will 
become the obligation and power of the local government to formulate a land plan for 
its entire territory as an overall spatial framework for making operational decisions, 
such as the issuance of development permits. Third, the dual land management system 
will be integrated into a coherent planning system underpinned by a development 
permission system, which will provide more space for the private sector to conduct land 
development. Although the planning system may become more decentralised, coherent, 
plan-led and market-oriented, the blueprinted nature will remain.
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Effects on  
(Type of rules)
Action situations for planning agencies in the Taiwanese planning system
Actor  
constellations
Regarding master/detail plan in urban planning area
 – In the stage of draft plan and deliberation of the urban planning committee: 
 Any person and organisation may express their comments on the draft plan.
 – In the stage of final plan:
Urban planning commission examined and approved the final version.
Action  
orientations
Position of each level of government
 – Central government: determines spatial policies in the national context, implements major 
public investment and sectoral development projects, and supervises local land development 
and conservation. 
 –  Local governments: are responsible for implementing urban plans, undertaking land-use and 
building-use control and providing local collective consumption goods.
Pay-off rule 
 – Compensation for (zone) expropriation: shall be paid to the landowners at the current land 
value publicly announced by the government. For the lands subject to zone  expropriation, 
the original landowners can choose to take back part of the construction land as 
 compensation.
 – Urban land consolidation: the land needed for local public uses, the expenses for engineering 
work and land consolidation, and the interest from loans shall be jointly contributed by the 
owners in proportion to the benefits that they accrue.
 – There is no adequate mechanism for the stakeholders to appeal the approval of master/
detail plan.
Actor capacities
(Planning  
instruments)
Local governments—preparing masterplans and making detail plans
Central government
 –  Administrative orders are commonly used to guide the planning activities. 
 –  The urban planning commission at the national level plays a decisive role in examining and 
approving the final version of a masterplan
Means to influence land use/development
 – Based on public law government is authorised to exercise expropriation, zone expropriation 
and urban land consolidation, and to set up the rules of case-by-case rezoning exaction
Table 22  
Summary of the Taiwanese urban planning system in 2012
§ 5.3 Comparisons
In this section, I summarise the comparisons between the Dutch and Taiwanese planning 
systems in Table 23 as a base to explore the similarities and differences of the planning 
styles in the Netherlands and Taiwan from the three interrelated aspects regarding the 
action situation of plan-making—actor constellation, action orientations and actor 
capacities. Regarding the actor constellation, there are two major differences between the 
two systems regarding the role of planning experts and the moment of public participation. 
First, in the Netherlands experts are but one group of many that play a role in the planning 
process, whereas in Taiwan experts are the keystone of the process. In the Netherlands a 
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land use plan is democratically legitimatised, because the plan is reviewed and approved 
by elected representatives. In contrast, in Taiwan the urban planning commissions at the 
national and local levels examine and approve the final version of the plan and the members 
of the commission mostly are spatial planning experts and administrative officers, so the 
nature of spatial planning in Taiwan is highly technocratic. 
Second, the moment of public participation in the Netherlands begins from the stage of 
preparing a draft plan. One of the major tasks for spatial planning authorities is to seek 
and build consensus with stakeholders in the stage of preparation, so the draft plan can 
be seen as an agreement between most stakeholders. However, in Taiwan it is common 
that the government will prepare a draft plan without the involvement of citizens and 
social organisations from the outset. At the draft plan stage, in theory all people can 
give comments and express their opinions in the review meetings of the urban planning 
commission. However in practice, this only makes the review meetings a battlefield for 
stakeholders to fight for their rights and for the government to defend the content of the 
draft plan, because consensus seeking and trust building between the government and 
stakeholders does not exist in the first place. This type of battle only makes the time of 
review even longer.
As for action orientations, there are two major differences in the two systems regarding 
the position of each level of government in spatial planning and development, and the 
underlying logic of the institutional design of land policy mechanisms. First, in both 
countries the central government determines spatial planning policies in the national 
context while the municipalities play a major role in detailing and implementing spatial 
planning throughout the country. But in Taiwan the supply of industrial land, including 
for science park development, is the responsibility of the central government, while in 
the Netherlands it is the responsibility of the municipalities and private sector. This is 
consistent with their societal models and administration systems. The Netherlands is 
recognised as a decentralised unitary state, where decision-making is based on broad 
consensus and the implementation of policy has to rely on the collaboration between 
different levels of government, while Taiwan is identified as a developmental state with 
a more hierarchical and centralised government system.
Second, there is a fundamental distinction between the conceptualisation of rights and 
interest in land in these two countries. In the Netherlands, the land value increment 
belongs to the property owners (Needham, 2007), but in Taiwan it should belong to 
the public. This distinction also influences how the different countries set up the rule to 
utilise proactive planning powers. For example, the starting point of the expropriation 
compensation in the Netherlands is the average value of the land within the plan area 
and proposed new development. In Taiwan the calculation of the compensation for 
the expropriated land is based on the current land value publicly announced by the 
government according to the existing land use plan rather than the proposed new land 
use plan.
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Effects on  
(Type of rules)
Comparisons of the Action situations for planning agencies in the Dutch and Taiwanese 
planning systems
Actor  
constellations
Similarity
 –  Public Participation: It is a requirement of the spatial planning law. 
Major Difference
 –  Primary Actors: In the Netherlands they are municipalities and elected representatives, while 
in Taiwan are local governments and urban planning commissions. 
 –  Public Participation: In the Netherlands the moment of public participation is earlier than in 
Taiwan. 
Action  
orientations
Position of each level of government
Similarity
Central government determines spatial planning policies in the national context while the 
municipalities play a major role in detailing and implementing spatial planning throughout the 
country.
Major difference
In Taiwan the supply of industrial land is the responsibility of the central government while in 
the Netherlands it is the responsibility of the municipalities and private sector.
Pay-off rules
Similarity
Financial Feasibility is required when implementing a spatial plan. The principle of beneficiary 
pays is adopted in the land policy mechanisms.
Major difference
1. Land value increment: in Taiwan it should belong to the public, but in the Netherlands it 
belongs to the property owners.
2. Approaches to take development initiatives: planning authorities in Taiwan have more 
proactive planning powers. 
3. The relation between property rights owners and the government: in Taiwan the underlying 
concept of zone expropriation and urban land consolidation is to share the risks and benefits 
of a new urban development with the property rights owners in the planned area, while in the 
Netherlands only developers and/or social housing corporation have the chance to participate 
a new urban development project.
4. Compensation: 
a. There is no planning compensation in Taiwan.
b. The calculation of the land expropriation compensation in Taiwan is based on the current 
land value publicly announced by the government. But the starting point of the expropriation 
compensation in the Netherlands is the average value of the land within the plan area and with 
the proposed new development. The distinctness is derived from the different cognition about 
the belongingness of the land value increment after the land development.
Actor capacities
(Planning  
instruments)
Similarity
 –  In both countries, financial or technical support is a common way to stimulate local planning 
activities.
 –  Land use plan is the key instrument to implement spatial plan.
 –  Planning information is published on the Internet and can be easily accessed.
Major difference
 –  The interaction mode in the spatial planning system: Taiwan is relatively more centralised 
and hierarchical, while the Netherlands is recognised as a decentralised unitary state.
 –  The way to keep consistence of planning policy on all level: in the Netherlands the central and 
provincial governments are encouraged to guide the municipal planning policies by policy 
guidelines, but in Taiwan the central government often uses administrative orders to guide 
the planning activities and directly intervenes planning content during the review on national 
level.
Table 23  
Comparisons between Dutch and Taiwanese planning systems
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The underlying concept of zone expropriation and urban land consolidation in Taiwan is 
to capture the land value increment for the public as well as to share the risk and benefits 
of a new urban development with property rights owners in the planned area regardless 
of the their willingness, which deeply depends on the booms and busts in the housing 
market. Therefore, due to overwhelming proactive powers and their underlying logic, 
the scale of urban development projects in Taiwan tends to be much bigger, while in 
the Netherlands spatial planning has to be more selective and strategic, because Dutch 
government has to bear most of the development costs and risks, although the land 
development sometimes is beneficial and profitable.
In terms of actor capacity, which refers to planning instruments, both countries tend 
to adopt proactive approaches to planning practices, but compared with the Taiwanese 
government the Dutch municipalities have relatively limited proactive powers to 
implement a land use plan. Dutch municipalities often pursue an active land policy 
as the major land supplier for housing and industrial sites, although there is no legal 
obligation on the part of municipalities. Except for expropriation and pre-emption 
powers, which are rarely used, public law does not grant the municipalities other 
proactive planning powers to enable them to pursue an active land policy and the 
planning system is designed to be a plan-led rather than a development-led system. But 
in practice the municipalities actively involve land development activities by purchasing 
land beforehand and playing the role of developer in order to maintain the quality of 
space, steer land development and recoup the costs of the development (Needham 
1997; 2007; Buitelaar and Sorel 2010).  
Due to the forces of neoliberalisation and fiscal dilemma, in the past two decades 
municipalities have been finding new approaches to cooperate with the private sector. 
Instead of buying land to control the quality of development on the land, three types 
of arrangement are commonly used by the municipalities, including the building claim 
model, the joint venture model and the concession model (for a detailed explanation 
please see Needham 2007, 194-197). These all involve negotiation with developers to 
reach agreements on land servicing, the sharing of costs, the content of the plan, and so 
on. Therefore, the land use plan becomes a record of land development agreement—
which is a result of negotiation and coordination between the governments, developers 
and/or social housing corporations—rather than a means to regulate spatial 
development (Needham 2007; Buitelaar and Sorel 2010). This shows that although 
the public law does not give the Dutch government many means to implement spatial 
planning, in order to achieve its high ambitions for the physical environment and land 
use, Dutch planning practice has developed several innovative measures that tend to be 
strategic and selective with an emphasis on the quality.
Planning authorities in Taiwan, in contrast, have more proactive planning powers to 
take development initiatives. Not only can the government expropriate private land, but 
also conduct zone expropriation and urban land consolidation to acquire land for public 
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undertakings, to implement national economic policies or to execute urban planning 
detail plans. Further, the Taiwanese planning community has adopted a quantitative 
approach, ‘a population-oriented land use organisation procedure’, as a base to 
conduct its blueprint planning since the 1960s (Chou 2010, 76). Population studies 
and predictions become the key content of urban development planning. This makes 
urban planning in Taiwan less strategic. In other words, the planning system in Taiwan 
is inclined to quantitative control and lacks the capacity to deal with qualitative issues.
In short, compared to the Taiwanese planning system and practices, Dutch planning 
is more selective, strategic, and qualitative-oriented and the planning process is more 
inclusive, interactive and bottom-up. According to the typology of planning styles I 
proposed in chapter three (see Figure 15), the spatial planning system and practices 
in the Netherlands is more inclined to the collaborative style, while Taiwan retains the 
features of the provider style of spatial planning despite the tendency to accept market 
measures since the 1980s. The forces of globalisation and neoliberalisation and the 
changing socio-political context have created big challenges for Taiwanese technocratic 
planners. When they struggle with the more dynamic and competitive global market as 
well as with a more democratic and diverse society, the Dutch planning approach may 
provide a direction for Taiwanese planners to inspect their way of planning. 
However, despite its lack of flexibility and openness, compared to Dutch spatial 
planning and practice, the Taiwanese planning system and practice does provide better 
legal certainty for landowners and developers. How to keep the balance between legal 
certainty and flexibility is an old debate in the field of spatial planning. It is no wonder 
that the planning system in Taiwan recently tends towards adopting a development 
permit system to improve its flexibility, while the new Dutch planning system strives to 
enhance its legal certainty. 
In chapter four and five I have respectively investigated the variables of the Dutch and 
Taiwanese planning systems and practices at the constitutional and collective-choice 
levels and compared their significant similarities and differences according to the 
comparative frameworks I proposed in chapter three (see Figure 14 and Table 11). 
The frameworks assist in exploring the differences of the spatial planning systems and 
practices between the two countries as well as in revealing the blind spots of spatial 
planning practices, which have been taken for granted in their own system and country. 
This forms the basis for the in-depth case study of the Eindhoven city-region in the 
Netherlands and the Hsinchu city-region in Taiwan.
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6 High-tech Spatial Policies and 
Development in Eindhoven City-region 
and Hsinchu City-region
The major focus of this research is to explore the role of spatial planning in high-tech 
development and to investigate the major factors that cause governments to apply 
different spatial planning and governance approaches when realising high-tech spatial 
developments in a particular region. This relates to the fields of spatial planning as well 
as high-tech development policy. In the previous two chapters I explored the major 
factors that shape spatial planning systems and practices in the Netherlands and Taiwan. 
In this chapter, I first review and compare the high-tech development policies that have 
an explicitly spatial dimension in these two countries to situate the high-tech spatial 
development of the two city-regions within their own national context. I then examine 
and compare the spatial mechanisms of high-tech development in these two city-regions. 
The comparison is based on the analytical framework that I developed in chapter two. 
The framework consists of the three principal components of high-tech development—
including R&D capital, relational capital and human capital—and spatial strategies that 
are often used to facilitate, support and enhance the development of the three principal 
components according to the findings of relevant studies (see Table 8 in chapter two).
§ 6.1 High-tech Spatial Development Policy in the Netherlands
In the past, economic objectives were framed within broader Dutch public policies serving 
political and social goals (Lagendijk and Boekema 2009). Now, economic performance 
is not only a goal in its own right but also takes priority over other public concerns. This 
change results from the pressure of global competition and the influence of neoliberalism 
and EU policy. One of the key instruments to address economic performance is the 
development of campuses, including university campuses and science parks (Ministerie 
van Economische Zaken 2010a). While there is no evidence to confirm that these 
campuses are succeeding in attracting and retaining high quality employment, the 
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs endoreses the claim that ‘the campuses are indeed 
crystallization points of innovative activity and they form an attractive environment for 
knowledge workers.’ (Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2010b; in Dutch, translated 
by the author) This statement points out how the Dutch government positions science 
parks as a key instrument to promote high-tech development. In order to give a more 
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complete picture of Dutch high-tech spatial development policy, in this section I first 
present the background, and then summarise the development of campuses in the 
Netherlands until 2012.
§ 6.1.1 Background of Dutch High-tech Spatial Development Policy
The emphasis on campus development corresponds to the demand of Dutch regional 
and economic policy in the past two decades for a more area-based and entrepreneurial 
approach. Previously, the underlying logic of Dutch regional policy was about achieving 
equality between regions, but since the 1980s an idea has emerged on the political agenda 
that regions must stand on their own. Provinces as well as municipalities thus have more 
responsibilities for economic development (Maussart 2009). 
In 2004, Interdepartementaal Beleidsonderzoek (IBO, Interdepartmental Policy 
Research) reviewed Dutch regional policy and stressed that regional policy should focus 
more on the specific potential of a given region, rather than use the same development 
standards to evaluate all regions. The review suggested that the Dutch government 
terminate redistributive regional policy and relevant funding programmes, such as 
the programme of Kompus voor de Noord and the Investeringspremie Regeling, and 
instead create an area-based budget to deal with the identified bottlenecks of nationally 
important regions. In response to the policy research, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MEZ) initiated a new economic policy, Pieken in de Delta (Peaks in the Delta), which 
recognised the priorities of national economic development from an area-based 
economic perspective (see Figure 22). This shows that the focus of Dutch regional policy 
has changed from lagging regions to strong regions, from exogenous and redistributive 
measures to indigenous and customised mechanisms.  
The Dutch government has embraced a more selective and strategic perspective for 
economic development. The initiative of Pieken in de Delta reveals a tendency of 
‘spatialisation of economic policy’ in discursive as well as institutional practices (Hajer 
and Zonneveld 2000; Lagendijk and Boekema 2009). Through a spatial approach, the 
government creates focal points to reach a consensus on the priorities of economic 
development between different levels of governments. In order to achieve the ambitions 
of Pieken in de Delta, from 2008 to 2011 the Dutch government released 129 million 
euros to enhance the strong clusters of companies and research institutions by investing 
in a limited number of ambitious projects. The projects included physical infrastructures 
or the knowledge infrastructures of the ‘peaks’, particularly of the main ports (the airport 
and the seaport) and campuses (knowledge-intensive parks) in the four leading areas—
Energy Node Gronigen, Randstad, East Netherlands, and Brainport Southeast Netherlands 
(Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2010c). 
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Figure 22  
An illustration of the peaks in the delta (Source: Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2008, 2).
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In 2011 the major focus of economic policy was adjusted. The newly formed Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (EL&I)8 introduced a new economic policy 
framework, Naar de Top (To the Top). According to this initiative, the Dutch government 
shifted its focus more towards enhancing the business climate by adopting a sectoral-
based cluster approach. They perceived that too little attention was being paid to 
industry-specific problems, and other public policies, such as environmental policy, 
spatial planning policy, education policy and health care policy, could also affect the 
development of industrial sectors. Therefore, the Dutch government decided to select 
nine top high-tech industrial sectors as targets and to focus on the improvement of 
the sectoral conditions across the full spectrum of public policy in order to go beyond 
the boundaries of departments and levels of government. On the basis of this ideology, 
the Ministry developed a coherent policy framework. The framework consists of the full 
spectrum of public policies, from foreign policy to education policy, from regulation to 
research policy, and from development aid to infrastructure and ICT (Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken Landbouw en Innovatie 2011a).
Nonetheless, the area-based approach remains. The new policy framework recognises 
that the main-, brain- and green-ports and the city-regions, including Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and Eindhoven, where the ports are located, are important for the economic 
strength of the Netherlands. The policy document also points out that campus 
development is one of the key instruments for regional governments to make a 
contribution to the promotion and enhancement of knowledge and innovation in the 
top sectors (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie 2011b). In 
short, the new economic initiative retains a focus on places, but with a more explicit 
intention to influence other public policies.
§ 6.1.2 An Overview of Dutch Campus Development in 2012
Respectively in 2009 and 2012, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture 
and Innovation commissioned Buck Consultants International to investigate the 
development of campuses in the Netherlands based on three main motivations. The first 
was to develop a complete list and assessment of campus developments and initiatives 
around the whole country. The second purpose was to identify the campuses considered 
8 In 2010 the Ministry of Economic Affairs was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 
to form the new Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation.
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to be, or having potential to be, nationally important based on two criteria. First, the 
campus must fit into the area-based innovation policy of the MEZ under the framework 
of the Pieken in de Delta. Second, the campus must possess, or have the potential to 
possess, sufficient clusters of knowledge and R&D activities. The third purpose was to 
evaluate the economic value of stimulating campus development (Buck Consultants 
International 2009). Although there is no evidence to prove that campus developments 
have succeeded in attracting and retaining high quality employment, the Dutch 
government has positioned the role of campuses as a key instrument to encourage 
clustering of innovative activities and to attract knowledge workers and firms (Ministerie 
van Economische Zaken 2010c, 2).
Two kinds of campuses were identified in the investigation’s report, including science 
and research parks, and open innovation campuses. Science and research parks are 
park-like industrial sites, where R&D activities are carried out by universities, hospitals, 
research institutes and/or companies. Open innovation campuses are science parks 
that have an anchor tenant, such as Philips in the High Tech Campus in Eindhoven. R&D 
activities are carried out by the anchor tenant together with other companies. In an open 
innovative campus research collaboration and interaction among the companies are 
highly encouraged (Buck Consultants International 2012). 
According to the report, a campus that is identified as being of national importance in the 
Netherlands must encompass four major elements: a focus on R&D activities, a physical 
location of high quality firms and research facilities, the presence of manifest knowledge 
carriers, and an open innovation environment (Buck Consultants International 2009; 
2012). As the director of Buck Consultants International stated in an interview that ‘a 
beautiful meadow is not enough’ for a campus development (Het Financieele Dagblad 
2012), for the Dutch government the major tasks of a nationally important campus 
are to provide high quality research facilities and knowledge carriers—such as research 
institutes, universities, and anchor firms—to create an open innovative environment in 
order to promote clustering of R&D activities and to attract knowledge firms and workers.
According to the report by Buck Consultants International of November 2012, from 
2009 to 2012 the number of campus developments and initiatives increased from 55 
to 74, of which eleven of the campus initiatives will not be realised due to the effects of 
the Eurozone crisis. Among the 74 campuses, 25 campuses can already be recognised 
as nationally important and eight campuses currently in the planning stage show the 
potential to be nationally important (see Figure 23). Regarding the role of government 
in the campus developments, the report demonstrates that in the past the financial 
support mainly came from investment programmes of the central government, such 
as Sterke Regio’s (Strong Regions), Pieken in de Delta, EFRO (European Regional 
Development Fund), and so on. The investment programmes particularly focused on 
the physical elements and preconditions of campuses, including the accommodation of 
firms (e.g. incubators and accelerators), capital intensive research facilities, accessibility 
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and restructuring (Buck Consultants International 2012). However, since 2010 the 
central government has stopped providing grants for campus development. Provinces 
and municipalities now play a major role in providing financial support to campuses, 
despite the fact that most local authorities are also under financial pressure and have 
limited resources to fill the financing gap that the central government has left behind 
(Het Financieele Dagblad 2012).
Figure 23  
Dutch national important campuses in 2012 (Source: Buck Consultants International 2012, 19)
§ 6.1.3  Summary
The Dutch national government has recognised the campus development as an important 
strategic instrument for the implementation of national economic policies, such as 
Pieken in de Delta in 2004 and Naar de Top in 2011, to enhance competitiveness in the 
global knowledge economy. The role of the Dutch government is expected to be that of 
facilitator and assistant in the development process of a campus by providing subsidies 
and conducting infrastructure development, while universities, large high-tech firms 
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and/or real estate developers are considered to be parties that develop and manage 
the campuses. Until recently, most grants were provided by the national government, 
but since 2010 the major responsibility of supporting campus development has shifted 
from the central government to the provinces and municipalities.
§ 6.2 High-tech Spatial Developments in Eindhoven Region
§ 6.2.1 Socio-economic Context: Towards Brainport Eindhoven
Since 2004 the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has recognised the Eindhoven 
city-region as the national Brainport, a centre of innovation and knowledge in the 
Netherlands (Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2004). The Brainport Eindhoven 
city-region together with the Seaport of Rotterdam and Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport 
are the top three engines of the Dutch economy (Ministerie van Economische Zaken 
2010b). However, the emergence of Brainport Eindhoven has not been a spontaneous 
process but rather the result of close collaboration between local governments, high-
tech industries and knowledge institutes.
Since the 1920s the Eindhoven city-region had been an important manufacturing 
centre based on the development of Philips Electronics, one of the largest European 
companies, and Van Doorne’s Automobiel Fabriek (DAF), a car and truck manufacturer. 
A two-pillar-model economic structure formed in the city-region and persisted until the 
beginning of the 1990s. From 1990 to 1992 the reorganisation of Philips resulted in 
8,000 layoffs, and the bankruptcy of DAF in 1993 caused 2,500 job losses (van der Veer 
1998; van der Meer et al. 2008). Nonetheless, due to the crisis the local governments in 
the Eindhoven city-region realised that they could no longer depend on a limited number 
of large companies. After extensive discussions with key stakeholders, they decided to 
diversify the regional economy and emphasise the importance of technology in order to 
lead the regional economy to a more sustainable and stable status. After two decades 
of efforts, the city-region has shifted from a manufacturing centre to an important 
innovation hot spot, at the national scale as well as the European scale. This shift was 
triggered by three successive economic initiatives: the Stimulus programme, Horizon 
Programme and Brainport Navigator 2013. Initiators, preparers, implementers, goals, 
themes and approaches of the three economic initiatives are summarised in Table 24.
i
 154 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development 
Programme Stimulus Horizon Brainport Navigator
Acceptance 1995 2002 2005
Initiator EU and SRE SRE SRE
Preparers
SRE worked with research 
institutes and business 
sector
Regional opportunity and 
implementation  
Commission
Sistermans Commission 
Management NV REDE NV REDE Brainport Operation BV
Ambition Level Regional National European
Goals
React to and recover from 
the crisis
-From industrial main port 
to top technology region 
-Strengthening economic 
structure
-Beyond Lisbon strategy 
(spending 6 % of gross 
 regional product on R&D)
-Top three in Europe 
 competitiveness
Themes
Business and clusters People-Technology- 
Environment
People-
Technology-Business-Basics
Approaches
Subsidy Framework to 
support the development 
of SMEs
Strategic Action Programme Strategic Action Programme
Implementation 
Area
Eindhoven city-region  
(Southeast Brabant;  
stimulus area)
-Eindhoven city-region
-Drawing attention to  
Southeast Netherlands
-Eindhoven city-region and 
its relations to Leuven and 
Aachen
-Drawing attention to  
Southeast Netherlands
Table 24  
Strategic economic programmes in Eindhoven city-region (Source: Brainport Eindhoven 2011, 20-21)
According to the object and formulation of the three initiatives, the development of 
Brainport Eindhoven can be divided into two periods: the economic recovery period 
and the formation of triple helix collaboration. In the period of economic recovery, 
the industrial sector was the object of governmental economic initiatives. The major 
approach was to provide subsidies to stimulate the development of SMEs with an 
emphasis on economic diversification. Awareness of the economic crisis provoked the 
twenty-one municipalities located in the Eindhoven city-region into an agreement to 
establish a regional fund by contributing NLG 11.5 (around 5.2 euros) per inhabitant 
per year to create jobs in the area. This formed a base to ask for financial help from the 
EU to initiate the Stimulus programme. The programme not only created 1,950 new 
companies and 4,000 new jobs but also revitalised 723 hectares of industrial sites and 
developed 412 hectares of new industrial sites (van der Meer et al. 2008). Its success 
allowed the city-region to shift from the two-pillar-model to a more diverse and 
sustainable economy.
Following the success of the Stimulus programme and a series of knowledge 
infrastructure developments, including the TNO Centre for Industrial Research 
(1996), the Dutch Polymer Institute (1997), the Philips High Tech Campus (1998), 
and the Embedded System Institute (2002) the economic focus of the city-region has 
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since moved to knowledge workers, top technology and open innovation ecosystems. 
This marks the start of the second period of economic development. In the process, 
relationships between the government, knowledge institutes and business community 
were gradually formed and institutionalised. 
In the city-region it has been broadly accepted that tight relationships between 
government, academia, and industry encourage the creation of an innovative milieu, so 
since the beginning of the 2000s the government has decided to adopt a triple helix 
model focusing on the development of hybrid organisations and tri-lateral networks 
that overlap and connect these three institutional spheres. The government first invited 
knowledge institutes and the business community to formulate and commit to a joint 
action-focused agenda and priorities—the Horizon Programme (Programme Agency 
Horizon 2004; Sistermans Commission 2006; van der Meer et al. 2008). On the basis 
of its success, in 2005 the government established the Stichting Brainport (Brainport 
Foundation) consisting of representatives of the three sectors, forming a platform as well 
as a collaborative body to determine the development strategies of Brainport Eindhoven 
(Brainport Development 2012). From within this context, the Brainport Navigator 2013 
was formulated.
§ 6.2.2 High-tech Spatial Developments in Eindhoven City-region
I outline the spatial elements of high-tech development in the Eindhoven city-region 
in Table 25. Except for universities, lead firms and external accessibility, most of the 
spatial elements were provided after the initiative of the Stimulus programme. The 
relocation of TNO9 Centre for Industrial Research in 1996 and the establishment of 
High Tech Campus in 1998 were the turning points that led the Eindhoven city-region 
towards high-tech development. By using the funding of the Stimulus programme, the 
Eindhoven municipality, TU/e and NV REDE10 promoted the relocation of TNO research 
centre (van der Meer et al. 2008). After the relocation, TNO has played a key role in 
promoting and participating in the establishment of four other R&D institutes in the 
9 TNO is the biggest organisation for applied scientific research in the Netherlands. TNO is partly funded by the 
Dutch government and earns most of its funding from the market.
10 NV REDE was established in 1982, the forerunner of Brainport Development NV. NV REDE was the economic 
development organisation for the Eindhoven region. It aimed to promote business and employment in the 
region, and its target groups were small and medium-sized enterprises in industry and services.
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city-region, including Embedded Systems Institute, Holst Centre, TNO Automotive and 
TÜV Rheinland TNO Automotive International, which have greatly enhanced regional 
innovation capacity and high-tech identity.
Spatial Elements Eindhoven City-region
R&D Capital
Universities TU/e (1956), Design Academy Eindhoven (1947), Fontys University of Applied Sciences 
(1996)
R&D Institutes  – Located in TU/e: TNO Centre for Industrial Research (1996), Dutch Polymer Institute 
(1997), Embedded Systems Institute (2002), Energy Research Centre of the Nether-
lands (2010), Foundation for Fundamental Research on Matter (2010)
 – Located in HTC: Holst Centre (2005) 
 – Located in HTAC: TNO Automotive (2007), TÜV Rheinland TNO Automotive Interna-
tional (2008)
Lead High-tech 
Firm
Philips (1891), DAF (1928), ASML (1984), etc.
Innovation  
Centre/Incubator
Twinning Centre (1998), BÈTA Technology & Business Accelerator (2007), Catalyst 
Technology & Business Incubator (2011)—all managed by Brainport Development NV
Relational Capital
Science/ 
 Technology Parks
 – Campuses: High Tech Campus (1998), High-Tech Automotive Campus (2009), TU/e 
Science Park (2010)
 – Other: Food Technology Park Brainport (2012)
 – Planning stage: Brainport Innovation Campus, Health Technology Park, Philips 
Healthcare Campus.
External 
and  Internal 
 Accessibility
External: Eindhoven Airport, A2 Highway, Railway, broadband infrastructure, etc.
Internal: HOV, Slow lane project, northeast corridor project, etc
.
Human Capital
Quality of Place City park, public and culture facilities, green surrounding, inner city redevelopment 
projects, etc.
Education and 
Training Institutes
International School Eindhoven (2009)
Table 25  
High-tech spatial developments in Eindhoven city-region
In 1998 Philips established High Tech Campus as a single spot to relocate all its R&D 
activities. In 2003 Philips opened up the campus to other technology companies, sharing 
its facilities and resources in order to create an open and innovative environment. This 
attracted numerous innovative companies—both large and small—to locate within the 
campus. In light of its success, the local governments in the city-region have recognised 
that the role of other powerful players in campus development is crucial. 
The Spatial Programme Brainport—the regional spatial framework—states that the 
role of government in the development of the campus is to facilitate and offer space 
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for powerful players to develop campus-like terrains, to lead the campuses to be more 
accessible, attractive and visible to local people and to weave-in the urban network 
(SRE 2009, 48–49). In other words, ‘the market determines knowledge concentrations 
(campuses). The government facilitates.’ (38). From a selective and strategic perspective, 
in 2010 the local governments commissioned Buck Consultants International to 
undertake an investigation into campus developments and initiatives in the city-region, 
Op weg naar een Brainport Campussenstrategie (Towards a Brainport campus strategy), 
to identify campuses that are or have potential to be highly important for regional high-
tech development. The governments now provide preferential support to the identified 
campuses.
In practice, there are three ways to establish a campus. First, a private R&D campus-like 
terrain that only belongs to one organisation or high-tech firm opens up and transforms 
into an open innovation environment, such as High Tech Campus, TU/e Science Park, 
Philips Healthcare Campus and Health Technology Park. Most of the time, the firm 
or organisation has purchased the land and must negotiate with local authorities 
concerning the planning content, infrastructure and other impacts. It is clear that the 
establishment of spatial frameworks and the improvement of external and internal 
accessibility are the major responsibilities of government, but the firms need to do the 
rest on their own in the development process of a campus.
Second, the local governments facilitate the transformation of an existing industrial 
site into a campus by collaborating with lead companies located on the site, by lobbing 
the national government to establish or relocate knowledge infrastructures (e.g. TNO 
Centre for Industrial Research), and by improving the external accessibility and quality 
of public space, such as High Tech Automotive Campus. The third mechanism is also a 
government initiative in which a municipality purchases land and cooperates with high-
tech firms either by leasing the land to them or establishing a joint company with them 
to develop a campus, such as the Brainport Innovation Campus (van Zeeland 2012b). 
In the second and third mechanisms, the local governments play a more active role. 
However the first mechanism is the most common approach to campus development in 
the Eindhoven city-region.
§ 6.2.3 Summary
The three successive strategic economic programmes have led the Eindhoven city-
region towards high-tech development. The local governments and governmental 
agencies, such as the SRE and NV REDE, play a leading role in promoting high-tech 
development by providing funding and space for the establishment of R&D institutes 
and innovation centres and by setting clear spatial frameworks and enhancing external 
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and internal accessibility for the campus developments. But the local governments have 
acknowledged that the key to promoting high-tech development is close collaboration 
among different levels of government, universities, R&D institutes and lead high-
tech firms, and the major role of local government is to coordinate and facilitate the 
collaboration.
§ 6.3 High-tech Spatial Development Policy in Taiwan
For Taiwan the fundamental factor that created the conditions for economic growth 
was ‘systematic and comprehensive state intervention in the economy, as well as 
state’s strategic guidance of the performance of national and multinational companies 
located on the shores of its territory’ (Castells 1992, 34). From the 1950s to the 1980s 
the leading department in the Taiwanese central government was the ‘economic 
development’ sector, whose plans had a strong spatial dimension and an overwhelming 
power to lead and affect national spatial planning (Hsia and Chang 1995). For example, 
in the 1960s they invented the notion of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) to promote 
labour-intensive and export-oriented industries and successively established six EPZs 
nearby major ports in central and southern Taiwan. In the early 1970s, they carried 
out the Ten Major Development Projects to augment railway, airport, port and other 
basic infrastructure as a foundation to develop capital-intensive import-substitution 
intermediate industries (CEPD 2011b). Those initiatives were all based on the planning 
rationality of technocrats.
It is no surprise that since the late 1970s Taiwan had adopted state-led science park 
development as the key instrument to trigger high-tech economic development. 
However, due to socio-political transformation in the past three decades, the internal 
logic guiding the science park approach has changed from a single technopole strategy to 
a technopolis programme (Hsu 2010). There has been more room for local governments 
and the private sector to participate in science park development, although the central 
government still holds most of the resources. I introduce the background and evolution 
of Taiwanese science park policy in the following section.
§ 6.3.1 Background of Taiwanese Science Park Policy
The decision of the Taiwanese government to adopt the science park approach 
derives from three major motivations at the time. First, from a political viewpoint the 
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development of a science park can enhance international image, attract highly skilled 
people back to Taiwan, and promote industrial innovation. Second, from an economic 
perspective a science park can systematically develop the industrial capacity to enter 
into international markets that need high quality goods. Finally, a science park can 
enhance the quality of high-tech human resource development and provide jobs for 
highly skilled people (Taiwan Provincial Government 1981). In order to fulfil its three 
motives, the Taiwanese government created a particular model for its science park 
developments. The three major planning concepts outlined in the model have had huge 
effects on the future development of science parks and their relation to surrounding 
areas, from a spatial planning and governance perspective and at both the urban and 
regional level.  First, the design of the park is like a new town. The infrastructures and 
services provided by the park are not only for satisfying the demands for production 
activities but also for creating a good environment to attract high-tech people and their 
family to stay (Lin 2010). 
Second, based on the exporting processing zone experience, the science park in Taiwan 
is planned as a free trade zone11 integrating elements of science and technology.12 
Specifically, it is a large-scale science-based industrial park containing not only R&D 
activities but also mass production. Third, in addition to several particular financial 
incentives, the park also provides tenant companies one-stop services, including planning 
management and evaluation, talent cultivation, subsidies for R&D, investment services, 
labour affairs, medical and health care, civil engineering, environmental protection, land 
planning, landscape management, information networks, fire prevention and disaster 
relief, as well as security management (SPA 2010a). 
The one-stop services can help tenant companies to avoid complicated administrative 
procedures, which normally involve a wide range of governmental agencies on different 
levels of government, and thus reduce their operational risk and cost. However, the 
provision of one-stop services implies that within the scope of services the tenant 
companies can bypass the supervision of local governments via the Science Park 
Administration (SPA), which was founded and funded by the central government under 
the National Science Council. For example, the SPA has a prevailing position in deciding 
the masterplan and detail plans of the park, and within the district the SPA also has the 
11 One of the tax incentives the enterprises located in the science park can enjoy is duty-free import of machinery, 
equipment, raw material and semi-finished products.
12 An enterprise has to be officially approved by the Park Investment Supervisory Committee for establishment in 
the park. The expense of research and development of the enrolled park enterprise shall remain a significant 
portion (around 30%) of its total investment and the research and development personnel of the enrolled park 
enterprise shall remain a significant portion (around 30%) of its total staff (Su 2010).
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authority to licence the building construction of tenant companies. In Taiwan, both 
administrative powers are supposed to be under local governments’ supervision. In 
short, the planning concepts based on new town and EPZ models and the provision of 
one-stop service constitute the park as an enclave. 
Following the planning concepts, the first science park, Hsinchu Science Park (HSP), was 
selectively and strategically developed in Hsinchu area, where one of the most important 
national research institutes and two national universities are located. This arrangement 
aimed to strengthen the linkages between the state, research institutes, universities and 
high-tech industry regarding flows of knowledge, information and human resources. 
Such an initiative has successfully stimulated national and local economic development 
since the late 1980s (Lin 1997) and led to the second economic ‘take-off’ for Taiwan (Tsai 
and Cheng 2006, 54). Under the full support of the state, two high-tech industries—
integrated circuits (IC), and computers and their peripheral products—started maturing 
and some companies have since become global players, such as Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) and Acer.
§ 6.3.2 Evolution of Taiwanese Science Park Policy
Due to the success of the HSP development, the land demand for high-tech industrial 
development rapidly increased in the 1990s, inciting the central government to look for 
other potential science park sites in Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan encountered a 
huge socio-political shift—from a party-state authoritarianism to a liberal democracy. 
Since the state was losing its arbitrary power and had to gain local factions’ and business 
groups’ support, the state could no longer play a strong leading role in economic policy-
making (Chen 1995; Hsu 2010). 
On the other hand, the HSP’s success and its huge economic spillovers let local 
governments believe that the development of a science park could trigger local 
economic development and promote local industrial restructuring processes, so almost 
every local government asked the National Science Council to develop a science park in 
their territory (Lin 2010). Considering the political support of local factions and land 
demand pressures, the policy of science park development reoriented to a technopolis 
programme, concealed behind the slogan of balancing regional development. As a result, 
another eleven science parks have been successively designated along the national 
highway around Taiwan (see Figure 24). This marks the shift of science park policy from 
a single technopole strategy to a technopolis programme. 
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Figure 24  
Distributions of science parks in 2010 (based on SPA 2011)
This shift has not only influenced the national spatial-economic structure and impacted 
local landscape and land development, but also has highlighted the changing role of the 
central government in economic development. For example, comparing the development 
of HSP with the Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP) and the Central Taiwan Science 
Park (CTSP), the major promoter in facilitating the development shifted from the state 
to local government in the 1990s, and again from local government to industry in the 
2000s (see Table 26). Different from the relationships between the state and the local 
governments in the development process of the HSP, the Tainan county government 
played an active role in the development process of the CTSP, because the Magistrate 
of the Tainan county government considered that the science park development could 
promote local economic development and increase his legitimacy as the elected head of 
the county.
Under the influence of neoliberalism, the major promoters of the STSP development 
became high-tech firms, especially some large firms that had been located in the HSP 
and sought land to expand their production capacity. This has led to a debate on the 
legality of land expropriation for science park development. For example, the location 
of the CTSP Erlin site was actually chosen by the AU Optronics Corporation in 2008. The 
role of government was to assist in all the legal procedures, including land use change, 
land expropriation, environmental assessment, and so on (Wang 2009). However, 
the mechanism to acquire land for the development or extension of a science park is 
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expropriation, which is an extreme form of limitation of property rights. According to 
article 3 of the Land Expropriation Act in Taiwan, the state can expropriate private land 
for public interest purposes. People challenged the legality of the land expropriation and 
argued that it was not reasonable to take away certain people’s property to benefit a 
particular consortium under the guise of public interest (Chu 2009).
Park (Year) Central Government Local Government Industry
HSP (1980) Major promoter Co-operator Co-operator
STSP (1996) Actively co-operator Major promoter Actively co-operator
CTSP (2003) Co-operator Actively co-operator Major promoter
Table 26  
The major actors in the series of science park developments (source: Wang 2009, 194)
The science park approach has fulfilled the three major motives discussed above and has 
led Taiwan to the global market. Nonetheless, it has created many issues for Taiwanese 
society, such as environmental pollution, water shortage, local social-economic 
polarisation, a divide of spatial governance, and heavy financial burden in developing 
successive science parks.13 Some people even wonder whether the contributions 
of science parks to the local economy are truth or myth (Lin 2010) and others doubt 
the necessity of developing more science parks at the expense of local society and 
environment (Lu 2010). The farmers’ and environmental movements in central Taiwan 
since the late 2000s are good examples. The primary appeal of the farmer’s movement is 
to resist the indiscriminate farmland expropriation for use by science park developments 
or extensions, while the environmental movement asks for a better proposal for some of 
the new developments in order to reduce the impact of water supply on local farmland. 
These appeals indicate that for Taiwanese civil society such economic developments 
are no longer a self-evident national interest. That is to say, the state can no longer use 
economic development as a means to legitimise its authority. Economic development 
should not be the only concern in the political agenda and decision-making. Taiwanese 
people are now asking for more.
13 According to a report of the National Science Council (2011) to the Legislative Yuen, the technopolis programme 
approach has not only overloaded the supply of high-tech industrial land but also significantly increased the 
financial burden on the Operation Fund of the Science Park. In the end of 2012, the debt will reach NT$ 123.4 
billion (around 3.25 billion euro). Every year the HSP will have more than NT$3.5 billion net income for the 
investment in fixed assets and the repayment of the debt. The debt of the HSP will not be paid off until 2040.
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§ 6.3.3 Summary
Due to the changing socio-political context, since the end of the 1990s science park policy 
in Taiwan has shifted from a single technopole strategy to a technopolis programme. 
Local governments and large high-tech firms have replaced the role of central 
government, becoming the major promoters in facilitating science park development. 
Nonetheless, the central government retains an essential role, because National Science 
Council of the Executive Yuan has legitimacy to establish and manage science parks 
according to the Act for Establishment and Administration of Science Parks. Further, the 
technopolis programme has caused a severe financial burden and overloaded the supply 
of high-tech industrial land. Since expropriation is the only mechanism to acquire land 
for the development or extension of a science park, a debate on the legality of land 
expropriation for science park development has emerged.
§ 6.4 High-tech Spatial Developments in Hsinchu Region
§ 6.4.1 Socio-economic Context: Large Externalities of the HSP
The Hsinchu city-region is considered the technology and innovation hot spot of 
Taiwan, due to its high economic performance in the ICT industry. The emergence of the 
Hsinchu high-tech city-region followed the rapid development of Hsinchu Science Park 
(HSP), which was established by the Taiwanese government in 1980 to drive national 
economic growth and industrial upgrading. The HSP has not only achieved the national 
goal, but also been recognised as one of the most successful technopoles in the world 
(Castells and Hall 1994). Its output value in 2010 was around 29,673 million euros, 
which represents 9.1 per cent of the GNP of Taiwan. 
In 2011, more than 148,000 people worked in the HSP and most of them lived in the 
city-region with their families. Since the 1990s local population has also exhibited 
enormous growth, from 698,918 to 937,693 inhabitants. The strong agglomeration 
forces have created enormous pressure for the supply of land and public investment in 
the surrounding area and forced the local governments to initiate spatial planning and 
land development projects to accommodate the housing demand and to improve local 
public facilities and business services (see Figure 25).
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Figure 25  
1987; Urmap website: http://www.urmap.com/ [Accessed in October 2010])
The success of the HSP has attracted so many knowledge workers to the region that the 
local demographic structure and income distribution have been influenced significantly. 
As shown in Table 27, in 2011 there were 477 high-tech companies located in the HSP 
with total corporate sales of 25,865 million euros (SPA 2012), around 30.3 per cent of 
the revenue of Taiwan’s entire manufacturing sector. This contributes to the average 
household income of Hsinchu city and Hsinchu county, which were respectively ranked 
2nd and 3rd nationwide in 2011 (CEPD 2012), while in 1980 they were ranked 7th (CEPD 
1981). However, the gap between rich and poor in Hsinchu city is the greatest among 
the seven big cities in Taiwan (see Table 28). An increasing socio-economic polarisation 
triggered by the HSP development has been recognised since the end of the 1990s. 
Year Companies Employees 
Corporate 
sales*
Domestic 
patens
Revenue of manu-
facturing sector in 
Taiwan*(**)
Population in 
Hsinchu City 
and County
2011 477 148,714 25,865 2,510 85,253 (30.3%) 937,693
2010 449 136,548 29,673 2,043 88,775 (33.4%) 928,359
2005 382 114,836 24,698 2,343 78,003 (31.7%) 868,369
2000 289 102,775 23,233 2,366 62,705 (37.1%) 808,152
1995 180 42,257 7,480 532 45,393 (16.5%) 748,832
1990 121 22,356 1,638 74 34,063   (4.8%) 698,918
1985 50 6,670 263 - 22,025   (1.2%) 670,576
1980 7 - - - 641,937
Note:* Million euros (Exchange rate: NT/euro=40); ** Corporate sales of the HSP/Revenue of Taiwan’s manu-
facturing sector× 100%.
Table 27  
Industrial development in the HSP  
(Source: Hsinchu Science Park Yearly Report 2009, 2010b, 2011, 2012; Urban and Regional Development 
Statics 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011; the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics (DGBAS) of Executive Yuan website: http://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5 [Accessed in April 2012])
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Index Taipei City
Kaohsiung 
City
Taichung 
City
Keelung 
City
Hsinchu 
City
Chiayi City
Tainan 
City
Area (Km2) 272 154 163 133 104 60 176
Population  
(million)
2.63 1.51 1.04 0.39 0.39 0.27 0.76
Civilian 
educati-
on level 
above 
university 
(%)
2006 27.80 18.74 19.99 13.96 22.22 16.59 19.33
2001 18.08 11.01 12.28 7.94 13.90 10.33 10.57
Average dispo-
sable income per 
household (Euro*)
31,560 24,252 24,231 19,561 29,282 20,017 21,299
Gap 
between 
rich and 
poor** 
(multiple)
2005 4.78 5.58 5.39 5.74 7.35 6.48 6.43
2000 4.32 6 4.49 4.71 6.91 5.75 4.93
Note:* Million euros (Exchange rate: NT/euro=40);** The average income of the richest twentieth of the 
population/ The average income of the poorest twentieth of the population.
Table 28  
Statistics of the seven biggest cities in Taiwan (2006)  
(Source: Taipei City Weekly Statistics Report 2007; Urban and Regional Development Statistics 2007, available at 
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/dn.aspx?uid=4907 [Accessed in May 2012])
It is a love and hate relationship for the local governments, because the HSP development 
does promote local economic development by attracting varieties of goods and workers/
people to the region, but its success also brings many environmental impacts on 
surrounding areas, such as traffic congestion, environmental pollutions, shortages 
supply of local facilities and housing, and so on. Although this is the duty of the local 
governments to deal with the externalities of the HSP development, they are rarely 
involved in the decision making of science park development. This has caused increasing 
tensions and contradictions between the local governments and the HSP, consisting of 
the SPA as well as its tenant companies.
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§ 6.4.2 High-tech Spatial Developments in Hsinchu City-region
The development of the Hsinchu high-tech city-region is predominantly state-led. As 
shown in Table 29, most of the spatial elements of high-tech development are located 
in the HSP special district and provided by the national government. Many of the lead 
high-tech firms in the HSP, such as the UMC and the TSMC, are spinoffs of the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI), a nationally funded R&D organisation specialising 
in applied research and technical services. As for innovation centres/incubators 
in the city-region, all of them were established by the national R&D institutes and 
universities. Functional divisions between national and local governments are clear. 
The central government is in charge of global production through investing in collective 
production infrastructure and making preferential policy inputs to attract high-tech 
industrial investment and serve high-tech industries, while the local governments 
take responsibility for the provision of collective consumption goods, including local 
transport and public facilities, environmental management, and urban development 
(Chou 2007).
However, since the 2000s Hsinchu county government and National Chiao Tung 
University (NCTU) have started to play a more active role in high-tech spatial 
development. In 1999 the NCTU proposed the Taiwan Knowledge-based Flagship 
Park (TKFP) urban development project to the Hsinchu county Government with an 
attempt to enhance their competitiveness and to work towards the status of one of the 
top universities in the world by acquiring new campus lands nearby their main campus, 
the HSP as well as the High-speed Rail Hsinchu station. At the same time, the Hsinchu 
county Government expected that the High-speed Rail Hsinchu Station Special District 
would be developed quickly and development demand for its surrounding non-urban 
land would be triggered as well because of the enormous housing demand of the HSP 
development (see Figure 25). An urban land use plan was needed to regulate and direct 
the potential land developments in the area, but the legal process consumed much time 
and money and the county government did not have enough budget and resources to 
conduct the planning project. As a result, when the NCTU proposed the TKFP project and 
expressed their willingness to be responsible for the planning funds in return for campus 
land free of rent, the county government was more than happy to accept their proposal 
(Chen 2011; Li 2011; Lin 2011; Liu 2011; Wu 2011).
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Spatial Elements Hsinchu City-region
R&D Capital
Universities National Chiao Tung University (1958), National Tsing Hua University (1956)
R&D Institutes  – Located in HSP special district: Industrial Technology Research Institute (1973), 
National Synchrotron Radiation Research Centre (1993), National Applied Research 
Laboratories (2003) 
 – Other: Food Industrial Research and Development Institute (1965)
Lead High-tech 
Firm
UMC (1980), TSMC (1987), AUO (1996), etc.
Innovation  
Centre/Incubator
Incubation Centre of Industrial Technology Research Institute, Innovation Incubation 
Centre of National Chiao Tung University, National Tsing Hua University Innovation 
Incubator.
Relational Capital
Science/ Techno-
logy Parks
 – National Science Park: Hsinchu Science Park (1980), Hsinchu Biomedical Science Park 
(2011)
 – Planning stage: Taiwan Knowledge-based Flagship Park
External and Inter-
nal Accessibility
 – External: Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, High-speed rail Hsinchu station, 
railway, highway, optical networks, etc.
 – Internal: road widening projects around HSP, Hsinchu light rail development plan, etc.
Human Capital
Quality of Place Environmental improvement of Hsinchu inner city, etc.
Education and 
Training Institutes
National Experimental High School (1983) located at Hsinchu Science Park, including 
elementary department and bilingual department.
Table 29  
High-tech spatial developments in Hsinchu city-region
The NCTU is one of the best universities in Taiwan and most of the knowledge workers 
and high-tech entrepreneurs in the HSP graduated from NCTU. The county government 
considered that the participation of NCTU would help to gain the support of high-tech 
industries as well as the national government and thus guarantee success of the high-
tech oriented planning project proposal. In addition to the good relations with the 
high-tech industries and the national government, the biggest advantage was that the 
NCTU brought money and new planning knowledge into the project (Li 2011; Liu 2011). 
However, the initiative is not going smoothly for two reasons. First, despite the setting 
up of a covenant between the NCTU and the county government, the legitimacy of the 
NCTU to be in charge of the operation of spatial planning is weak. Second, although the 
project has been identified as a part of the National Development Plan, it was initiated by 
the NCTU with the purpose to acquire new campus land for free. People have criticised 
this intention—as a national university they should have focused more on research and 
education rather than trying to gain profits from land development. As of 2012, the 
masterplan and detail plans of the project still remain in the deliberation process of the 
Urban Planning Committee at the national level.
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§ 6.4.3 Summary
For planning authorities in Taiwan, the role of spatial planning is limited to providing a 
legal base to acquire land for public facilities and/or high-tech related industrial activities 
and to regulating and/or facilitating land development. This has led to a blueprinted 
and project-oriented planning style. The TKFP project is a result of close collaboration 
between Hsinchu county government and the NCTU. This is a new approach to science 
park development. The initiative shows the changing interrelationships between 
the central government, local governments and other sectors. The role of the central 
government has been minimised but remains essential.
§ 6.5 Comparisons
In both countries, to promote high-tech economic development has been the priority on 
the political agenda. I summarise the spatial elements of high-tech development in the 
two city-regions in Table 30.
Spatial Elements Eindhoven City-region Hsinchu City-region
R&D Capital
Universities E E
R&D Institutes H E/H
Lead High-tech Firm E H
Innovation  
Centre/Incubator
H H
Relational Capital
Science/ Technology Parks E/H H
External and Internal Accessi-
bility
E/H E/H
Human Capital
Quality of Place E/H H
Education and 
Training Institutes
H H
Note: ‘E’ means existing elements (before high-tech development policy); ‘H’ means elements have been 
provided or are planned due to high-tech development policy.
Table 30  
High-tech spatial developments in the two city-regions
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According to the three principal components, I compare how the governments in these 
two case study areas provide the spatial elements of high-tech development in the 
following sections.
§ 6.5.1 Spatial Mechanisms to Enhance R&D Capital
To locate R&D institutes in a science park/campus has been considered as the major 
strategy of high-tech development in these two regions and the central governments 
play an essential role in establishing knowledge infrastructures, including universities 
and R&D institutes. Both in the Netherlands and Taiwan, the top research universities 
and R&D institutes are funded by the central government, such as the TU/e and the TNO 
in Eindhoven and the NCTU, the NTHU and ITRI in Hsinchu. They are the major actors 
in the regional as well as national innovation system. Their existence has profound 
influence on high-tech spatial development in both city-regions. 
Nonetheless, there are two major differences between the two city-regions regarding 
the ways in which knowledge infrastructure is provided. First, except for the TNO, most 
of the R&D institutes in the Eindhoven city-region are the result of close collaboration 
between local government, universities, R&D institutes and lead high-tech firms. For 
example, the Embedded Systems Institute was founded by ASML, Océ, Philips and TNO 
along with Delft University of Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology and 
University of Twente. Foundation for Fundamental Research on Matter relocates most 
of its Rijnhuizen Institute for Plasma Physics to TU/e Science Park with the support of 
TU/e and the provincial government (Foundation for Fundamental Research on Matter 
2010). On the contrary, all of the R&D institutes in the Hsinchu city-region are state 
initiatives.
The second is the establishment and management of innovation centres/incubators. In 
Hsinchu, innovation centres/incubators are part of the facilities and services of the two 
universities and ITRI. In the Eindhoven city-region, the innovation centres/incubators 
are established and managed by the regional development company. In the past, it was 
the NV REDE. Since 2010, it has been the Brainport Development NV. Its shareholders 
include the Brainport Foundation (50%), the SRE (25.9%), Eindhoven municipality 
(15.2%), Helmond municipality (5.5%) and Veldhoven municipality (3.4%) (Brainport 
Development 2012). Brainport Foundation acts as the board of directors of the Brainport 
Development NV. The board of the Brainport Foundation is comprised of twelve 
representatives from the governments, knowledge institutes and business community. 
Each sector has four representatives on the board. The mayor of Eindhoven chairs the 
board. Nonetheless, the funding of the regional development company is mainly from 
the SRE and the three municipalities (Brainport Development 2012). This implies that 
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in the Eindhoven city-region there is close collaboration between local governments, 
knowledge institutes and lead high-tech firms in enhancing R&D capacity, but the 
role of local governments, especially the SRE, is crucial as coordinator and facilitator in 
building relationships for high-tech spatial developments.
§ 6.5.2 Spatial Mechanisms to Enhance Relational Capital
The improvement of internal and external accessibility and the development of science/
technology parks have been considered as the most effective spatial strategies to enhance 
relational capital in these two city-regions. The improvements to accessibility in both 
cases are mainly based on the support of their central governments. For example, in the 
Netherlands, Meerjarenplan Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport (MIRT, Multi-Year Plan 
for Infrastructure, Spatial Planning and Transport) is the major instrument that provides 
a platform for the central government, provincial governments and municipalities to 
coordinate national investment in both infrastructural and spatial developments, to 
balance national interest and projects with locals interest and projects (van Haegen 
2012). 
Regarding the development of science/technology parks, although both countries have 
identified science park development as a crystallisation point to stimulate high-tech 
industrial clustering, there are four significant differences in mechanisms between these 
two countries. The first is the definition of science park, which has influenced the ways 
that the governments allocate resources to support science park development. In the 
Netherlands most of the science parks are initiated by the private sector or universities, 
sometimes with the support of provinces and/or municipalities. The central government 
only identifies and invests in the ‘campuses’ that are of national importance or have 
the potential to be of national importance as a basis to formulate high-tech economic 
strategies (Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2010a).  The campuses have to have 
four essential elements, including a focus on R&D activities, a physical location of high 
quality firms and research facilities, the presence of manifest knowledge carriers, and an 
open, innovative environment. 
In Taiwan the establishment and administration of science parks must be governed 
by the provisions of the Act for Establishment and Administration of Science Parks. 
According to the act, The National Science Council (NSC) of the Executive Yuan may select 
a suitable site and apply to the Executive Yuan for their approval to establish a science 
park for the purposes of attracting high-tech industries and professionals, encouraging 
the research and innovation of domestic industries and enhancing the technology of 
local high-tech industries. The NSC must establish science park administrations in the 
science parks to oversee the management of the parks and provide the park enterprises 
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with various services. In other words, science park developments in Taiwan are state-led. 
All of the park sites are of course considered to be of national importance. 
However, since the demise of the authoritarian state in the late 1990s, the decision 
regarding the location of a science park has huge political implications, because the 
governing party has to gain local support and local governments believe that science 
park development can trigger local economic growth and industrial upgrading. This has 
led to a technopolis programme approach. As a result, the supply of high-tech industrial 
land has been overloaded and the financial burden on the Operation Fund of the Science 
Park has significantly increased. The result shows that the Taiwanese government has 
chosen a less systematic and selective approach to conduct science park development 
since the 2000s.
The second significant difference is the role of government and the functional divisions 
between different levels of government in relation to science park/campus development. 
In the Netherlands the role of the central government is to identify top sectors, to 
improve the business and research climate in general, to realise and provide advanced 
research facilities, and to improve accessibility and quality of the campuses in the 
international and national context. The major tasks for the provinces and municipalities 
are to facilitate campus initiatives, to lobby the national government and the EU, to 
widen residential options for knowledge workers and to shape better relationships 
between the campuses and cities (Advies Platform Randstad 2040 2009; Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken 2010c; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2010a). In Taiwan the 
central government is the party who initiates, develops and manages the science park 
and the local government is responsible for the supply of collective consumption goods 
in the surrounding areas. Specifically, the Dutch government assists in the development 
of a science park rather than undertaking the development itself, as is done by the 
Taiwanese government. 
The third significant distinction between Taiwanese and Dutch science park approaches 
is the relation between the park/campus and its surroundings from a spatial planning 
perspective. The Dutch government tends to see the campuses and their surroundings 
as a whole and aims to interweave the campuses with their surrounding urban fabric 
from both physical and non-physical perspectives. Negotiation and coordination 
between the campuses, high-tech industries and the governments are thus considered 
essential to achieve this goal. This helps to build the three key soft infrastructures of 
high-tech space development—including the R&D capital, the relational capital and the 
human capital—in the first place and forms a better starting point for urban and regional 
governance.
Different from the Dutch approach, the role of spatial planning in science park 
development is weak in Taiwan, because the location and establishment of science 
parks are dominated by the central government from a distance. The underlying logic 
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of science park development and management in Taiwan makes the science park an 
enclave. Such a heavily institutional design does provide a highly efficient environment 
to serve high-tech industries, but also has caused severe conflicts between park 
administration, local governments and social organisaitons. Although formal and 
informal channels for cooperation have increased and the tensions among them have 
been reduced to a certain degree, the separation of governance between the parks and 
their surroundings remains. Nonetheless, the new initiative of the TKFP project intends 
to create an integrated environment between the new science park, university campus 
and its surroundings. The planning result remains uncertain, but the project has shown 
an alternative way of science park planning and development in Taiwan.
Finally, ‘cluster effects’ of high-tech industry have been considered as the engine of 
local economic growth in these two city-regions, but their spatial patterns of high-tech 
development clustering are very different. This relates to the differences in their definition 
and scale of science park/campus. As shown in Figure 26 and 27, in the Eindhoven city-
region the industrial clustering pattern tends to be polycentric and the science parks/
campuses scatter in the core area along the highways. The size of the science parks/
campuses mostly is smaller than 100 hectares. Each science park/campus may focus 
on one particular field of R&D and the role of the science park/campus is expected to 
facilitate clustering of its relevant industries.
Figure 26  
Spatial patterns of high-tech clustering in the two city-regions
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Figure 27  
Distribution of Science park/campus in Eindhoven City-region
On the other hand, the industrial clustering pattern in the Hsincu city-region tends 
to be monocentric. The science park development is dominated by the Science Park 
Administration under the supervision of the NSC. According to the national technology 
policy, the HSP focuses on more than six high technologies, including integrated circuits, 
computer and peripherals, telecommunications, optoelectronics, precision machinery 
and biotechnology.
The HSP is actually a large-scale science-based industrial park containing not only R&D 
activities but also mass production. The size of the HSP is around 650 hectares, which 
is much larger than the size of the science park/campus in Eindhoven city-region. The 
industrial networks and clustering effects have formed in the Hsinchu city-region, but 
the formation mainly relies on the development of the HSP. For example, following 
the rapid growth of the HSP, many industrial companies, in relation to the HSP’s high-
tech firms, have gradually replaced traditional industries as the major industries of the 
Hsinchu Industrial Zone, an old industrial district managed by the Taiwanese Industrial 
Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs (see Figure 28). Due to the expansion 
demand of the HSP, Jhuna Park was established in 2000 along the national highway, 
although it is actually a satellite site of the HSP rather than an independent science park.
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Figure 28  
Functional networks of Hsinchu high-tech city-region
§ 6.5.3 Spatial Mechanisms to Enhance Human Capital
Both city-regions try to provide adequate facilities to fit the living demands of knowledge 
workers. For example, there are international schools in both regions for the children 
of knowledge workers. Spatial plans in both city-regions emphasise the importance of 
spatial quality in attracting and retaining knowledge workers. For example, the Spatial 
Programme Brainport (SRE 2009, 50) has stated that:
The objective is to search for a[n] attractive combination between nature, agriculture, 
recreation, living and working…Landscapes are robust (thematic) green areas to which 
new functions are carefully added, in a very low density and with respect for nature. These 
reserves have a high spatial quality and control is co-ordinated, often in conjunction with 
the agrarian sector. The landscapes offer knowledge workers a place for repose, space, 
reflection and recreation in close proximity to the city.
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The TKFP project in Hsinchu also plans to provide 20 hectares of residential area 
for the development of an ‘international village community’ in accordance with 
the Technological Talent Development Policy of Executive Yuan (Hsinchu County 
Government 2011). 
The quality of place is highly subjective and it is difficult to evaluate and compare, 
especially across different national cultures and environmental conditions, but there 
is one major difference that can be recognised regarding the underlying logic of 
creating quality of place. For the Taiwanese government, there is a distinction between 
knowledge workers and local residents regarding the conception of living quality, so 
they plan to develop a particular ‘international village community’ for the knowledge 
workers. In contrast, the Dutch government acknowledges that ‘[k]nowledge workers do 
not have specific housing needs and are part of the regular housing market.’ (SRE 2012, 
2; original in Dutch, translated by the author) The key point is to provide a variety of 
housing choices to both knowledge workers and local residents from high to low density, 
from urban to rural areas.
§ 6.5.4 Remarks
The governments in both cases play an active role. But the emergence of the Hsinchu 
high-tech city-region fully relies on input from the Taiwanese national government, 
while the development of Brainport Eindhoven depends more on collaboration between 
municipalities in the form of regional governance. While the Taiwanese government 
tends towards a provider style of policy, the Dutch government prefers a collaborative 
style of policy. The Dutch government adopts a more strategic and selective approach 
to high-tech spatial development. The provision of the spatial elements is based on 
close collaboration among different levels of government, knowledge institutes and lead 
high-tech firms. 
In Taiwan, unlike the Dutch approach, most of the spatial elements in relation to high-
tech development are provided by the national government. Most of the necessary 
resources for high-tech development are also mastered by the national government. 
This approach is rather efficient and effective in terms of high-tech development, but 
it also has created large externalities on surrounding areas and resulted in conflicts and 
tensions between the national government and the local governments in the Hsinchu 
city-region.
In short, the systematic comparisons undertaken in chapters four, five and six together 
form an in-depth understanding of the two case study areas in terms of their socio-
political context, spatial planning systems and high-tech spatial development policies. 
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This is useful for investigating how the governments use the spatial planning system and 
tools to facilitate, induce, and/or support high-tech development, and for exploring the 
factors that shape the practices of high-tech spatial planning and development in these 
two city-regions. This is further discussed in the next chapter.
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7 High-tech Oriented Spatial Planning 
and Governance in Eindhoven City-
region and Hsinchu City-region
In the previous chapter, I explored high-tech policy in the Netherlands and Taiwan as 
well as high-tech spatial development in the Eindhoven and Hsinchu city-regions. I 
found that the governments in these two countries and city-regions play an active role in 
conducting and/or facilitating the development of high-tech spatial elements, including 
R&D institutes, innovation centres, science and technology parks, good accessibility, 
and quality of space, although the functional divisions between different levels of 
government vary. However, these high-tech spatial elements necessarily have spatial 
effects on the surrounding areas, and spatial planning must play a role in anticipating 
and/or mediating the implications from a more comprehensive perspective. 
Spatial planning is about providing frameworks and principles for spatial development 
and coordinating policies across sectors. Although the scope of spatial planning differs, 
in most countries the key function of contemporary spatial planning is to manage 
spatial development and organisation in a particular place(Healey 2006; United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe 2008; Dühr et al. 2010). A set of governance practices 
occur in the spatial planning process ‘for developing and implementing [spatial] 
strategies, plans, policies and projects, and for regulating the location, timing and form 
of development.’ (Healey et al. 1997, 4) Specifically, I use the term ‘spatial governance’ 
to refer to the part of spatial planning activities that mainly involve the mobilisation of 
needed resources and actors to deal with spatial planning issues and achieve goals of 
spatial planning in a particular place. 
On the basis of this understanding, in this chapter I focus more on how the governments 
conduct, facilitate and coordinate high-tech spatial developments and deal with the 
spatial issues generated in the process through spatial planning and governance. I first 
review the practices of spatial planning and governance in the Eindhoven and Hsinchu 
city-regions and identify the significant similarities and differences of the spatial 
planning and governance practices between the two case study areas. According to the 
findings of the previous three chapters, I then explore the major institutional factors that 
contribute to the differences in order to answer my research questions.
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§ 7.1 Brainport Eindhoven
The concept of Brainport embodies a shift in Dutch spatial planning doctrine. In the past 
two decades the focus of Dutch national spatial policy has shifted from housing supply 
and allocation to area-based economic development through an infrastructure network 
approach. Spatial planning policy and economic development policy are strategically 
integrated, addressing both the roles of regions and urban networks. At the same time, 
it has been broadly accepted that regions have to stand on their own. Provinces and city-
regions become major facilitators of economic development. Since 2004 the Eindhoven 
city-region has been recognised as one of the core economic areas and urban networks 
on the national level, because the region is highly prominent both nationally and 
internationally in the field of research and development (Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment et al. 2004; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2004). 
The recognition not only indicates the full support of the Dutch national government, 
but also affirms the common interest and key agenda of the Eindhoven city-region. In 
this section, I first outline major spatial frameworks and planning concepts of Brainport 
Eindhoven and introduce its governance approach to realising the spatial policies of 
Brainport Eindhoven. Then, I demonstrate the spatial issues and consequences of the 
development of Brainport Eindhoven in 2012.
§ 7.1.1 Spatial Planning Concepts of Brainport Eindhoven
Spatial Programme Brainport and Brainport Avenue are the most important high-tech 
oriented spatial planning policies in the Eindhoven city-region. They together form the 
spatial framework of the city-region. I respectively summarise their functions and major 
planning concepts in the following sections.
A Spatial Programme Brainport
In 2009 Spatial Programme Brainport was formulated on the basis of a social-spatial 
study, Het Geniale Landschap (the Ingenious Landscape) initiated in 2007 by the SRE 
together with Eindhoven Municipality, Helmond Municipality and Province Noord-
Brabant. The study aimed to supplement the spatial component of Brainport, because 
the Brainport agenda and its relevant initiatives mainly derived from an economic 
perspective and had little notion of how to create spatial conditions that can further 
strengthen the Brainport development (Urban Affairs and vhp 2007). The function of 
the social-spatial study was to recognise a set of spatial opportunities and to formulate 
scenarios for the Brainport development as a starting point to stimulate public debate 
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and to build consensus. In 2009 the SRE in cooperation with the URBACT II14 programme 
translated the study into the Spatial Programme Brainport containing a set of concrete 
projects and area developments within the framework of the Regional Structure Plan 
Eindhoven City Region. 
Figure 29  
Spatial frameworks of Eindhoven city-region (Source: SRE 2009, 17, 22, 24, and 28)
The two major functions of the Spatial Programme Brainport are to supplement the 
spatial component of Brainport and to form the basis for gaining regional support 
and attracting investors. As shown in Figure 29, in the Spatial Programme Brainport 
the priorities are functional networks, including internal and external accessibility 
among clusters, and a regional green structure. Within the functional networks and 
14 URBACT is a European exchange and learning programme and is jointly financed by the European Union 
(European Regional Development Fund) and the Member States.
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the green structure, Eindhoven city-region is divided into six development areas, 
including 1) Brainport Avenue, 2) Nieuwe Woud (experimental residential area with 
green landscape), 3) Middengebied (regional green landscape), 4) Northeast corridor 
Helmond, 5) Grenscorridor N69 and 6) rural areas. These form the fundamental spatial 
framework of the Eindhoven city-region. 
However, the content of the spatial programme is dynamic and flexible. Every year, the 
Executive Committee of the SRE draws up a list of projects within the spatial framework. 
The projects have to fit the four supplementary criteria formulated in the spatial 
programme. These are: supra-local/(sub)regional character, high spatial quality (usage 
value, perceptive value and future value), modernisation/innovation character, and 
having high potential for implementation in the short term (SRE 2009, 41). Projects 
that have been implemented can be removed from the list and new projects that meet 
the criteria can be added in the list as well. This implies that the Spatial Programme 
Brainport does not present an endpoint to reach but rather a dynamic process of strategic 
planning.
B Brainport Avenue Nationally Important Project
De geniale Brainport locatie (the ingenious Brainport location) indicates a cohesive 
vision and framework for local development within the A2-zone in the Eindhoven 
city-region and has been recognised as a nationally important project—the Brainport 
Avenue project (SRE et al. 2008, 6). A nationally important project has the function of 
coordinating the actions of various national government departments and all levels of 
government. It forms a basis for reserving funding, around 75 million euros, from the 
budget of the Nota Ruimtebudget15 (National Spatial Strategy) (SRE et al. 2008; Enno 
Zuidema Stedebouw 2008). 
Since the Regional Structure Plan the Eindhoven City-region put forth in 2005, the A2-
zone has been identified as the ‘top-technology-axis’ as well as the ‘showcase’ of Brainport 
Eindhoven due to its high concentration of R&D activities and good international and 
national accessibility (SRE and Province Noord-Brabant 2005, 134,137). Many high-
quality science parks and high-tech industrial parks—including High Tech Campus, 
ASML, Philips Medical Systems, Flight Forum, and so on—are located in the A2-zone 
15 The budget of the National Spatial Strategy from 2008 to 2014 is around one billion euros (Ministry of Transport 
and Water Management 2010). In 2010 the Dutch government in total invested around 11 billion euros in 
physical development (336-337).
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and are easily accessible from the national highway and rail networks as well as the 
Eindhoven Airport (see Figure 30 and Figure 27 in section 6.5.2).
Figure 30  
International accessibility of Brainport Avenue (Source: Enno Zuidema Stedebouw 2010, 5)
In order to secure the regional ambition and avoid ‘cluttering’ development in the 
area, the Samenwerkings-verband Regio Eindhoven (City-region Eindhoven, SRE) 
together with the municipalities of Best, Eindhoven, Son en Breugel, Veldhoven and 
Waalre, where the A2-zone is located, formulated the development programme in 
2008. The programme consists of several development projects, including Slowlane 
A2, Landelijk Strijp, De Run, T-campus, Strijp S, Station Area, and so on (see Figure 
31). On the basis of the spatial framework of the Eindhoven city-region, the showcase 
of Brainport Avenue and a good balance between red (urban) and green space are the 
two major planning principles of the Brainport Avenue. As shown in Figure 32, within 
the red and green structure, five development areas are identified according to their 
landscape characteristics, including Mozaiek, Park, Avenue, Dommel and Bos. The 
spatial developments located in the five areas have to respect the particular landscape 
characteristics of the areas in order to provide attractive and varied scenes along the A2 
Highway (Buck Consultants International and Fakton 2009; SRE et al. 2008).
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Figure 31  
The spatial framework of Brainport Avenue (Based on Buck Consultants International andFakton 2009, 29)
Figure 32  
The spatial concepts and framework of Brainport Avenue (Based on SRE et al. 2008, 31, 51)
The development of Brainport Avenue consists of many development projects, which 
involve various stakeholders and are implemented by different municipalities where the 
projects are located. The progress of each development project is different. Some are 
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quick and some are slow. In order to keep the spatial quality, on the basis of the two 
planning principles in 2010 the SRE in consultation with the five involved municipalities 
has established an evaluation framework, Brainport Avenue: Criteria for Spatial Quality, 
and a spatial quality advisory team to monitor future developments in the A2-zone 
(Enno Zuidema Stedebouw 2010).
§ 7.1.2 Spatial Planning and Governance Approach of Brainport Eindhoven
Spatial Programme Brainport and De geniale Brainport locatie are non-statutory planning 
documents, but they demonstrate agreements of spatial planning and development 
among government agencies involved in the Brainport development. The agreements 
are underpinned by intensively vertical and horizontal collaboration and consensus 
building between different governmental agencies, including the SRE, municipalities 
and municipal councils, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Province Noord-Brabant, and so 
on. In the process, local authorities, including the SRE and the involved municipalities, 
play a crucial role in promoting, shaping and mobilising needed resources to realise the 
planning goals of Brainport Eindhoven. 
Regarding the functional divisions between the SRE and the municipalities in the 
development of Brainport Eindhoven, there are three key principles. First, the 
responsibility to realise the development projects contained in Spatial Programme 
Brainport and Brainport Avenue programme actually belongs to the municipalities, 
where the projects are located, rather than the SRE (SRE et al. 2008). Second, a 
development project is undertaken by the SRE or province, only when the project crosses 
municipal boundaries, such as the construction of Slowlane A2, a cycling path along the 
A2 highway connecting all the development projects. Third, the SRE will not intervene 
in local decision-making, unless the decision will influence the development of the 
Eindhoven city-region as a whole. The mechanisms the SRE uses to intervene in local 
decisions are negotiation, mediation and giving advice. The municipalities have the 
competence to make the final decision. 
Since 1993 the SRE has played the most important role in coordinating various topics 
regarding the issues of spatial planning, traffic, transport, housing, environment, 
education, health, culture, recreation, tourism, and socio-economic affairs at the city-
regional level. However, since the enforcement of the new Spatial Planning Act (Wro) 
in 2008, the SRE has lost the authority to formulate statue plans, such as the regional 
structure plan. This has forced the SRE to play a more active role and to apply a new 
approach, an open network approach, to realise its ambitions for spatial planning. 
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In the new approach scheme, the SRE acts not only as a coordinator, like before, but 
also as a network broker and facilitator in the spatial planning and governance process 
of the Brainport development. The SRE helps relevant actors connect to each other 
and assists the actors, including governmental and non-governmental agencies, who 
have similar interests in forming informal collaboration groups and/or formal regional 
partnerships according to particular issues and/or goals of spatial planning (van Zeeland 
2012ba 2012b). For example, the SRE assists relevant municipalities in forming the 
Samenwerking Stedelijk Gebied Eindhoven (Eindhoven Urban Area Cooperation) and the 
Campusgemeenten (Park Cities). The former consists of eight municipalities aiming to 
deal with the allocation and development of social housing and industrial sites around 
the city of Eindhoven. The latter is a new alliance aiming to strengthen the development 
of high-tech campuses, so it involves four municipalities, including Eindhoven, 
Helmond, Veldhoven and Best, who are in the core innovative area of the city-region 
(van den Hoogenhof 2012).
At the municipal level, municipalities apply a ‘cluster approach’ to involve local 
stakeholders and manage different relationships clustered around issues and topics 
of each particular development project in order to build/seek local consensus on the 
goals of the project (van Eert 2012). I take the development of the Brainport Innovation 
Campus, one of the most important development projects of Spatial Programme 
Brainport and Brainport Avenue, as an example to demonstrate the spatial planning and 
governance approach of the SRE and the municipalities, because it shows the common 
spatial planning and governance practices in the spatial planning and development 
process of Brainport Eindhoven both on the regional and local levels, and involves not 
only governmental agencies but also the market and civil society.
At the end of the 2000s, the SRE and Eindhoven municipality recognised the potential 
to develop the BeA2 business site (the location of Brainport Innovation Campus) as 
a campus to accommodate high value-added knowledge and technology industries 
because of its attractive landscape and strategic location (see Figure 33) (SRE et al. 2008, 
88). With the support of Brainport Development NV, the SRE consulted with lead high-
tech firms in the Eindhoven city-region, such as ASML, Philips, etc. about the proposed 
development. In the consulting process, the SRE recognised the spatial demands of the 
suppliers of the lead firms. Several high-tech suppliers expressed their interests to locate 
in the campus in order to be closer to their customers, the lead high-tech firms. The 
planning concept of Brainport Innovation Campus thus emerged.
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Figure 33  
Distribution of business sites in the A2-zone (based on SRE et al. 2008, 26)
On the one hand, the SRE together with the Brainport Development NV helped the 
establishment of an industrial association of the suppliers—the Brainport Industries 
(van Leest 2012; van Zeeland 2012a; 2012b). On the other hand, they introduced 
the association to Eindhoven municipality and promoted the collaboration between 
the association and Eindhoven municipality in developing the new campus(van Eert 
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2012; van Zeeland, 2012a; 2012b). Since the former bedrijventerreinen structuurvisie 
(structure vision of business sites) of Eindhoven city-region published in 2000, the 
BeA2 has been identified as an area that has potential to be developed as a business site. 
In line with the structure vision, Eindhoven municipality has systematically purchased 
most of the land during the past ten years and continuously negotiate with the remaining 
landowners, who own the rest of the land within the BeA2 site. Since a consensus was 
reached in De geniale Brainport locatie, agreeing to develop the BeA2 as a campus for 
high-tech industries, and since the Eindhoven municipality has bought most of the 
land, the municipality is welcoming the SRE’s proposal to collaborate with Brainport 
Industries in developing the BeA2 business site as the Brainport Innovation Campus.
Nonetheless, it is clear for the Eindhoven municipality that Brainport Innovation 
Campus is one of the key components of the Brainport Avenue development programme 
from a national and regional perspective, but from a local perspective its relation to 
the development and spatial quality of its surrounding area, Landelijk Strijp, and the 
support of local stakeholders are also important. Specifically, Brainport Innovation 
Campus is a development project that is nested in different levels of spatial planning 
policies and practices. In addition to Spatial Programme Brainport and Brainport 
Avenue development programme, in 2008 the Eindhoven municipality formulated a 
development vision for Landelijk Strijp, where Brainport Innovation Campus is located, 
aiming to seek synergy among the various developments as a means to achieve better 
spatial quality and integral land use in the area of Landelijk Strijp (see Figure 34)(Enno 
Zuidema Stedebouw 2008). 
The vision was formulated through intensive collaboration between the representatives 
of different stakeholders, including involved government agencies, Brainport Industries, 
residents, landowners, social organisations, and so on. In the beginning, Eindhoven 
municipality invited all the representatives of stakeholders together to seek common 
development goals for Landelijk Strijp. After reaching consensus on the common goals 
and planning principals, Eindhoven municipality divided the stakeholders into twenty 
clusters according to which topics and issues of spatial planning were most related to 
certain stakeholders in order to govern the relationships and collaboration in a more 
effective and efficient way (van Eert 2012).
Regarding the project of Brainport Innovation Campus, Eindhoven municipality plans 
to cooperate with Brainport Industries either by leasing the land or directly involving in 
Brainport Innovation Corporation, which is a company in charge of the development and 
management of Brainport Innovation Campus, as one of the shareholders. The SRE and 
Eindhoven municipality lean more towards the latter form of cooperation (van Zeeland 
2012a). However, the planning content and implementation mechanisms of the project 
are not yet certain. Only when Brainport Industries makes a formal commitment to 
participate in the development of the project will a bestemmingsplan (municipal land 
use plan) of the Brainport Innovation Campus will be drafted according to the result of 
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the negotiation, thus entering into the legal procedure. But as of May 2012, Eindhoven 
municipality remains in waiting for the commitment of Brainport Industries (van Eert 
2012). 
Figure 34  
Development vision of Landelijk Strijp (Source: Landelijk Strijp Boucher, Eindhoven municipality 2008)
Although the results of the developments of Landelijk Strijp as well as Brainport 
Innovation Campus are still full of uncertainties, the way of practicing spatial planning 
and governance in the case study demonstrates the common spatial planning and 
governance practices in the Eindhoven city-region since the late 2000s. The role of SRE is 
to consider the spatial quality and development of the Eindhoven city-region as a whole. 
On the basis of the consideration, the SRE facilitates and shapes the collaboration on 
a regional level, while the municipality pays more attention to local spatial quality and 
consensus building. 
The planning and governance approach taken in the Brainport development embodies a 
relational perspective, whereby attention is put on the way to link, manage and mobilise 
the relationships clustered around various spatial issues and topics at different levels of 
spatial planning. In the process, several non-statue plans, such as Spatial Programme 
Brainport, De geniale Brainport locatie, and the Development Vision of Landelijk Strijp, 
are employed as a strategic instrument to stimulate debate, involve stakeholders and 
build/seek consensus on development goals of particular places/projects, but also to 
mobilise needed actors and their resources to achieve the goals. 
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In the planning process of the Brainport Eindhoven development, the bestemmingsplan 
is the result of negotiation and coordination between different levels of government, 
industrial investors, and other stakeholders. It can be seen as a record of an agreement 
between different interests rather than a means to regulate spatial development. This is 
in accordance with the Dutch planning tradition at the municipal level (for details please 
see section 5.1).
§ 7.1.3 Spatial Consequences: A Huge Oversupply of Industrial Land
Industrial land development, including science parks and technology parks, is one of 
the critical spatial elements of high-tech development. How to provide sufficient and 
adequate land for industrial use is one of the biggest spatial issues in the development 
process of a high-tech city-region. Through the establishment of the SRE, the twenty-
one municipalities in the Eindhoven city-region have a long tradition of collaboration on 
various topics, which include industrial land supply. Once in a while, the SRE collaborates 
with provincial government to conduct investigations of industrial land demand in 
consultation with Brabant-Zeeuwse Werkgeversvereniging (Brabant-Zeeuwse Employers 
Association, BZW) and Kamer van Koophandel Brabant (Chamber of Commerce Brabant, 
KvK) and distributes the projected demand for industrial land to the sub-regions of the 
Eindhoven city-region. According to the distribution, the twenty-one municipalities 
in the Eindhoven city-region propose where the industrial land should be located and 
implemented it (van Zeeland 2012b).
On the basis of a consensus between the SRE, provincial government and the 
municipalities, an agreement will be reached in the form of regional industrial policy 
together with a spatial framework of industrial land development, such as the Regionale 
Bedrijventerrein Structuurvisie 2000 (Regional Structure Vision of Business Site 
Development) and the Regionale Agenda Bedrijventerreinen 2008 (Regional Agenda 
of Business Site Development). In other words, the industrial land supply policy in the 
Eindhoven city-region is not based on a collection of land development projects initiated 
by each municipality, but rather on an intensive negotiation and coordination process. 
It is an agreement between the municipalities, the SRE and the provincial government.
However, due to the global financial crisis of 2008 and changing working conditions, 
such as teleworking at home, the municipalities in the Eindhoven city-region have 
encountered a huge oversupply and a serious financial issue in relation to the 
development of industrial land. According to the regional agreement of business site 
development announced in 2012, until 2020 the demand for new industrial land in 
the Eindhoven city-region is 353 hectares but the planned industrial land supply is 951 
hectares. In other words, oversupply of industrial land is 599 hectares, most of which 
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(around 461 hectares) is located in the core area of the Eindhoven city-region (SRE and 
Provincie Noord-Brabant 2012). In order to deal with the issue, a ‘traffic light’ model 
has been developed as a basis to seek consensus among the province, the SRE and the 
municipalities. 
According to the model if a municipality has already constructed the infrastructure of the 
planned industrial land, such as the roads, the development project is recognised as green 
and the municipality can keep working on the development. If the municipality has only 
purchased the land but not yet conducted the infrastructure development, the project 
is recognised as orange—and may or may not be developed after 2020. If the land has 
not yet been bought by the municipality, it is recognised as red—will not be developed. 
But if it has been recognised as a ‘campus’, which is a nationally or regionally important 
science or technology park development, such as Brainport Innovation Campus, it is 
always recognised as green—can be developed. However, it is difficult to deal with the 
issue in practice, because the municipalities have bought most of the land, which was 
planned to accommodate the future industrial land demand. The municipalities now 
need to pay the interest and most of them have serious financial problems (van Zeeland 
2012a). As of May 2012, there remains 422 hectares of the land for which it has yet to be 
decided if development with occur or not, because the municipalities, the SRE and the 
provincial government have not yet reached a consensus. However they are intensively 
working together to search for resolutions and support from the central government and 
other stakeholders.
The oversupply issue in the Eindhoven city-region shows two conventional challenges 
in high-tech development. These are: mechanisms to keep a proper balance between 
industrial land supply and demand, and to stimulate private investment in industrial 
land development. First, industrial land supply policy in the Eindhoven city-region 
is based on intensive negotiation and coordination between provincial, regional and 
municipal governments and regional business communities. It is difficult to predict 
long-term global economic cycles and industrial land demand, but the long tradition of 
collaboration in the Eindhoven city-region does gradually generate knowledge resources 
(intellectual capital), network resources (social capital) and power base (political capital), 
which link to ‘institutional capacity’, to develop strategic spatial planning activities and 
involve various stakeholders to deal with the challenge (Healey 1997). 
Second, there are two major mechanisms to provide industrial land in the Eindhoven 
city-region. First, according to the agreement of regional industrial land supply, a 
municipality buys the farmland that has been designated and sells it to firms (rarely to 
be developers) with some rights. The bestemmingsplan is made according to the result 
of the negotiation. Another approach is that firms buy the land and negotiate with the 
municipality to formulate a new bestemmingsplan for the site. The first mechanism is 
the most commonly used approach to provide industrial land in the city-region, and it 
has created a severe financial burden for the municipalities since the crisis of 2008 (van 
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Zeeland 2012a). Under this context, the municipalities can no longer play the role of 
provider. The SRE has started to encourage municipalities to cooperate with the private 
sector to develop the sites as in the case of Brainport Innovation Campus. 
Recently, an alternative approach has emerged in the city-region. The municipality of 
Best is calling for private investment to develop a specific area as an industrial park. If a 
private party has an interest in developing the land, it first has to submit a plan and the 
municipality will check if the plan is sound. In the process, the party has to deal with the 
issues of land ownership on its own. After the negotiation processes, the municipality 
will prepare a bestemmingsplan for the industrial park (van Zeeland 2012a). In this 
approach the municipality plays a less active role. The municipality tries to shift the risks 
to the investor, but it is not yet known if any party is willing to invest in the industrial 
land development, especially when facing economic decline. The challenge for the 
government might be how to involve and cooperate with powerful players in spatial 
development and to take risk management into consideration.
§ 7.1.4 Remarks
Since the end of the 2000s the dominant high-tech spatial planning and governance 
style in Eindhoven city-region has a tendency to shift from a provider style to a 
collaborative style. This can be observed from recent high-tech oriented spatial planning 
and governance projects in this city-region, such as Spatial Programme Brainport, De 
geniale Brainport locatie and the Development Vision of Landelijk Strijp. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that even within one government more than one planning 
style may exist according to the planning context. Hence, even if a dominant planning 
style can be identified, exceptions will always occur. In this research, I more address 
the changing style of spatial planning and governance in relation to high-tech spatial 
development.
This shift mainly relates to two events occurring at the end of the 2000s—the promulgation 
of the new Dutch Spatial Planning Act (Wro) and the financial crisis. First, in 2008 the 
Wro came into effect. Since then, the streekplan (regional plan) formulated by the SRE 
and provincial government has lost its legal status. A structuurvisie (structure vision) and 
Verordening Ruimte (spatial regulation) become the major legal planning instruments on 
the city-regional and provincial level. The SRE and the provincial government has lost the 
power to approve bestemmingsplan (municipal land use plans), but they still tend to play an 
active role in city-regional planning, so the SRE and the provincial government change their 
way of spatial planning and governance to a more collaborative style.
i
 191 High-tech Oriented Spatial Planning and Governance in Eindhoven City-region and Hsinchu City-region
Second, before the financial crisis, the most comment approach to provide industrial 
land in the Eindhoven city-region was that—municipalities bought the farmland and 
sold it to firms with some rights. The firms would develop the industrial land rather 
than the municipalities themselves. But after the crisis, the situation has changed. Due 
to the financial burden, the municipalities can no longer play an active role to provide 
industrial land. The SRE also encourages municipalities to cooperate with the private 
sector to develop industrial land. The oversupply of industrial land and financial burden 
of municipalities in Eindhoven city-region could be seen as a legacy of provider style of 
spatial planning and governance, but also as one of the triggers that leads the shift of the 
dominant style of high-tech oriented spatial planning policy from the provider style to 
the collaborative style in Eindhoven city-region.
Nowadays, the spatial planning and governance approach of Brainport Eindhoven 
development has a dynamic and flexible character. Spatial plans and development 
projects at different levels and scales are nested within each other by recursive 
coordination and communications among different governmental agencies and 
stakeholders. One the one hand, the spatial focus provides a clear agenda that can 
promote coalition building and the obtaining of resources. On the other hand, the 
recursive process generates intellectual capital, social capital and a political base, leading 
to an increase of ‘institutional capacity’. This is why the SRE and the municipalities can 
gain support from the EU and the Dutch central and provincial governments, involve 
various regional actors, and coordinate relevant sectoral policies for the development of 
Brainport Eindhoven as well as deal with new issues, such as the oversupply of industrial 
land.
§ 7.2 Hsinchu High-tech City-region
Since the beginning of the 1990s the local governments have started to initiate several 
spatial planning and development initiatives to mediate the large demand for the 
development of local facilities, housing, and accessibility resulting from the Hsinchu 
Science Park (HSP) development. Figure 35 illustrates the distribution of the major 
initiatives in the Hsinchu city-region in the form of an urban planning masterplan 
project. 
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Figure 35  
Urban planning masterplans in Hsinchu city-region
Most of the new initiatives are project-based planning without guiding frameworks. This 
is in accordance with the Taiwanese planning tradition. However, the role of different 
levels of government is changing in the practices of spatial planning and governance. 
Different from the HSP development, other actors are involved in the process. In this 
section, I first outline major spatial planning and governance practices in the city-region. 
Then, I demonstrate the spatial issues and consequences of high-tech development in 
the Hsinchu city-region.
§ 7.2.1 Spatial Planning in Hsinchu High-tech City-region
In addition to the HSP development project in the 1980s, the HSC Development Plan 
in the 1990s and the Taiwan Knowledge-based Flagship Park development project in 
the 2000s were the two most important spatial planning and development projects in 
the Hsinchu city-region that had been brought into the national economic development 
plan. These two high-tech spatial planning initiatives also reflect the changing role of 
central government in science park development in the 1990s and 2000s, from the 
major promoter and developer to the essential co-operator. I summarise the origins and 
planning concepts of these two initiatives in the following sections.
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A HSC Development Plan
The HSC Development Plan was the only plan at a city-regional scale in the Hsinchu 
city-region. It aimed to strengthen further the HSP’s competitiveness by coupling with 
the increasing land demands for industry and housing and enhancing the quality of the 
business climate and living environment. Its major function was to guide all sectoral 
development plans in the Hsinchu city-region to achieve this goal. In the beginning the 
primary actors consisted of local governments, the Science Park Administration (SPA), 
the Industrial Technology Research Institute and the two national universities adjacent 
to the HSP (Chen 2001). In 1990 the Executive Yuan, the highest administrative body 
of Taiwan, brought the project into the 11th Six-year National Development Plan and 
designated the National Science Council (NSC) and the Taiwanese provincial government 
in charge of the planning. This minimised the role of local governments and knowledge 
institutes. The interaction mode among the major actors thus became hierarchical, 
because the central government had much more power than the other actors and 
wanted to dominate the planning direction.
Nonetheless, the project was originally initiated by local governments and knowledge 
institutes. This allowed them the chance to participate in the decision-making from the 
very beginning, but their proposals could be adopted only when they complied with the 
major aim of the central government—to strengthen the competitiveness of the HSP 
and enhance its development. The priority of the central government was clearly shown 
in the planning concept. The planned area was classified into two categories: the HSP, 
and the ancillary area of the HSP (SPA and TPG 1993 Vol1:6–29). As shown in Figure 36, 
the science belt referred to the core area of the HSP development and the living belt and 
conservation belt were considered as ancillary areas of the HSP. Spatial development 
in the living belt and conservation belt was conditional and regulated. Major public 
investment was allocated in the core area.
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Figure 36  
Spatial concept of Hsinchu Science City Development Plan (based on SPA and TPG 1993, 10-16)
At the end of the 1990s governmental and fiscal structures were reorganised. 
The Taiwanese provincial government was downscaled in 1998. While most of 
its competences were ceded to the national government, some were devolved to 
local government. One of the major promoters of the HSC Development Plan thus 
disappeared. At the same time, the national government reoriented the policy of science 
park development from a single technopole strategy to a technopolis programme. The 
policy reorientation led the SPA to busy itself with new science park developments and 
withdraw its role from the regional science city plan, because for the SPA, on account of 
its duties, the priority of the plan was to search for new land to accommodate high-tech 
industrial activities rather than to promote regional development. The reorganisation 
and changing policy undoubtedly declared an end to the plan. The outcome increased 
the tensions and conflicts between the local governments and the SPA, and led to the 
collapse of the emerging multi-level governance in the city-region.
Although in the planning process of the HSC Development Plan the interactions between 
different levels of government remained hierarchical, the bottom-up origin of the 
initiative allowed regional actors, including local governments and knowledge institutes, 
a chance to participate in the decision-making in the early stages. Their early planning 
concepts garnered a certain degree of consensus on the part of the regional actors 
and some of the concepts were retained in the development plan, forming follow-up 
spatial planning and development projects at the end of the 1990s and the beginning 
of the 2000s, such as Hsinchu Science Special District Masterplan, Expending Hsinchu 
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Interchange Road Area District Masterplan, and so on (see Figure 35). However, the 
HSC Development Plan was formulated as a blueprint, but no one was in charge of the 
implementation of the plan after the reorganisation of governmental structure and the 
reorientation of science park development policy at the end of the 1990s. Therefore, 
the plan was terminated, although it was not yet completed. Since the 2000s, local 
governments have abandoned the HSC Development Plan and sought other possibilities 
to deal with the externalities of the HSP development, such as the establishment of the 
Governor Forum16 in 2002.
B Taiwan Knowledge-based Flagship Park development project
Within this context, the planning initiative of the Taiwan Knowledge-based Flagship Park 
(TKFP) Special District has no significant interrelationship with the HSC Development 
Plan. It has been identified as a nationally important project involving different levels 
of government and one knowledge institute in the planning process. However, the 
TKFP project can only be considered as a local initiative land development project 
(446 hectares), because there is no substantial support from the national government, 
although it has been included in the national economic development plan. The TKFP 
project is a bottom-up initiative dominated by two local actors—the National Chiaotung 
University (NCTU) and the Hsinchu county government. 
In 1999 the NCTU proposed the TKFP project to the Hsinchu county government as 
an attempt to enhance their competitiveness and to work towards the status of one 
of the top universities in the world by acquiring new campus lands nearby their main 
campus, the HSP as well as the High-speed Rail Hsinchu station. At the same time, the 
Hsinchu county government expected that the High-speed Rail Hsinchu Station Special 
District would be developed quickly and the development demands on its surrounding 
non-urban land would be triggered as well because of the enormous housing demand 
of the HSP development (see Figure 25 in section 6.4.1). An urban land use plan was 
needed to regulate and direct the potential land developments in the area, but the legal 
16 In March 2002 the Director General of SPA invited the mayor of Hsinchu city, the magistrate of Hsinchu county 
and the chairperson of the Allied Association for Science Park Industries to hold the first Governor Forum. 
During the forum, they reached a consensus and agreed to strive for funds from the national government (Lin, 
2007). In 2003 the national government approved a new administrative regulation, the Principles for the 
Allocation of Science Park Subsidy for Local Development, to establish annual funding based on the Operation 
Fund of the Science Park Administration to subsidise local development located within three kilometres from 
the boundary of the HSP. The establishment of the subsidy indeed solidified the collaboration (Jhan 2008; Lin 
2007), but it also led the scope of the agenda to be very limited. Since then, to negotiate the distribution of 
subsidy and to mediate the jurisdictional conflicts have been the major topics in the forum.
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process consumed much time and money and the county government did not have 
enough budget and resources to conduct the planning project. As a result, when the 
NCTU proposed the TKFP project and expressed their willingness to be responsible for 
the planning funds in return for campus land free of rent,17 the county government was 
more than happy to accept their proposal (Wu 2011; Liu 2011; Li 2011; Lin 2011; Chen 
2011).
The NCTU is one of the best universities in Taiwan and most of the knowledge workers 
and high-tech entrepreneurs in the HSP graduated from NCTU. The county government 
considered that the participation of NCTU would help to gain the support of high-tech 
industries as well as the national government and thus guarantee success of the high-
tech oriented planning project proposal. In addition to the good relations with the high-
tech industries and the national government, the biggest advantage is that the NCTU 
brought money and new planning knowledge into the project (Liu 2011; Li 2011). In 
contrast with the HSP development, the masterplan of the TKFP Special District not 
only is devoted to the development of high-tech economy, but also strives for quality of 
place. For example, one of its major planning strategies is to establish comprehensive 
networks of green and water structures by using existing irrigation systems, historical 
buildings, small temples, and certain public spaces in relation to the culture identity 
of local residents (see Figure 37). This strategy shows an attempt to take both local 
environmental and cultural aspects into consideration in the planning process.
17 According to article 4 of Land Expropriation Act in Taiwan, zone expropriation can be carried out, when all or 
part of a newly established urban area is to undergo development and construction, so the Hsinchu county 
government can apply zone expropriation to develop the TKFP. According to article 55-2 of the Equalisation 
of Land Rights Act, after planning and preparation, lands in lieu of compensation shall be given to the original 
owners. But the competent authorities may allocate a part of the land, which is located within the area of zone 
expropriation, to government agencies for public facilities as indicated in the expropriation plan. Since the 
NCTU is a national university, a higher education administrative authority under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Education in Taiwan, it is possible for the NCTU to acquire the campus land for free after zone expropriation 
according to the law.
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Figure 37  
Green and water structures of the TKFP Plan (Source: Hsinchu County Government 2011, 91. 114)
§ 7.2.2 New Spatial Planning and Governance Approach in Hsinchu City-region
The HSP development project in the 1980s, the HSC Development Plan in the 1990s and 
the TKFP project in the 2000s are the three most important high-tech oriented spatial 
planning and development projects in the Hsinchu city-region. The HSP project and 
the HSC Development Plan were dominated by the central government. Their planning 
style was hierarchical and technocratic. The central government acted as a provider and 
imposed the plans on the city-region. The role of other actors was very minor. But the 
situation has gradually changed since the end of the 1990s. 
The Taiwan provincial government was downscaled in 1998. Together with the 
release of the Local Government Act in 1999, some of the administrative powers 
and responsibilities have been devolved to the local governments, including spatial 
planning, environmental protection, and so on. The devolution increased bargaining 
leverage of the local governments in spatial planning and governance. After the end of 
the HSC Development Plan and the administration reorganisation and devolution, the 
local governments have tried to formulate a series of spatial planning and development 
initiatives to deal with the externalities of the HSP development on their own. However, 
compared to the central government, knowledge, networks and political resources of 
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the local governments are relatively limited. They also lack experience in planning and 
developing high-tech spaces, so it is necessary for them to cooperate with other powerful 
actors in the city-region.
As a result, since the 2000s some alternative spatial planning and governance approaches 
have emerged. The local governments adopt a ‘contract network’ approach, which links 
actors through agreements, contracts, or joint ventures based on the consent of the 
involved actors, so joint gains across the involved actors are a necessary condition (Feiock 
2009). This approach is project-based. In the contract network, relationships are based 
on bilateral exchanges between involved actors. Decision-making is based on individual 
bargaining rather than broad consensus building. I take the TKFP project as an example 
to demonstrate the alternative spatial planning and governance approach to high-tech 
spatial developments in the Hsinchu city-region. After the NCTU proposed the TKFP 
project to the Hsinchu county government, in 2000 an agreement was signed between the 
two parties to co-develop the non-urban land in search for new opportunities for Hsinchu.
As shown in Table 31, the agreement specified the functional divisions between the 
county government and the NCTU, and indicated that the Hsinchu county government 
would be the major implementer of the project in charge of zone expropriation and 
the legal administrative procedure after the promulgation of the legal plan according 
to the law. The NCTU was responsible for the operation of spatial planning in the legal 
planning procedure. This type of functional division was very unique in Taiwan, because 
the operation of spatial planning should be part of the autonomies and duties of local 
governments. It was the first time a local government authorised a national university 
to conduct a spatial planning project, an experiment that has brought many advantages 
and disadvantages.
Responsibilities Hsinchu County Government NCTU
Work Items  – To provide administrative 
support and assist in holding 
relevant meetings.
 – To delineate planned area.
 – To undertake zone expropri-
ation.
 – While promoting the project, the NCTU should 
assign a particular person in close contact with the 
county government to inform the working process 
and  content, exchange opinions and discuss relevant 
issues.
 – To prepare relevant legal plans and maps to go 
through the legal planning procedure.
 – Topographic survey.
 –  Environmental impact assessment.
Finance To cover the costs related to 
zone expropriation and relevant 
administrative procedure.
To cover the costs related to: 1. Holding international 
seminars, workshops, conferences and over sea study 
tours; 2. Preparing relevant legal plans and maps; 3. 
Conducting topographic survey and environmental 
impact assessment.
Table 31  
Functional divisions in the TKFP project (based on Source: Xu 2004)
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Year Planning Maps Notes
2002 The first conceptual plan of the TKFP was formula-
ted to gain the support of the central government to 
accept the planned area.
The planned area is 1,235 hectares and divided 
into two development phases. The first phase 
development area is 450 hectares, including 82 
hectares high-tech industrial area, 40 hectares 
university campus, and 382 hectares residential 
area. The remaining 772 hectares will be developed 
eventually. 
In order to maintain the local living context, most 
of the irrigation system and all of the local historical 
buildings and small temples are preserved in their 
original places.
2007 In 2007, the Regional Planning Committee at the 
central government level accepted the conceptual 
plan, but the committee only accept the first phase 
development area as urbanised area and removed 
the remaining area from the plan, so the planned 
area was reduced to 447 hectares.
2010 According to suggestions of the landowners and 
Urban Planning Committee at the local and central 
governments, the planning content has been 
revised several times. 3.8 hectares Haka Agriculture 
and Recreation Zone has been added to the plan, 
because some landowners tend to keep engaging in 
farming after the development.
Table 32  
The course of spatial planning of the TKFP project (Source: Hsinchu County Government 2002; 2007; 2010)
Beyond the good relations with the high-tech industries and the national government, 
the biggest advantage is that the NCTU brought both funds and new planning knowledge 
to the project. Based on the support of international professionals, the planning team of 
NCTU decided to experiment with participatory planning—a planning mechanism that 
had never really been applied at an urban scale in Taiwan. As shown in Table 32, the 
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planning content of the project actually presents a dialogue among different sectors. The 
interaction modes tend to be horizontal negotiations among the county government, 
the NCTU and landowners. The NCTU also plays an essential role to conduct vertical 
networking with relevant government agencies on higher levels.
However, the initiative is not going smoothly based on two reasons. First, despite the 
setting up of a covenant between the NCTU and the county government, the legitimacy 
of the NCTU to be in charge of the operation of spatial planning, is weak. Second, 
although the project has been identified as a part of the National Development Plan, it 
was initiated by the NCTU with the purpose to acquire new campus land for free. People 
criticised the NCTU’s intentions and considered that as a national university they should 
pay more attention to research and education rather than try to gain profits from land 
development. As of 2012, the masterplan and detail plans of the project are still in the 
deliberation process of the Urban Planning Committee at the national level. This shows 
a challenge in spatial planning and governance. The question is whether the decision-
making process is accountable and meets the principles of social justice, when the local 
governments try to cooperate with other powerful actors by offering some incentives.
§ 7.2.3 Spatial Consequences: Increasing Urban Sprawl in Hsinchu City-region
Many studies have shown the industrial clustering effects of the HSP on surrounding 
industrial zones along the National Freeway No.1, such as Hsinchu Industrial Zone 
in Hukou. A functional city-region has formed and been connected by dense flows of 
industrial activities, people and information (Hsieh et al. 2005; Hu et al. 2005a; Hu et al. 
2005b; Chou 2007; Hsieh 2008). On the other hand, the spatial organisation of the city-
region has a tendency towards urban sprawl due to three interrelated factors, including 
landscape constraints, land supply shortage for housing and industrial development, 
and the farmland release programme in non-urban areas. 
First of all, the HSP is located in a valley surrounded by hills. Since the end of 1980s the 
industrial land supply of the HSP could no longer satisfy the growth demand of the high-
tech industries. As the exploitable land adjacent to the park is scare, it became necessary 
for the Science Park Administration (SPA) to look for new land in surrounding areas to 
accommodate the demand. At the end of the 1990s, a 123 hectares satellite site was 
finally designated in Jhunan, Mioali county (see Figure 28 in section 6.5.2). Following 
the expansions, the economic effects of the HSP have extended beyond the Hsinchu 
area. This has further promoted the development of the Hsinchu high-tech city-region 
in terms of the functional relation and regional economic integration in those areas 
(Chou 2007).
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Secondly, the increasing land demand for high-tech industrial development and housing 
has triggered housing development in non-urban areas. National land resources in 
Taiwan are divided into two management systems—the urban development land 
system and non-urban development land system. The Urban Planning Act and the 
Regional Planning Act respectively regulate the two systems. According to the acts, local 
governments need to spend more than ten years going through all the legal procedures 
of the two systems to initiate new urban development projects (for details please see 
section 6.2). It is difficult for local governments to provide adequate land for housing 
and industrial land development in time. 
Thirdly, since 1995 the national government has launched a farmland release programme 
in response to the impact of accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 
agricultural industry. The restrictions on the sale and purchase of farmland have thus 
been eased. A farm cabin is permitted to be built on every piece of farmland, and the 
maximum building area is ten per cent of the total farmland. This has encouraged the 
sprawl of rural development surrounding metropolitan areas, especially in the Hsinchu 
city-region. From 2000 to 2010, more than 225 hectares of farmland located in Hsinchu 
county have applied for the construction of a farm cabin. This is around 53 per cent of 
the total area of farmland in Taiwan that has applied to build a farm cabin in Taiwan 
(Control Yuan, R.O.C 2010). Besides, there is no clear spatial framework as reference to 
guide the decision-making of each application for a farm cabin construction. This has 
led to severe urban sprawl in the city-region, but there is no adequate mechanism to 
deal with the issue. 
§ 7.2.4 Remarks
For planning authorities in the Hsinchu city-region, the role of spatial planning is limited 
to provide a legal base to acquire land for public facilities and/or high-tech related 
industrial activities and to regulate and/or facilitate land development. Their capacity 
to link various sectoral policies to spatial planning is weak. The dominant style of spatial 
planning and governance in the city-region is in accordance with the Taiwanese planning 
tradition—blueprinted and project-oriented planning. 
The HSC Development Plan was the only plan at a city-regional scale in the Hsinchu 
city-region but the reorganisation of government structure and the changing science 
park policy led to the end of the plan and the collapse of the emerging multi-level 
governance in the city-region. The TKFP project is a result of close collaboration 
between Hsinchu county government and the NCTU. This is a new approach to spatial 
planning and development in the Hsinchu city-region. The initiative shows the changing 
interrelationships between the central government, local governments and other 
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sectors. The role of central government has become minor but remains essential in the 
development of the Hsinchu high-tech city-region, because the spatial planning system 
in Taiwan is hierarchical and centralised.
Moreover, due to the blueprinted and project-oriented planning style, spatial planning 
in the Hsinchu city-region is rather fragmented and lacks a common vision for the city-
region as a whole. The land supply shortage for housing and the national farmland release 
programme have led to severe urban sprawl in the city-region. It may be necessary to 
conduct spatial planning at the city-regional level to provide clear spatial frameworks to 
guide the developments in both urban planning areas and non-urban areas.
§ 7.3 Comparisons
Through reviewing the practices of spatial planning and governance, I found three 
major similarities in the development process of these two high-tech city-regions. 
First, although the local governments in these two city-regions are inclined to play an 
active role in the spatial planning and governance of high-tech spatial developments, 
they recognise the necessity to collaborate with other powerful high-tech players in 
the city-region, such as universities, R&D institutes and/or high-tech firms, in order 
to bring in not only money, but also knowledge, networks, and political resources to 
achieve particular planning goals. This also relates to the second similarity—creation 
of new institutional arenas for collaboration, such as a strategic alliance regarding a 
specific spatial issue, or a steering group or a development corporation of a particular 
development project/programme that consists of various stakeholders. 
Third, they both adopt the concept of an interactive innovative model and try to take 
advantage of cluster effects in the high-tech spatial development. For them, it is 
important to provide adequate industrial land in close proximity to existing R&D 
clusters with good accessibility, because they expect that knowledge generation is not 
limited to the R&D activities within universities, R&D institutes, and lead high-tech 
firms, but also in the interaction process between upstream suppliers and downstream 
customers in a value chain and between the lead firms and their support networks. 
Particularly, in these two city-regions, R&D and production, sales and services activities 
coexist and complement each other. That is why the local governments in these two city-
regions are trying their best to provide new industrial land in their core area of high-tech 
spatial development (see Figure 38). However, this also creates a dilemma for the local 
governments. That is, how to keep a proper balance between land supply and demand 
for industrial land development in the process of high-tech development, a conventional 
challenge in spatial planning and governance practices.
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Figure 38  
Industrial site development in the Eindhoven and Hsinchu city-regions (the right figure is based on SRE and Provincie Noord-Brabant 
2012)
Despite the similarities, several significant differences exist in their spatial planning 
and governance practices. I demonstrate the differences according to three aspects, 
including the dominant style of spatial planning, the mechanisms of spatial governance 
and the spatial pattern of industrial land development. On the basis of the previous 
three chapters, I discuss the major institutional factors that contribute to the differences 
in the following sections.
§ 7.3.1 Dominant Style of Spatial Planning
The dominant style of high-tech oriented spatial planning policy in both city-regions has 
a tendency to shift from the provider style to the collaborative style, but the governments 
in the Eindhoven city-region adopt a framework-based planning approach, while the 
governments in the Hsinchu city-region apply a project-based planning approach. The 
difference mainly results from the differences of spatial planning doctrines and legal 
planning systems in these two countries.
As discussed in chapter five, the legal planning systems in these two countries are 
designed as plan-led, but the planning practices in the Netherlands are more strategic, 
selective and development-led. The governments in the Eindhoven city-region follow 
the doctrine. They formulate strategic plans or spatial frameworks at different levels and 
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scales as a basis to seek and build consensus between stakeholders and use the strategic 
plans or frameworks to guide, facilitate and coordinate project developments. A strategic 
plan or spatial framework is temporally dynamic rather than an endpoint to be reached. 
There are recursive interactions between strategic plans/frameworks and development 
projects, so spatial plans and development projects at different levels and scales can nest 
within each other. The recursive interactions between different levels of government 
agencies and various stakeholders are based on the Dutch administrative tradition—a 
decentralised unitary state. Collaboration and consensus building/seeking are common 
practices for the governments when formulating policy.
In contrast, there is no strategic planning tradition at the city-regional and urban level 
in Taiwan. The Taiwanese central government tried to ask city and county governments 
to propose county/city comprehensive development plans at the end of the 1980s, but 
formulating these type of development plans became a formality for the city and county 
governments, serving the requirement of the central government rather than acting as 
a new planning instrument to guide the spatial developments in the city or county as a 
whole (for details please see section 5.3). 
Although in the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the governments 
in the Hsinchu city-region did try to formulate the Hsinchu Science City Development 
Plan to provide a spatial framework at the city-regional level, it was hardly considered 
as a practice of strategic planning based on two reasons. First, it was considered as a 
blueprint plan used to guide public investments in the city-region. In other words, the 
plan tried to indicate an endpoint to be reached by the different levels of government. 
Second, the central government played a dominant role in the plan-making process. 
The decision-making regarding the plan was very hierarchical rather than collaborative. 
Since the end of the plan at the end of the 1990s, the dominant spatial planning style in 
the city-region has returned to the project-based approach. There is no other updated 
plan at the city-regional level as reference for decision-making in each new development 
initiative.
In short, the dominant style of spatial planning in the Eindhoven city-region is 
framework-based and collaborative. It is so strategic and flexible that it may be easier 
to meet the nature of high-tech industry—a high degree of market volatility. However, 
this style of planning lacks legal certainty for the landowners, because the legal 
procedure of a bestemmingsplan (municipal land use plan) is the final stage of spatial 
planning. A strategic plan or spatial framework does not guarantee the final result of 
the bestemmingsplan. This increases the risks of spatial development not only for the 
landowners and developers but also the municipality, because in most of the cases the 
municipality purchases the land beforehand. 
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On the other hand, the dominant style of spatial planning in the Hsinchu city-region is 
blueprinted and project-based. Since the end of the 1990s, the local governments in the 
Hsinchu city-region have started to play a more active role in high-tech development and 
tried to involve other powerful players in the city-region to conduct high-tech oriented 
spatial development. This has led to a more collaborative spatial planning approach. 
But the Taiwanese planning system lacks flexibility. The legal planning procedure is too 
complicated and too long to meet the large land demands of the housing market and 
industrial development. In addition to the failure of land use control in non-urban areas, 
the city-region has faced an emerging issue of urban sprawl.
§ 7.3.2 Mechanisms of Spatial Governance
In relation to the shift of high-tech oriented spatial planning policy in both city-regions, 
various institutional arenas have developed to accommodate the new collaboration. 
Nonetheless, they use different spatial governance approaches to formulate and 
implement their high-tech spatial policies, strategies, plans and projects. The 
governments in the Eindhoven city-region mainly apply the open network approach 
at the city-regional level and the systematic cluster approach at the municipal level, 
while the governments in the Hsinchu city-region adopt the contract network approach. 
Specifically, planning decision-making in the Hsinchu city-region is based on individual 
bargaining of each particular project rather than on broader consensus, as occurs in the 
Eindhoven city-region. The difference not only relates to their dominant planning styles, 
but also their particular regional culture characteristics and historical experiences.
Various official documents and reports of the Eindhoven city-region keep emphasising 
their regional culture of cooperation and trust, such as Afstand en betrokkenheid: 
Perspectieven op duurzame gebiedsontwikkeling (Distance and engagement: 
perspectives of sustainable area development) (Horlings et al. 2009, p.126), What’s 
Next? Brainport Eindhoven Region Aligning Smart and Strong (Brainport Eindhoven 
2011) and so on. In an article in Stedenbouw en Ruimtelijke Ordening (Urban and Spatial 
Planning Magazine), Wim van de Donk, the Commissaris van de Koningin (Queen’s 
Commissioner) of Noor-Brabant Province, also states that the long-term rooted socio-
cultural capital of open-minded cooperation and trust are the key factors of the success 
of Brainport Eindhoven (van de Donk 2011). In a personal interview with the project 
manager of Landelijk Strijp in the Eindhoven municipality in May 2012, he also pointed 
out that ‘in this area, in Brabant, we have a culture putting our strength together, not 
individually… we are always companion and try to make things happen, so for us it is 
usual to interact in that way with all stakeholders.’ 
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In fact, the emergence of a collaborative culture in the field of regional governance 
and spatial planning in the city-region can be traced back to the formation of the 
Samenwerkingsverband Agglomeratie Eindhoven (Collaborative Agglomeration 
Eindhoven) in 1964 due to a need for planning rapid and uncontrolled growth around 
Eindhoven at that time (van der Veer 1998). The emphasis on cooperative culture is not 
only a strategy to build Brainport’s identity and a way to brand the city-region, but also 
a key value that the governments in the city-region are eager to build and practice in 
the formulation and implementation processes of Brainport policies, strategies, plans, 
and projects. This can be seen in the establishment of the Brainport Foundation, which 
consists of representatives of the local governments, knowledge institutes and business 
community as a platform and a collaborative body to determine the development 
strategies of Brainport Eindhoven, but also in the spatial planning and governance 
practices of Spatial Programme Brainport and the Brainport Avenue project. 
In contrast to the Eindhoven experience, the formation of collaborative culture in 
Hsinchu city-region is not smooth. The termination of the Hsinchu Science City 
Development Plan at the end of the 1990s has led to the collapse of the emerging multi-
level governance and collaboration in the Hsinchu city-region. The Governor Forum 
has been established since 2002 as a platform to mediate the jurisdictional conflicts 
between the local governments and Science Park Administration (SPA), but the routine 
meeting hardly cultivates mutual reciprocity, trust and collaborative norms in the 
regional arena due to historical experience. The major motivation for the SPA to initiate 
the Governor Forum is to appease local discontent, so the SPA considers the forum as an 
occasion for ‘social interactions’ (Yen 2011). The local governments see the meeting as 
a platform to negotiate the allocation of the subsidy with the SPA rather than ‘as some 
kind of cooperative forum for promoting regional potentialities, in which all relevant 
stakeholders in the region…meet, negotiate, and decide upon planning policies and 
their implementation’ (Chou 2007, 1398). 
Despite the fact that the local governments have sought cooperation with other 
powerful actors in the Hsinchu city-region since the 2000s, the culture of collaboration 
is in its infancy and the interactions between regional actors are limited to particular 
projects. Whether this kind of collaboration can provide an opportunity to develop 
trust and reciprocity among regional actors, to increase institutional capacity of the 
local governments and to promote the development of spatial governance networks in 
the city-region remains to be observed.
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§ 7.3.3 Spatial Patterns of Industrial Land Development
The governments in these two city-regions see the development of science parks/
campuses as a way to stimulate the development of industrial clusters and try to take 
advantage of cluster effects by providing adequate industrial land. As shown in Figure 
38, most of the industrial sites, including science/technology parks and industrial 
parks, in these two city-regions are located in close proximity to highway exits. 
Nonetheless, the industrial sites in the Eindhoven city-region are relatively smaller in 
size and are more evenly distributed. For example, the average size of the sixty-two 
new proposed industrial sites in the Eindhoven city-region is around 15 hectares and 
the largest one, in Helmond, is 60 hectares (SRE and Provincie Noord-Brabant 2012). 
Regarding existing industrial sites, the biggest industrial site is the Hurk Eindhoven, 
which is 205 hectares and the largest campus (science park) is High Tech Campus, 
which is 103 hectares. But in the Hsinchu city-region, the size of the Hsinchu Science 
Park is 653 hectares and the Hsinchu Industrial Park is 517 hectares. The proposed 
industrial land development projects are always a part of new town development 
projects, such as the TKFP project, which also consist of urban land development for 
housing, commerce and other urban functions. 
The differences may mainly result from their geographical conditions and their 
proactive planning powers to influence land use directly. First, as shown in Figure 38, 
the allocation of spatial developments in the Hsinchu city-region is constrained by its 
hilly terrain. Second, compared to the Taiwanese government, the Dutch government 
has relatively limited proactive powers to implement a land use plan. Dutch public law 
authorises the Dutch municipalities the power of expropriation and pre-emption, but 
they rarely use these proactive powers. In practice, the Dutch municipalities actively 
involve land development activities by purchasing land beforehand. The Taiwanese 
government, in contrast, can not only expropriate private land according to its current 
land value publicly announced by the government, but also conduct zone expropriation 
and urban land consolidation to acquire land for public undertakings, to implement 
national economic policies or to execute the urban planning detail plan. As a result, 
the scale of land development projects in Taiwan tends to be much bigger than in the 
Netherlands (for details please see chapter six).
§ 7.3.4 Remarks
According to the typology I proposed in chapter three (see Table 15), since the end 
of the 2000s the dominant style of high-tech spatial planning and governance in the 
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Eindhoven city-region has shifted from the provider style of framework-based approach 
to the collaboratively framework-based approach, while in the Hsinchu city-region is 
shifting from the provider style of project-based approach to the collaboratively project-
based approach. The comparative analysis shows that the influences of national spatial 
planning systems and of the regional socio-cultural and historical contexts on high-tech 
spatial planning and governance practices of these two city-regions are obvious and 
direct. But this does not mean that they are the only factors. According to the findings in 
chapter four and five, other institutional variables do have effects on the national spatial 
planning systems as well.
The high-tech spatial policies in the Netherlands and Taiwan also create particular 
conditions for high-tech spatial planning and governance in these two city-regions. 
For example, the success of gaining support from the Dutch national government for 
the development of Brainport Eindhoven further encourages the collaborative culture 
in the Eindhoven city-region. The formation of the Hsinchu high-tech city-region is 
derived from the state-led high-tech development, but the development has also 
created a huge institutional barrier to regional governance and spatial planning due to 
the large externalities and the enclave design of the park (for details please see chapter 
six). Additionally, the alternation of national science park policy also triggers local 
governments to seek a more collaborative approach in high-tech spatial development.
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8 Conclusions and Reflections
In the past three decades, numerous high-tech city-regions have emerged with the 
rise of new high-tech industries across the world. Many of them have been specifically 
supported by national technology policies—in developed or developing countries—
implemented to trigger economic growth and to enhance global competitiveness at 
the national and/or city-regional level. These policies have involved the development 
of high-tech spaces—including research science/technology parks, innovation centres, 
science cities, high-tech city-regions, and so on—albeit in different ways. The motivation 
of this research is to understand the role spatial planning and governance has played in 
the development process of a high-tech city-region and to explore how the means and 
practices of spatial planning and governance are shaped by certain institutional factors 
when dealing with spatial issues of high-tech development. This chapter completes 
the research by answering the guiding research questions and by reflecting on the 
comparative study of high-tech spatial planning and directions for future research.
§ 8.1 Main Empirical Findings
This section consists of four subsections. Each of them answers one of the first four 
research questions proposed in chapter one. Together they present the main empirical 
findings of this research. The third and fourth subsections also answer the final research 
question, which is in relation to the identification of major institutional factors that 
shape high-tech spatial planning and governance mechanisms. 
In the first subsection, I present how the principal components of high-tech development 
identified in chapter two are conceptualised by the governments in the two case study 
areas. Then, I outline the major differences between the Dutch and Taiwanese spatial 
planning systems and discuss how the differences relate to the institutional variables 
according to the findings in chapter four and five. The first two subsections provide 
fundamental knowledge to investigate the major factors that shape the forms and means 
of high-tech spatial planning and governance in the two city-regions.
In the third subsection, I summarise the major similarities and differences of the spatial 
mechanisms for high-tech development between the Eindhoven city-region and the 
Hsinchu city-region. Based on the findings of the first subsections, I analyse the major 
institutional factors lead to differences between the two cases. Finally, I sketch out the 
major similarities and differences of high-tech spatial planning and governance approaches 
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between the two case study areas, and discuss the major factors that influence how the 
governments use the system and tools of spatial planning and governance to mobilise 
resources and actors to deal with the spatial issues of high-tech development.
§ 8.1.1 The Principal Components of High-tech Development
In chapter six, I reviewed the provision of the principal components and discussed how 
governments perceive the principal components in the two case study areas. I found 
that the governments in the two cases do try to provide the principal components I 
identified in chapter two, but how they conceptualise the principal components has 
some differences. The most significant differences can be observed through how they 
define the nationally important science park/campus and how they perceive the living 
demands of knowledge workers. 
First, the Dutch national government identifies nationally important science parks as 
‘campuses’, when the parks meet four criteria, including a focus of R&D activities, a 
physical location of high quality firms and research facilities, the presence of manifest 
knowledge carriers, and an open innovation environment. In Taiwan, nationally 
important science parks are all state-led initiatives. An enterprise has to be officially 
approved by the Park Investment Supervisory Committee for establishment in the 
science park. The science park in Taiwan is actually a science-based industrial park 
containing not only R&D activities but also mass production. This implies that the 
innovation models underlying the planning concept of the Dutch and Taiwanese science 
park policies are different, although their core concern is the same. That is, to promote 
R&D activities and enhance innovation capacity.
Second, the governments in the two city-regions both try to provide adequate facilities 
to fit the living demands of knowledge workers, but how they understand these demands 
is different. I take how they perceive the housing demands of knowledge workers as an 
example. The Dutch government acknowledges that the housing needs of knowledge 
workers are part of the regular housing market, but for the Taiwanese government, there 
is a distinction between knowledge workers and local residents regarding the conception 
of living quality. For example, they plan to develop an ‘international village community’ 
catering only to the knowledge workers.
Overall, the comparisons of the two cases have shown that how the government 
conceptualises the principal components may be different from country to country and the 
different conceptualisation will influence both the content of and the mechanisms used to 
implement the policy and strategy. This will be further discussed in the third subsection.
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§ 8.1.2 Factors that Shape Spatial Planning Arenas
In chapter four and five, I have respectively outlined and compared the socio-political 
contexts and spatial planning systems in the Netherlands and Taiwan on the basis of the 
analytical framework built in chapter three. As shown in Table 33, the constellation of 
primary actors and the degree of public participation in the decision-making process of 
spatial planning have strong relations to two institutional variables: the model of society 
and the administration system.
Arena Major Differences Significant Factors
Actor Constellations  – Constellation of primary actors
 – Public participation
 – Model of society
 – Administration system
Action Orientations  – Belongings of land value increment
 – Government’s approaches to take 
 development initiatives
 – The relationship between property 
rights owners and the government
 – Compensation principles
 – Conceptualisation of rights in land
Actor (Government)
Capacities
 – Means to influence land use/ 
 development directly
 – Conceptualisation of rights in land
 – Interaction mode/distribution of power 
in the planning system
 – The way to keep consistency of planning 
policy on all level
 – Administration system
Table 33  
Major Differences of the Dutch and Taiwanese planning arena
The Netherlands is a decentralised unitary state with a multi-party democratic 
system. Important policy-making is based on broad consensus among different levels 
of government and stakeholders. Taiwan is known as a developmental state with a 
hierarchical nature. Although the political system in Taiwan has shifted from a party-
state authoritarianism to a two party democratic system in the past two decades and 
the role of civil society in policy making has been increasing, the legacy of authoritarians 
and economic-oriented policy-making remains in the spatial planning system. It is no 
surprise that the bestemmingsplan (Dutch municipal land use plan) has to be approved 
by municipal council rather than a planning commission as it does in the Taiwanese 
planning system. The planning commission in Taiwan mainly consists of administrative 
officers and experts rather than representatives of local residents. 
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The conceptualisation of rights in land is the most significant institutional variable 
that underlies actors’ action orientations in the process of plan-making, because the 
conceptualisation of rights in land in a country has a strong effect on the institutional 
design of government’s means to influence land use/ development directly and of 
government’s approaches to take development initiatives. This also influences how the 
government and stakeholders measure their benefits and costs when a planning decision 
is made. For example, in the Netherlands land value increment belongs to the property 
owners, because according to the spirit of the Dutch Constitution the landowners owns 
the current and future rights and interests in land. In contrast, equalisation of land rights 
is one of the core values of the Taiwanese Constitution. According to this core value, 
the protection of rights in land should be controlled on the basis of statutory powers. 
If the land value increment does not derive from the application of labour or capital of 
the owners, it should belong to the public. This gives the Taiwanese government more 
proactive powers and room to intervene in land use and land development.
Regarding locus of spatial planning powers, despite the fact that several new planning 
instruments introduced by the new Dutch planning law have increased the planning 
powers of the national and provincial governments, in practice the national and provincial 
governments follow the principle—decentralised if possible, centralised if necessary. 
The principle is in accordance with the root of the Dutch administration system—a 
decentralised unitary state. On the other hand, the spatial planning system in Taiwan 
is very hierarchical and centralised when compared with the Dutch planning system. 
The planning commission at the national level plays a determinant role in the decision-
making of a spatial plan, including the regional plan and the urban planning masterplan. 
The institutional design of the Taiwanese spatial planning system is consistent with the 
unitary and hierarchical nature of its administration system.
§ 8.1.3 Spatial Mechanisms to Enhance High-tech Development
In chapter six, I reviewed and compared the spatial mechanisms to enhance high-tech 
development in the Eindhoven city-region and the Hsinchu city-regions. According to the 
principal components of high-tech development identified in chapter two, I summarise 
the major similarities and differences between the two city-regions in Table 34.
As shown in Table 34, the governments in the two city-regions have been using a range of 
spatial mechanisms to enhance the three principal components, including R&D capital, 
relational capital and human capital, to achieve the goal of high-tech development and 
economic growth. However, two major differences can be recognised in their spatial 
mechanisms. First, the establishment of knowledge institutes and science parks/
campuses in the Netherlands is a result of close collaboration between public and private 
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sectors, but in Taiwan it is a state-led initiative. The Taiwanese central government has 
mastered most of the resources for high-tech development and considers that it holds 
the major responsibility for high-tech development, rather than the local governments. 
This is correlated to the characteristic of a developmental state.
Principal Component Spatial Mechanisms
R&D Capital
Similarity
 – The establishment of knowledge institutes, such as R&D institutes and 
innovation centres/incubators, has been considered as a precondition of 
high-tech development.
Difference
 – Relative roles of the public and private sectors in establishing knowledge 
institutes, especially the role of central government.
Relational 
Capital
Similarity
 – Good internal and external accessibility has been considered as a 
 precondition of high-tech development.
 – The development of science/technology parks has been recognised as 
the most effective spatial mechanism to induce and support clustering of 
high-tech industries.
 – The provision of industrial land in close proximity to existing R&D 
 clusters with good accessibility is strategically important for the 
 government to take the advantage of cluster effects.
Difference
 – Relative roles of the public and private sectors in establishing science 
parks/campuses, especially the functional divisions between different 
levels of government.
 – The conception of science park/campus development
Human Capital
Similarity
 – Special living demands of knowledge workers are taken into 
 consideration, such as international (basic) schools.
Difference  – Government’s perception of the living demands of knowledge workers. 
Table 34  
Comparisons of the spatial mechanisms in the two city-regions
Second, although they both consider science park/campus development as a 
strategically important instrument, which can be a crystallisation point to stimulate 
high-tech industrial clustering in the city-region, the conception of science park/
campus development in the two city-regions is different. In the Eindhoven city-region, 
most of the science parks have been initiated by private sectors or universities since 
1998. The governments put more effort into the ‘campuses’ that have been considered 
as nationally and/or regionally important science parks.
In contrast, in the Hsinchu city-region the development of science parks is mainly a 
government initiative. Except for the on-going initiative of the Taiwan Knowledge-based 
Flagship Park, all of the science park developments in the city-region are state-led, such 
as the HSP and Jhunan Park. The state-led science park developments are actually large-
scale science-based industrial parks consisting of not only R&D activities but also mass 
production. The different conception of science parks/campuses in the two city-regions 
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may result from their different historical roots and their technological capacities when 
the science park/campus policies were formulated. 
The science park development policy in Taiwan was formulated in the late 1970s. At 
that time, the industrial capacity was weak and a national innovation system was not yet 
developed. In fact, there was no firm that could be recognised as ‘high-tech’. Under this 
context, the major mission of the science park development was to promote industrial 
upgrading and ‘leapfrogging’ economic development. It was expedient to establish a 
science-based industrial park consisting of R&D activities and mass production when 
considering the stage of technological development of Taiwan at that time. Since then, 
the prototype of the Taiwanese science park has formed and influenced the trajectory of 
science park development in Taiwan.
On the other hand, in the Eindhoven city-region the first science park, High Tech 
Campus (HTC), was established by Phillips in 1998. At that time, Phillips had been a 
large international firm with high R&D capacity for decades. It relocated all of its R&D 
activities and facilities to the HTC and in 2003 decided to open up the campus to other 
technological companies in order to create an open innovation environment in the 
campus. This has attracted many innovative companies—both large and small—to 
locate in the campus. The success of the HTC has had a huge effect on the conception of 
science parks/campuses in the Eindhoven city-regions, as well as the entire Netherlands, 
and influenced their approach to science park/campus development.  
Through comparisons of the Eindhoven and Hsinchu city-regions, I recognise that the way 
the governments conduct, facilitate and/or support the provision of the spatial elements 
for high-tech development is not only influenced by their socio-political context (e.g. 
model of society and administration system), but also by their historical roots of high-
tech policy formulation, which are in relation to their technological capacities at that 
time. However, one aspect has to be highlighted. Although current and future high-tech 
development trajectories have been shaped by the prior conceptualisation of the spatial 
mechanisms and the correlated development of institutions, the changing context (e.g. 
technological development and socio-political transformation) can possibly intervene 
and rearticulate current conjectures towards a new trajectory. 
In other words, institutional factors and the spatial mechanisms that shape the 
institutional factors are dynamic rather than static. The dynamics can be observed in 
the changing science park policy in Taiwan—from a single technopole strategy to a 
technopolis programme—and the changing role of the national government in science 
park development—from a major promoter to a co-operator (for details please see 
section 6.3).
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§ 8.1.4 Spatial Planning and Governance of High-tech Spatial Development
In chapter seven, two major similarities of the spatial planning and governance practices 
between the two city-regions were identified: the demand for collaboration and the 
creation of new institutional arenas. The local governments in the two city-regions 
tend to play an active role in high-tech spatial developments, but they both recognise 
the necessity to collaborate with other powerful high-tech players (e.g. universities, 
R&D institutes and high-tech firms) to bring necessary resources to accomplish their 
development goals. Their common strategy is to create new institutional arenas for the 
collaboration.
Further, although the high-tech spatial policy styles in the two city-regions both have a 
tendency to shift from the provider style to the collaborative style, their spatial planning 
and governance approaches to high-tech spatial developments are very different. 
I summarise the major differences, their spatial implications and the institutional 
variables relating to the differences in Table 35.
Major Difference Significant Factors Spatial Implications
 – Dominant Style of high-tech 
oriented spatial planning 
(Framework-based vs.  
project-based)
 – Administration system
 – Legal spatial planning system 
(including land management 
system)
 – Planning doctrines (present the 
attributes of a particular planning 
community)
 – The spatial relation between 
each science park/cam-
pus  development and their 
 surroundings
 – Spatial Governance  
Mechanism  
(Open network vs. contract 
network)
 – Dominant spatial planning style
 – Regional culture characteristics
 – Historical experience
 – The capacity of spatial planning to 
anticipate and mediate the spatial 
consequences and effects of a 
high-tech spatial development at 
different scales
Table 35  
High-tech spatial planning and governance of the two cases
The governments in the Eindhoven city-region adopt a framework-based planning 
approach. The governments see the formulation of strategic plans or spatial frameworks 
at different levels and scales as their major planning instrument. The nature of the 
strategic plans and the spatial frameworks is temporally dynamic. They do not intend to 
present an endpoint to be reached. On the contrary, strategic plans or spatial frameworks 
are used as a tool not only to guide, facilitate and coordinate project developments, but 
also to seek and build consensus between stakeholders. 
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In other words, the formulation of the strategic plans and spatial frameworks is a part of 
the process of consensus building. This correlates to the Dutch administrative tradition, 
spatial planning system and doctrines. When formulating policy and making planning 
decisions, collaboration and consensus building/seeking are common practices for 
the governments. On the basis of the framework-based planning approach, the Dutch 
governments tend to see the science parks/campuses and their surroundings as a 
whole and aim to interweave the science parks/campuses with their surrounding urban 
fabric from both a physical and non-physical perspectives. This is very different from the 
‘enclave’ character of Taiwanese science park developments.
The governments in the Hsinchu city-region apply a project-based blueprint approach. 
This is in accordance with the dominant planning style in Taiwan, which has been shaped 
by the Taiwanese centralised planning system and dual land management system. The 
dual land management system makes a clear distinction between urban planning land 
and non-urban land. This has led Taiwanese spatial planning to a fragmented project-
oriented planning approach, by which planning decisions are made case-by-case and 
it is difficult to take the interrelationships among different developmental initiatives 
into considerations. Further, a range of proactive planning powers has been given to 
the governments to implement various development projects on the basis of the legally 
binding urban planning detail plan (for details please see section 5.3). The governments 
and planning authorities are thus inclined to see a spatial plan as an endpoint to be 
reached, a blueprint style of planning. 
Regarding the spatial governance approach, the governments in Eindhoven city-region 
mainly take the systematic clustering approach at municipal level and the open network 
approach at city-region level. The former approach is mainly used to seek and build 
local consensus, while the latter approach is employed to bring powerful players and 
necessary resources into planning arenas to deal with particular spatial issues and to 
achieve certain planning goals. Practice of the open network approach has increased 
the institutional capacity of Eindhoven city-regions in anticipating and mediating the 
spatial consequences and effects of high-tech spatial developments at different scales. 
On the other hand, since the 2000s the governments in the Hsinchu city-region have 
applied the contract network approach in their spatial governance practices. This approach 
is project-based. It links actors through agreements, contracts, or joint ventures based on 
individual bargaining of each particular project. It is obvious that the governance approach 
taken by the governments in the city-region correlates to its dominant planning style. 
Additionally, the particular regional culture characteristics and historical experience of a 
city-region also have effects on the governance approach taken. For example, a regional 
culture of cooperation and trust has existed in the Eindhoven city-region for a long time. 
The emphasis on cooperative culture is not only a strategy to build Brainport identity and 
a way to brand the city-region, but also a core value the governments in the city-region 
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are eager to build and practice in spatial planning and governance activities. Several 
historical events have further encouraged the collaborative culture in the Eindhoven 
city-region, such as the success of gaining support from the EU and the Dutch national 
government for the Stimulus programme in the 1990s and for the development of 
Brainport Eindhoven in the 2000s. The collaborative culture underlies their practice of 
an open network approach.
§ 8.2 Conclusions
In light of the in-depth study of the two city-regions and the conclusions of each chapter, 
three principles and subsequent challenges can be recognised for the development of a 
high-tech city-region, which I summarise in the following sections.
§ 8.2.1 The Provision of the Three Principal Components
Both cases I selected have been recognised as important innovation hot spots not only on 
the national scale but also on the international scale. I have found that the governments 
in these two city-regions both have been aware that the provision of the high-tech spatial 
elements—including universities, R&D institutes, high-tech firms, innovation centres, 
science/technology parks, good accessibility, well-functioning education and training 
systems, and quality of place—is the precondition for high-tech development, but their 
successes rely on synergy between various spatial and aspatial elements of R&D capital, 
relational capital and human capital rather than on physical developments alone. 
Moreover, the conception of the principal components is not static. It may change through 
time and space and be influenced by contemporary technological development and 
dominant discourses about innovation models and high-tech development. I use the 
evolution of the innovation model as an example to explain the dynamic nature of the 
principal components and their spatial implication. As discussed in chapter two, in the 
1960s and 1970s the dominant innovation model was a science push model. At that time, 
it was broadly accepted that scientific and applied research activities could be spatially 
separated from production and diffusion activities. On the basis of the linear innovation 
model, some research parks, science parks and science cities, which only consisted of 
research activities, were established, such as Cambridge Science Park in the UK, Sophia 
Antipolis in France, Tsukuba Science City in Japan, and Deadok Innopolis in Korea.
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Later on, an interactive innovation model was proposed. Innovation in this model is 
understood as a social process of ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by using’ that is based 
on tacit knowledge, a model that emphasises the role of socio-cultural structures and 
the interactions among local firms and institutes in technological development. The 
discourse has underlain the development of technology parks and high-tech city regions. 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, an open innovation model has been introduced. The 
open innovation model addresses the utilisation of not only internal but also external 
knowledge to create value and increase the effectiveness of R&D activities. The model is 
labelled as an open innovation paradigm because there are many ways for ideas to flow 
into the innovation process as well as to flow out into markets through R&D outsourcing, 
licensing or spin-offs. The open innovation discourse has influenced the definition of 
nationally/regionally important science parks in the Netherlands and the Eindhoven 
city-region.
Policy makers and planners need to acknowledge the dynamic nature of the principal 
components and be aware of their spatial implications. Learning lessons from other 
places is important, but a questionable assumption of easy high-tech policy transfer 
should be avoided. The in-depth case study conducted in this research has shown that 
success factors vary between places according to their particular circumstances, which 
are characterised by certain institutional variables, such as cultural attributes, socio-
economic conditions, technology capacity, administration system, policy style, spatial 
planning system and other sectoral policies.
§ 8.2.2 Close Collaboration among Government, Knowledge Institutes and Firms
A wide range of know-how for high-tech development—such as generation of valuable 
knowledge, mastery of technology trends and market dynamics, accessibility to 
international market, production and knowledge networks, and so on—are mastered 
by knowledge institutes and high-tech firms, so it is necessary for the governments 
to collaborate with them in the high-tech development process. The key to building 
tight relationships between the three parties is to seek a common vision, to establish 
mutual trust and to form a collaborative culture by creating opportunities for constant 
cooperation and contact. To develop new institutional arenas is a good strategy. The 
establishment of the Brainport Foundation in the Eindhoven city-region is a good 
example.
However, the creation of new institutional arenas will make possible new alliances 
and realignments of power to influence the decision-making of spatial planning and 
development. Issues related to accountability and social justice may emerge in the new 
governance practices. For example, the Regional Council of the SRE in the Eindhoven 
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city-region is comprised of a representative of each participating municipality and the 
representatives are the burgemeester (mayor) of the municipality or a member of the 
municipal executive board. In the Netherlands, a mayor is appointed by the cabinet and 
the member of the municipal executive board is appointed by the municipal council, 
so the representatives of the municipalities in the regional council are administrators 
rather than elected officials. In view of this, some municipal councillors in the Eindhoven 
city-region doubt the democratic accountability of the SRE and criticise its lack of 
transparency in decision-making, although they identify the achievements of the SRE 
in promoting regional collaboration, lobbying, and so on.18 Similar criticism may be 
directed at the operation of the Brainport Foundation.
In terms of spatial planning and development practices, once the governments decide 
to play an active role in collaborating with other powerful actors (e.g. universities, high-
tech firms, etc.) to develop high-tech spaces, two other issues may emerge. First, there 
are risks in the development process and expected (financial) surplus when land is 
developed. How to manage the risks and reasonably share the benefits and costs with the 
other actors is a practical question for the governments. Second, if the governments and 
the powerful actors decide to develop the high-tech space together, they may work ‘hand 
in glove’ for mutual benefits and corporatism may develop due to the tight relationship. 
This may influence the fairness of planning decision-making. Some decisions may be 
made at the expense of local society, the environment or certain individual rights. 
The development project of the Taiwan Knowledge-based Flagship Park (TKFP) in 
the Hsinchu city-region provides an example of this situation. In this case, the local 
government is cooperating with the National Chiaotung University. They reached an 
agreement that the university is responsible for the planning funds and gaining support 
from national government and high-tech industry. In return, the local government has 
to allocate campus land to the university for free after zone expropriation. The initiative 
is not proceeding smoothly through the legal procedure of the planning system at the 
national level. One of the reasons is that people criticise the intention of the university 
and consider that as a national university they should pay attention to research and 
education rather than to gaining profits from land development. 
18 In 2010 Daniëlle van Lith, a municipal councillor in the Eindhoven city-region, criticised the direct 
accountability and a lack of transparency of the SRE in decision-making in the VNG Magazine. VNG is an 
association of the Dutch municipalities. It works as a platform for the Dutch municipalities. (http://www.
vngmagazine.nl/weblog/706/hoera-afschaffing-van-de-wgr ; accessed in November 2012)
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In short, when the governments try to cooperate with other powerful actors to achieve 
the goals of a high-tech spatial development, it is crucial to consider whether the 
decision making process is transparent and accountable, and meets the principles of 
social justice. The effectiveness and efficiency of the high-tech spatial planning and 
development should not be the only concerns. The governments should keep social 
and spatial justice in mind and seek to achieve a fairer distribution of side effects of the 
development and safeguard the public/civic interests at the same time.
§ 8.2.3 To Anticipate and Monitor the Externalities of High-tech Development
The provision of the high-tech spatial elements has spatial effects on the surrounding 
areas, such as traffic congestion, a shortage of local public facilities, imbalance between 
land supply and demand for housing and/or industrial land, and so on. In order to reduce 
the unintentional spatial impacts, it is necessary to anticipate and monitor continuously 
the externalities of the high-tech development from a more comprehensive perspective.
I summarise the spatial effects of the Dutch and Taiwanese high-tech spatial 
developments in Table 36 as an example to demonstrate the possible externalities 
of high-tech development. Learning from the two case study areas, I have found that 
although the Dutch and Taiwanese governments take different approaches to science 
park/campus development, they both encounter the issue of potentially oversupplying 
high-tech industrial land at the national level. In the Netherlands, from 2009 to 2012, 
the number of campus developments and initiatives rapidly increased from 55 to 74, but 
eleven of them will not be realised due to the impact of the Eurozone crisis. In Taiwan, 
following the success of the HSP development, many local governments have asked for 
the development of a national science park. As of 2012, another eight science parks have 
been established, three are in the developing stage and one is in the planning stage.
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The Netherlands Taiwan
Major Attributes/
Differences
 – Identification of national importance 
(area-based and selective)
 – Cluster approach on the basis of 
campus development, but the major 
responsibility is on the provinces and 
municipalities
 – State-led science park development 
(technopole planning)
 – The state has control over most of the 
resources for high-tech development
 – Cluster approach on the basis of 
 national science park development with 
an ‘enclave’ characteristic 
Outcomes Positive
 – Efficient allocation of resources accor-
ding to local conditions
 – Encouraging inter-municipal collabo-
ration
Positive
 – Effective integration of resources
 – The provision of highly efficient busi-
ness environment for high-tech firms
Negative
 – Municipalities in the Eindhoven city-re-
gion are facing a heavy financial burden 
in developing industrial sites
Negative
 – Operational fund of the Science Park is 
facing a heavy financial burden 
 – A separation of spatial governance 
hinders regional collaboration
Spatial Effects at 
National Level
 – A rapid increase of campus develop-
ments and initiatives, but some of them 
will not be realised
 – A mushroom growth of science park 
development around Taiwan.
 – An oversupply of high-tech industrial 
land
Spatial Effects at 
Regional Level
 – Polycentric industrial clustering pattern 
 – The success of High Tech Campus has 
led to a mushroom growth of science 
park/campus developments in the 
core area
 – A huge oversupply of industrial land in 
the city-region
 – Monocentric industrial clustering 
pattern
 – A rapid increase in population has crea-
ted enormous pressure for the supply of 
housing and public facilities
 – Urban sprawl
Table 36  
Dutch and Taiwanese high-tech spatial developments
At the city-regional level, the situation is different in the two city-regions. In the 
Eindhoven city-region, after the success of High Tech Campus, six science parks/
campuses have been established or are in the planning stage, since the late 2000s. 
In addition to the science park/campus development, there is a serious issue of 
oversupplying industrial land. This has caused many of the municipalities in the city-
region to face a heavy financial burden. In contrast, the success of the HSP development 
has led to a rapid increase in population and created enormous pressure for the supply of 
housing and public facilities in the Hsinchu city-region. But the local governments could 
not provide adequate land to meet local housing demand in time due to the centralised 
spatial planning system. Besides, there is no proper planning instrument to manage the 
non-urban land. As a result, the rapid growth has led to a severe urban sprawl issue in 
the city-region. 
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One successful instance of a high-tech spatial development may lead to a mushroom 
growth of science park developments and result in an oversupplying of land. Policy 
makers and planners have to be aware of the possible spatial consequences. On the 
other hand, both cases have shown that the issue of imbalance between land supply 
and demand for housing and/or industrial land may have been embedded in the spatial 
planning systems for a long time. So some people may argue that high-tech development 
is merely a trigger of this deeply rooted issue. Nevertheless, the way the governments 
use spatial planning instruments also has effects on the result. It is crucial to learn from 
the experience and anticipate the unintentional spatial effects.
§ 8.3 Methodological Reflections
Methodology has been the key issue in this research. Because I consider that high-tech 
development has been a global phenomenon for decades, a global view was necessary 
for this research. This was the reason I selected two case study areas respectively located 
in Europe and Asia. When considering the issues of policy transfer and lesson-drawing, 
I decided to conduct a comparative study in order to investigate the major factors that 
shape the spatial mechanisms for high-tech development and learn from the cases in 
a more cautious way. The main question became how to establish a generic analytical 
framework to expose the factors systematically and learn from the comparisons. 
The general framework for institutional analysis proposed by Ostrom provided a very 
comprehensive and operational foundation for me to develop the generic comparative 
framework, which consists of a set of institutional variables according to previous 
comparative research of spatial planning systems and practices. Several typologies and 
categorisations in relation to the institutional variables, such as welfare state regimes, 
policy styles, planning instruments, and so on, are employed to describe better and 
compare the particular socio-political contexts and planning systems of the two case 
study areas. After conducting the whole research, I now make some reflections on the 
value of comparative research and the analytical frameworks established in this research 
in the following sections.
§ 8.3.1 Restating the Value of Comparative Research
It is not appropriate to expect that good practices and policies of a particular place can be 
directly transferred to other places and have the same effect. The value of comparative 
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research is to help learn from other cases in a more cautious way. For example, the 
introduction of framework-based collaborative planning may help the governments 
in the Hsinchu city-region deal with the large externalities of the HSP development, 
effectively guide spatial development and curb urban sprawl. But it is difficult to 
encourage the local governments to apply the framework-based planning style due to 
two interrelated institutional constraints—the dual land management system and the 
highly centralised planning system. 
The dual land system has two different types of land use and control systems—urban 
planning system and non-urban land system. There is no adequate mechanism to 
manage the development in the non-urban areas. In order to have better management, 
it is common for the local governments to change the non-urban land to urban planning 
land through initiating new urban development projects. But the local governments 
often need to spend more than ten years to complete the legal procedure, so in order 
to strive for timeliness the local governments are eager to submit draft plans to 
the legal procedure but not to seek consensus and anticipate the externalities and 
interrelationships between projects beforehand. 
Further, in the legal planning procedure the national government plays a determinate 
role and its planning decisions are made case-by-case at a distance. This is also unlikely 
to encourage local governments to adopt the framework-based planning approach. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the local governments in the Hsinchu city-region 
can never adopt the framework-based approach. I only want to point out that the support 
of the national government for the adoption is crucial in Taiwan. 
Specifically, it is necessary to identify the implicit assumptions and institutional factors 
that shape a particular planning system but are often taken for granted, in order to draw 
lessons from other countries and find a way to improve the system. This shows another 
value of the comparative research. That is, to increase mutual understanding between 
the scholars, planners and policy makers of studied countries and create a platform 
for them to exchange their knowledge and experiences. I hope that the result of this 
research can inspire Dutch and Taiwanese scholars and practitioners in the field of 
spatial planning to learn from each other and to reflect on their planning practices.
§ 8.3.2 Reflections on the Analytical Frameworks
The concept of multiple institutional layers identified by Ostrom was particularly useful 
for this research (see Figure 4 in section 1.4.2 B and Figure 14 in section 3.1). This had 
led me to explore systematically the major institutional variables that may have effects 
on spatial planning systems and practices. Together with the analytical framework I 
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established in chapter three (see Table 11 in section 3.3.2)—which was mainly based 
on the general framework for institutional analysis introduced by Ostrom and the actor-
centred institutional framework proposed by Scharpf—in chapter five I investigated the 
major institutional factors that have shaped the action situations of spatial planning. On 
the basis of this, I explored how the practice of high-tech spatial planning and governance 
in relation to the particular action situations of spatial planning in the two city-regions 
in chapter seven. The findings have shown that the concepts of institutionalism are very 
useful for the establishment of a generic framework that is not tied to a specific place or 
case.
However, the frameworks of institutional analysis I established on the basis of the 
institutional concepts of Ostrom and Scharpf implied a temporarily fixed situation for 
analysis. While this created an easier situation for analysis, it was difficult to use the 
frameworks to investigate and explain the dynamic interrelationships between the 
changing institutional contexts and decision-making regarding high-tech spatial 
planning at a specific place and time. Further, institutional factors were often interrelated 
and it was hard to clarify the causality. For this reason I adopted a diachronic approach to 
complement the empirical study in part three, in order to understand the influences of 
prior institutional development and specific episodes on later policy/decision-making 
and action-taking. 
In short, the analytical frameworks built upon Ostrom’s and Scharpf’s frameworks 
worked well in the comparative study of this research. But in the future if other studies 
consider applying the frameworks from this research, the effect of historical path 
dependency has to be taken into consideration.
§ 8.4 Directions for Future Research
In this research, I fill a gap between the high-tech development and spatial planning 
literature by exploring the spatial effects of high-tech development and the role that 
spatial planning may play in the high-tech development process through an in-depth 
comparative study of the Eindhoven city-region in the Netherlands and the Hsinchu 
city-region in Taiwan. Despite the fact that this research contributes to knowledge 
development in the field of high-tech development and spatial planning, a wide scope of 
issues still needs to be explored further. In view of the challenges that I have addressed 
in section 8.2, giving priority to understanding the critical issues for the spatial effects 
of high-tech development would deepen understanding of high-tech development 
and its wider implications, but also of the nature and operation of spatial planning and 
governance. I present those issues in the following sections.
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Role of the government in developing a science/technology park
It is a dilemma for governments regarding the balance of land supply and demand for 
science/technology park development, which has been seen as one of the most effective 
instruments for pursuing high-tech development. However, science/technology park 
development is unlikely to bear fruit in the short term, but rather taking as long as two or 
three decades. In the development process, the timing and growth pattern of science/
technology park development will be influenced by many internal and external variables, 
such as historical development of technological capacities, the wider economic cycle, 
and so on. 
In some places and times, governments may need to play a more leading role to conduct 
or facilitate the development, for example, when there is no other existing powerful high-
tech actor, as the Taiwanese government faced in the 1970s, or there is an economic 
downturn, as the Dutch government has been facing since the Eurozone crisis. Based 
on this understanding, two more questions are raised. First, what role should the 
governments play in developing a science/technology park in different circumstances? 
Second, if the governments need to play a leading role, how do they conduct or facilitate 
the development of a science/technology park and manage the risks following the 
development at the same time?
Governance mechanisms of high-tech spatial developments
Following the two questions regarding the role of government in developing a science/
technology park, broader issues in relation to the governance mechanisms of high-
tech spatial developments appear. As shown in this research, there is a demand for the 
government to consider how to collaborate with various public and private agencies 
and govern the complex relations among them when realising a high-tech spatial 
development project in a particular place. A range of governance mechanisms may be 
developed according to specific regional/local circumstances. This raises two major 
questions regarding the institutional design of governance mechanisms. 
The first is how to develop governance mechanisms that can increase the ‘institutional 
capacity’ of the particular place—which link to the generation of knowledge resources 
(intellectual capital), network resources (social capital) and power base (political 
capital) in the governance process. This capacity is expected to be helpful for promoting 
regional/local potentialities, coordinating different interests and overcoming future 
challenges of high-tech development. At the same time, another important question 
has to be considered. That is, how to seek for achieving a fairer distribution of side effects 
of a high-tech spatial development and safeguarding the public/civic interests at the 
same time. This involves issues of power relations, social justice and accountability of 
the institutional design, which are worthy of further investigation.
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Wider generalisations about high-tech development and its implications
In this research, I have examined in detail cases in the Netherlands and Taiwan, which 
respectively present two different high-tech development modes. The research results 
have shown the dynamic nature of the principal components of high-tech development. 
The value of comparative research is significant, but in a small-scale comparative 
study it is difficult to make wider generalisations. Furthermore, the research results 
highly depend on the case selection, because the comparisons are made in a relative 
sense between the two cases. Therefore, comparative studies looking at more cases in 
different countries are needed. I expect that more cases can be studied, compared and 
generalised on the basis of the comparative frameworks of this research. More general 
conclusions regarding the nature of high-tech development and its wider implications 
can be drawn in the future.
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A I A List of Interviewees
Eindhoven City-region
Sector Unite Position Name Date
Government SRE Senior Advisor of Spatial and Hou-
sing Policy; Programme Manager of 
Brainport Avenue
J.A. Jean van 
Zeeland
2012-02-15 
2012-11-14  
(Eindhoven) 
Gemeente Eindhoven Senior Urban Designer Cees Donkers 2011-11-24  
(Eindhoven)
Gemeente Eindhoven Programme Manager of Spoorzone Jos Roijmans 2012-03-01  
(Eindhoven)
Gemeente Eindhoven Programme Manager of Landelijk 
Strijp
Gerwin van Eert 2012-05-24  
(Eindhoven)
Gemeente Veldhoven Strategic Policy Advisor Marjan van den 
Hoogenhof 
2012-05-29  
(Veldhoven)
Regional 
Devel-opment 
Company
Brainport Develop-
ment NV
Manager of Strategy and Public 
Affairs
Edgar van Leest 2012-05-29  
 (Eindhoven)
2012-12-07 (E-mail)
Science Park High Tech Campus Manager of Business Development 
& Communication
Bert-Jan  
Woertman
2012-05-23  
(Eindhoven)
Hsinchu City-region
Sector Unite Position Name Date
Government Science Park Adminis-
tration
Director General Tzong-Ming YEN 2011-10-13  
(Hsinchu City)
Hsinchu City Gover-
nment
Deputy Director of Department of 
Urban Development
Chun-Yu WEI 2011-10-17  
(Hsinchu City)
Ex-director of Depart-ment of Urban 
Development (2002.01-2010.01)
Chiu-Jung 
HUANG
2011-10-11  
(Hsinchu County)
Ex-director of Depart-ment of Urban 
Development (2000.01-2002.01)
Charles Ching-
Rong LIN
2011-09-22  
(Tainan City)
Hsinchu County Gover-
nment
Director of Department of Internati-
onal Economic Development
Sian-Sheng LIN 2011-10-12  
(Hsin-chu County)
Deputy Director of Department of 
Interna-tional Economic Develop-
ment
Wei-Chih CHEN 2011-10-11  
(Hsinchu County)
Secretary of the Hsinchu County 
Chief Executive Office
Yu-Chao WU 2011-10-12  
(Hsinchu County)
Industry Hermes-Epitek Corp 
(located in the HSP)
General Manager of Hermes-Epitek 
Corp; Vice President of Taiwan IC 
Committee Board
Chin-Yung SHU 2011-10-13  
(Hsinchu City)
University National Chio-Tung 
University (NCTU)
Coordinator of Puyu Development 
Plan and New Campus Force, NCTU
Chien-Cheng LIN 2011-10-17  
(Hsinchu County)
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Sector Unite Position Name Date
Other Urban Planning 
Committee, Ministry of 
Interior
Professor of Graduate Institute of 
Urban Planning, National Taipei 
University
Tsu-Lung CHOU 2011-09-28  
(Taipei City)
Planning Consultant Coordinator of Taiwan Know-
ledge-based Flagship Park Project 
(Puyu Plan) since 2000
Zi-Yao LI 2011-09-29  
(Taipei City)
Local Social Organi-
sation
Chairman of Jhu-Bei Puyu Self-help 
Association
Chin-Jung 
TSENG
2011-10-17 (Hsinchu 
County)
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Curriculum Vitae
Wei-Ju Huang was born in Taiwan. From 1997 until 2001 she studied urban planning at 
National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan. After obtaining her Master of Urban Design 
degree in 2003 from Pratt Institute in New York City, she worked for Tainan City Hall and 
Metropolitan Consultants Inc. in Taiwan until 2007. Metropolitan Consultants Inc. is 
one of the leading urban planning and design companies in Taiwan, where she had the 
chance to manage several significant planning and design projects. Her work experience 
has not only given her considerable expertise in the practice of urban planning and 
design, but also has led her to understand better the challenges facing Taiwanese cities 
and the limitations of planners and designers. 
In light of this understanding, she decided to devote herself to exploring sophisticated 
approaches to help urban planners and designers deal with contemporary spatial 
planning issues. She started her PhD research at the Spatial Planning and Strategy Chair 
of the Urbanism Department, Delft University of Technology in 2009. During the four-
year research period, she engaged in teaching and organisation activities in the chair, 
but also disseminated her research results through academic meetings, congresses 
and academic journals. She has been awarded several scholarships to support the PhD 
research, including 2009 DELTA / NTIO Joint Environmental Scholarship from the Delta 
Electronics Foundation, 2010 MOE Scholarship for Doctoral Program from the Ministry 
of Education, R.O.C., and 2012 Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship from the Chiang Ching-
kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange.
Her experiences in the United States, Taiwan, and the Netherlands have provided the 
opportunity to recognise how different spatial planning and urban design systems 
shape the planning practices and spatial organisation of particular places.  She has also 
cultivated her abilities to understand and adapt to different institutions and cultures, and 
to communicate and cooperate with people from different countries. This multinational 
experience has been invaluable and forms the core of her research interests.
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